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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores how adolescent women see the risk of contracting AIDS in 
heterosexual relationships, 'how' in terms of viewpoints but also of the processes in 
which these viewpoints are constructed. The thesis is based on sociological theories of 
'health' and 'risk' and sociological critiques of the scientific approach to 'risk' adopted 
by health promotion. The thesis draws on focus groups data gathered in twenty-four 
group meetings with adolescent women from a big city of the South of Brazil. The 
thesis develops the argument that 'sexual risk' in general and 'HIV/AIDS sexual risk' 
in particular are epistemological constructs, for 'risk' is not an event 'per se', but an 
event constructed through knowledge. The thesis assumes that it is important to 
investigate the many layers of knowledge that underpin adolescent women's 
conceptions of 'sexual risk' because this provides information about what they mean 
by that and how those meanings are constructed. 
The thesis challenges health promotion's idea that adolescent women's practice of 
'unsafe sex' is the result of ignorance or incorrect perception of the risks of sex. The 
thesis demonstrates that adolescent women are very good learners of health 
promotion's messages on 'safe sex'. They know the risks and the available self-
protection strategies. They also know that it is their responsibility to take care of 
themselves and how important this is in a social environment that is continuously 
risky. The thesis argues that although sexual risk assessment is an operation influenced 
by a number of knowledges, health promotion's knowledge is the most influential of 
all. To learn the lessons of health promotion discourses on 'choice' implies to invest in 
'self-governance'. The thesis concludes that this ideal of self-governance underpins 
adolescent women's conceptions of risky/safe sex and that it produces conceptions of 
risky/safe sex that are distinct from those used by health promoters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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Is it not true that no adolescent would ever choose to be infected by the HIV virus? Is it 
not true that we have so frequently told adolescents about the risks of unprotected sex? 
Is it not true that nearly every adolescent has a reasonable knowledge of the sexual 
means of HIV transmission and strategies of self-protection? Is it not true that health 
authorities have invested a lot of money and effort in educational campaigns and 
programs aiming at informing those who are not sufficiently well informed or not 
convinced about the risks? Is it not true that health researchers have long been doing 
their best to advance their understandings of the HIV I AIDS problem and to 
communicate their findings to adolescents? Is it not true that health professionals, 
teachers, community workers have tried everything to raise adolescents' awareness of 
the continuing growth of the HIV I AIDS epidemic? 
'So, why do adolescents insist in turning their backs to our knowledge of the risks?' 
Probably because they think they are invulnerable to the HIV I AIDS risk. Maybe it is a 
lack of maturity. Probably because they do not understand the information. Maybe 
because they like to take risks. Probably because they are unrealistically optimist. 
Maybe because condoms are not easily accessible. 
Questions and answers such as these were a source of constant anxiety for me in my 
time as a nursing student, a nurse, a nursing teacher and a health promoter. Similarly to 
other health professionals, I had been taught that adolescents were special; that we 
should give them special attention because they were young and youngsters were 
different from adults in their responses to the risks of sex. And so, like others, I 
embarked on a sort of mission to 'save' adolescents from the risk of catching 
HIV I AIDS by telling them what to do to save themselves. To achieve that I invested in 
two main tasks: to teach future nurses my knowledge of the problem and of its 
solutions and to work as a health promoter directly with communities, in particular 
with adolescents. 
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In spite of my efforts and apart from the little empirical data on the effectiveness of my 
information-giving activities, I could never see the efficacy of my work. Sexual risk-
taking or sexual risk-protection are not situations that can be externally assessed. I had 
just one real clue about whether or not my work was contributing to promote 
adolescents' health, specifically in the case of HIV/AIDS prevention. The clue was 
that, unfortunately, the percentage of HIV positive young people in Brazil was 
increasing, most ofthem infected via sexual intercourse (Brasil 2000a). 
In spite of the frustrations, I continued repeating the same messages to my audiences 
for some time: that adolescents were especially at risk, that adolescents needed to know 
how to take care of themselves and that doctors, nurses and teachers are the ones who 
could help adolescents to do that. I could not see any other way of doing health 
education differently from teaching my knowledge (let's say other's knowledge that I 
took as mine) about the risks of unprotected sex. Moreover, I could not see any other 
way of explaining to my nursing students the risky sexual behaviour of adolescents 
than saying that they tended to be careless. 
It was, however, not possible to continue to be passive to all that. I had too easily 
accepted other's discourses. I had to find other answers to my questions. The answers I 
had were not satisfactory at all. They were too simplistic. They seemed to show that 
adolescents were not able to think rationally, at least in a consistent way, about the 
risks of sex. And if that were true, would it help to continue appealing for their 
rationality? I felt that there was a gap between their and our ways of thinking. I got the 
feeling that we did not understand each other. 
My professional and moral commitments stimulated a search for my own knowledge 
about the question of adolescents' sexual risk behaviour. With that in mind I decided to 
invest in a doctoral course where I could expand my 'reduced' knowledge about health 
promotion and health education, and question with more 'authority' my own and 
others' beliefs about the origin of the problem of adolescents' HIV/AIDS sexual risk-
taking. 
I had three main motivations to choose 'girls' as my research subjects. As in other 
countries, we have witnessed in Brazil the heterosexualization of the HIV I AIDS 
epidemic, with a continuing increase of the rates of women's infection (see Appendix 
10 
I, page 220). In 1986 only 3% of all AIDS cases were attributed to heterosexual 
transmission. By 1997 this figure increased to 28%, which is equivalent to 56% of the 
AIDS cases attributed to sexual transmission. Also, in 1985 there were 25 male cases 
to 1 female case, whereas in 1998 the ratio reached 2:1 (BrasiI2000b). The production 
of knowledge about young women's responses to the HIV/AIDS sexual risk should 
then illuminate health promotion's approach and understanding of the problem. 
A second motivation was that since I started my career in higher education and as a 
nursing teacher. I had always worked in the context of adolescents' health promotion. 
By focusing my doctoral research on 'girls' I would have then the opportunity to use 
my own experience and to meet my personal professional interests. The knowledge 
produced with my research could help my own practice as a health promoter and in the 
training of nurses to be health promoters. 
The third motivation was that I wanted to listen to girls' own accounts of sexual risk-
taking, for I was tired of listening and repeating what others thought of it. With my 
work I could make 'girls' visible, for as subjects they have been neglected both in 
discourses on adolescence and those about the risks of sex. Unconsciously I was, 
perhaps, also seeking responses to personal dilemmas concerning the health and sex 
education of my adolescent daughters. 
Gender blindness is a common feature of studies and theories about the 'problem' of 
adolescents' sexual risk-taking. As some have argued, apart from the consideration of 
their biological differences, 'adolescents' (or the group of 'teens') are usually treated as 
a 'risk-group', a category of similar 'risk subjects' who occupy similar positions within 
the social and cultural milieu (Frankenberg 1992; Wyn and White 1997). That has been 
the case with research on adolescents' sexual risk behaviour. Most of what we now 
know about adolescent women's responses to the risks of sex has been produced by 
such studies. The emphasis on the psychological construction of adolescents' sexual 
risk behaviours has led researchers to mistakenly treat boys and girls as if both 
experienced sex within the same structural conditions. 1 
1 See for example Hingson and Strunin 1992; Meitzler, Noell, and Biglan 1992; Moore and Rosenthal 
1991. 
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The idea that adolescence is an undifferentiated expenence has its roots in 
psychological theories of human development. The 'youth' paradigm developed within 
this framework conceptualizes 'adolescence' as a universal phase of human life that is 
constituted by developmental stages (mental, physical, psychological). These stages are 
seen as comprising developmental tasks that must be completed by young people 
during their 'growing up' process if they are to become 'normal' adults. The idea that 
to be an adolescent is to be in the process of 'becoming adult' confers great 
significance to adolescence and creates a stereotypical notion of adolescence as a 
dangerous time (Wyn and White 1997). Adolescence is seen as a period in which the 
emphasis on experimentation and identity construction exposes individuals to a climate 
of uncertainties and potential risks. Adolescents are expected to " ... make rational 
choices about their future identity, 'trying on' a number of personae before finding 
their appropriate place in the social order" (Wyn and White 1997, p.53). The youth 
paradigm conceives the 'adolescent self as a 'self that exists independently from 
social circumstances. It is a 'self that is there to be found and developed during 
adolescence and that once found and developed will be the same throughout one's life. 
This assumption leads to the idea that adolescents have essential characteristics that 
make them different from adults (Wyn and White 1997). It is during such a crucial 
period that by making the 'wrong' choices young people may become deviants (from 
the mainstream), which will spoil the whole process of becoming a 'normal' adult. 
The premise that 'youth' is the 'at risk' generation seems to emerge from that. The 
assumption that in every adolescent there is a 'self that can be corrupted by the social 
before being 'appropriately' shaped is used to argue for the vulnerability of young 
people (Wyn and White 1997). To be 'at risk' is seen as a perennial status; a status that 
will endure until the entrance into adulthood. The widespread use of theories of youth 
development in the problematising of adolescence has resulted in a frequent 
association of risk-taking with youth delinquency and anti-social behaviour. "From this 
perspective [ ... J, 'risk-taking' is a term that describes behaviour that is defined as 
unconventional by professionals" (Wyn and White 1997, p.68), and thus needs 
correction. In this paradigm the only differentiation accepted within this single entity of 
youth is the one that separates the 'normal' from the 'deviants' (Wyn and White 1997). 
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While 'girls' seem to have been forgotten in many discourses on adolescence, 
apparently they have a place within discourses that associate 'adolescent women' with 
'sexual risks', in particular 'HIV/AIDS risk'. The emergence of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic brought with it the notion of heterosexual woman as a 'risk identity', either 
as a 'risk subject' (the HIV/AIDS victims) or 'risk object' (the HIV/AIDS carrier). 
Like adult women, 'girls' have been included in the monolithic biomedical categories 
of those 'at HIV/AIDS risk' and not 'at HIV/AIDS risk', depending on the 
classificatory system employed (Treichler 1988). Despite the visibility of women in 
AIDS discourses since the earlier stages of the epidemic, it was not until recently that 
the specific effects of HIV I AIDS on women have become recognized (Richardson 
1996). The emergence of "heterosexual AIDS" (Goma 1996, p.5), until then 
recognized as predominantly a homosexual disease, brought about a shift of focus. It 
was not possible to see the disease as confined to the gay community anymore; it 
became obvious that the spectrum of the epidemic was much broader than that. The 
biomedical message was that everyone was equally at risk of contracting HIV I AIDS, 
including 'ordinary' heterosexual men and women (Goma 1996). With the 
'unexpected' increase in the rates of the heterosexual transmission of the HIV virus 
heterosexual women began to be seen as 'risk subjects'. 
If, on the one hand, the 'heterosexualization' of AIDS has had the advantage of 
including 'ordinary' woman (Goma 1996), on the other, its inclusiveness has not 
resulted in the acknowledgment of the specific conditions of women's exposure to the 
risks of heterosexual sex, above all in biomedical discourses. On the contrary, it has 
served to reaffirm the normality of heterosexuality and heterosexual sex. It is often the 
case that heterosexual women contract AIDS from infected men during sexual 
intercourse (BrasiI2000a). This implies a logical association between men, women and 
AIDS. But, the connection heterosexuality-AIDS does not emphasize women's 
position; it is focused on "the safety of notions of heterosexuality" (Goma 1996, p.5). 
The predominant representation of HI VIA IDS as a 'problem of deviants' posits female 
heterosexual sex as risky if and only if it does not follow the socially accepted norms 
of the institution of heterosexuality (for instance, sex outside marriage, sex for 
pleasure, or sexual practices not limited to vaginal intercourse). This constructs a very 
specific notion of heterosexual woman 'at risk': the one who does not practice the 
socially accepted and 'normal' heterosexual sex (Richardson 1996). 
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Even though 'women' are represented in the discourses on heterosexual HIV/AIDS, 
the emphasis on normative assumptions about sexuality and 'normal' heterosexual 
behaviour have resulted in a sort of 'gender blindness' concerning the different risk 
positions occupied by women and men in the context of heterosexual sex. Both adult 
and young women occupy similar spaces of power in the biomedical discourses of 
sexual risks (which locate the feminine in the same position as the masculine subject). 
For women, however, these are 'unreal' positions or positions that in real life are 
actually not available to them (Jones 1993). Women's "presumed power" in sexual 
encounters with men is no more than "an apparent or potential power" (Browne and 
Minichiello 1994, p.248, authors' emphasis). 
"Heterosexual AIDS serves more to obscure women than to reveal the reality and 
potential of the crisis facing women; it shifts attention from the complexities of 
individual women to the bland, massed ranks of heterosexuals" (Gorna 1996, p.5). In 
this sense, the term 'heterosexuals' is misleading, for it is women who have more often 
been contaminated through heterosexual sex (Treichler 1988). Contradictorily enough, 
even when women gain a very visible position in the heterosexual AIDS discourses, 
the term 'heterosexual' continue to be misleading. I am referring to the specific 
discourses of AIDS prevention from which heterosexual men are virtually excluded. 
When it comes to promoting heterosexuals' protection against HIV/AIDS, the targets 
of health education are invariably heterosexual women who are to be the caretakers of 
themselves and also of their male partners (Petersen and Lupton 1996). The 
inclusiveness of discourses on heterosexual AIDS is then 'softened' when 
responsibility for risk prevention is 'the' message. 
The point I have tried to make in the paragraphs above is that of the invisibility of 
'girls' within both the discourse of adolescence and of the risks of sex. This is 
important because it highlights the empty space that my thesis intends to occupy. The 
relevance of improving our empirical knowledge of girls' experiences and ideas about 
the risks of sex is that it may provide elements for the development of an 
understanding of what risky/safe sex means to them, why it has such meanings and 
how these meanings are constructed. I am convinced that there is no better way of 
starting a theory on girls' sexual risk behaviour than to analyse the process by which 
they are made 'risk subjects'. 
14 
I started my doctoral course with all the expectations registered above in what I have 
meant to be the autobiography of my research question (Miller 1995). The question 
became defined as 'how do adolescent women see the personal risk of catching 
HIV I AIDS in heterosexual relationships?' . My ultimate goal was to produce 
knowledge with which I could question the theories of health promotion concerning 
adolescent women's sexual risk-taking. 
The more I studied health promotion theories, especially those in the context of 
HIV I AIDS, the more it became clear that their emphasis was on risk discourses. As we 
will see in this thesis, the use of the notion of risk in health promotion's discourses has 
been criticized by sociologists. It is argued that in health promotion's discourses of risk 
is embedded the individualistic idea that we are able and have the moral obligation to 
protect ourselves against health-related risks by making the healthiest choices possible 
[Lupton, 1995 #439; Petersen, 1996 #347]. The critiques emphasize that this type of 
discourse ignores the social factors that constrain choice, so that it is not always 
possible to make the healthiest choice. They also point out that 'the healthiest choice' 
does not mean the same to everyone. 
With the help of sociological theories on risk I will argue throughout this thesis that the 
contributions of my study on adolescent women's ways of seeing the HIV I AIDS sexual 
risk are not limited to the context of HIV I AIDS prevention. More fundamentally, my 
work contributes to the re-thinking of the project of health promotion as a whole. The 
thesis will show that, as opposed to what health promoters seem to think, the risk 
lessons taught by health promoters to adolescent women are very wellieamed; but that 
what adolescent women make of those lessons is not always congruent with health 
promoters' intentions. In that sense it will be argued that risk meanings are dependent 
on knowledge and that, although influential, health promotion is not the only 
institution that shapes the knowledge background employed by adolescent women to 
make sense of 'risk'. 
Strikingly, while I started my research with the idea of developing a theory about the 
participants' ways of seeing their personal risk of catching HIV/AIDS via sex, the data 
collection process did not follow the direction originally planned. Actually, only a 
small proportion of the data gathered was specifically related to 'HIV/AIDS sexual 
risk'. Most frequently conversations about HIV/AIDS risk did not remain focused on 
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the theme for long. This seems to suggest that my decisions with regard to 
methodology as well as its underpinning assumptions had a major impact on data. 
From the beginning, it was assumed that if I was to explore the participants' 
viewpoints on HIV / AIDS sexual and their epistemological nature, the data collection 
process should provide as much space as possible for the participants to articulate and 
express those viewpoints. So, from the beginning, the method employed in the data 
collection was intended to be as open as possible to the participants' guidance. A 
theoretical standpoint was behind this methodological option, which was the 
assumption that risk meanings are dependent on the sociocultural context. So, to find 
out about 'ways of seeing' the risk of being infected by the HIV virus in heterosexual 
relationships it should also be necessary to open the research to other matters like the 
meanings attached to sex and all other related meanings that are in one way or another 
incorporated in the general context where sex is to be experienced. In the end, the data 
gathered and the theory developed from it was not focused on HIV / AIDS sexual risk 
'per se ' but on the elements upon which the research participants make sense of it. 
A particular theme that will permeate my thesis is the Foucauldian notion of 'the care 
of the self (Foucault 1984). The theme is at the core of the thesis argument that 'risk' 
(either taken in general terms or as applied to sex) is an epistemological construct, its 
conceptions being dependent on social knowledge and values. I will argue in this thesis 
that knowledge about 'the care of the self and of its social value is highly influential in 
the way adolescent women define what is 'risk' and what is 'safety', particularly when 
it comes to the assessment of sexual risks. I will also argue that although health 
promotion is not the only source of risk knowledge, it is mainly through health 
promotion's discourses on risk that adolescent women learn how important it is to take 
care of oneself in a 'risk society' (Beck 1992) like the one they live in. 
Brazilian society is governed by a neo-liberal regime in which 'the care of the self is 
an imperative. It is valued as an ideal of 'good citizenship'. It is a duty and a privilege, 
it is an obligation and a gift (Foucault 1984). To be able to take care of oneself is 
understood as an exercise of power and freedom. It implies to be able to choose how to 
live life or what to do with it. It also implies independence from external government; 
it is oneself who is in charge of one's life. 
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The incorporation of the notion of 'the care of the self into health promotion is 
revealed in its discourses on risk. For health promoters, risks to personal health are not 
located outside the 'self, but within it. Individual lifestyle, the outcome of personal 
choices about how to live life, is the origin of risks. While safer options are available, 
to expose the 'self to a given risk is a choice. The individual is responsible for her/his 
own safety. The role of health promotion is to offer help and advice about the pros and 
cons of certain options. It is the individual's duty to get informed about the menu of 
options, the pros and cons of each of them, and to choose the safest option possible. 
Accepting that we live in a 'risk society', to promote health means to teach lay people 
where and what the risks to their health are, and more fundamentally what they need to 
do to protect themselves against those risks. Health promotion is then the promotion of 
'the care of the self; 'one's health' meaning one's ability to take care of oneself. 
The thesis will discuss the consequences of the use of the imperative of 'the care of the 
self in adolescent women's responses to the risks of sex, including HIV/AIDS risk. It 
will conclude that the conscious production of strategies of self-surveillance creates an 
illusion of self-governance, which is very difficult to sustain in the risky terrain of 
heterosexual relationships, traditionally dominated by men. 
The thesis has the following structure. In Chapter 2 I review the theoretical framework 
of the thesis, focusing on key debates in the sociology of health and risk to 
contextualise the argument of the thesis. The chapter is focused on the issues raised by 
the sociological critique of the scientific approach to risk adopted by health promotion. 
Those issues are used as starting points for the development of my thesis argument, 
which is that 'risk' in general, and HIV/AIDS sexual risk in particular, are 
epistemological constructs. In Chapter 3 I describe how the research was carried out 
and justify the choice of 'focus groups' as the main research procedure. Here I raise 
two particular methodological concerns that impact upon my thesis as a whole: the 
impact of translation of data; and post-structuralist arguments about the nature of the 
'subject' (girl). In Chapter 4 I start to build up the thesis argument by uncovering some 
of the layers of knowledge that exist behind the girls' ways of seeing HIV / AIDS sexual 
risk. Drawing on the research subjects' accounts of everyday risks I argue there that the 
knowledge background that underpins their ways of seeing risk originate from their life 
experiences in Brazilian 'risk society'. In Chapter 5 I explore the girls' ways of seeing 
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HIV / AIDS sexual risk through a focus on their specific accounts of the risks attached 
to heterosexual relationships. In the data analysis presented in the chapter I argue that 
the knowledge of the value of 'the care of the self, which I see as learned mainly from 
health promotion's discourses of risk, is particularly influential in the girls' ways of 
seeing and responding to the risk of heterosexual HIV infection. In Chapter 6 I present 
my concluding comments reminding the reader how and with which concerns the 
research was carried out, and the ways by which the thesis argument was developed. I 
also revisit my argument concerning the epistemological nature of risk and point out its 
implications for health promotion, particularly in the context of HIV / AIDS prevention 
amongst adolescent women. 
CHAPTER 2 
HEALTH PROMOTION AND RISK 
"Margarine may be better than butter, but it also has its risks. Driving without a 
seatbelt is dangerous, but eating apples is as well. Smoking kills, but so does 
nearly everything". (Sapolsky 1990, p.83) 
INTRODUCTION 
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This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It reviews the literature 
that addresses 'health promotion' and 'risk' from a scientific and a sociological point 
of view. The aim of the chapter is to get a picture of the field where my thesis is 
located - the sociology of health and risk. The sociological theories on risk reviewed 
here inform the thesis argument which is that 'risk' in general, and HIV I AIDS risk in 
particular, are epistemological constructs. Consequently, 'risk' is not seen here as an 
event 'per se' but as an event in knowledge. From that, my thesis explores the question 
of how adolescent women see 'risk' when the hazard considered is the HIV I AIDS 
sexual infection. I believe that the answers to this question bring important 
contributions for health promotion. 
The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part presents a literature review 
on the foundations of health promotion. It discusses the underpinning ideologies, 
concepts and discourses of the so-called 'new' public health, where health promotion is 
located as a discipline. It also looks at Health Education, the main strategy of health 
promotion. Showing the background of ideas that exist behind contemporary public 
health should contribute to understanding why and how discourses of risk have become 
key to the context of health promotion. The proliferation of discourses of 'health risk' 
is certainly not a phenomenon that has happened out of a context. The emphasis on 
'risk', either in the context of public health or in other areas, is the result of a 
combination of social, cultural and political factors that has set the scene for 
contemporary society's obsessive interest in risk knowledge. The second part of the 
chapter looks at the sociological perspectives on risk. It introduces the issues discussed 
in the third part, where the literature on 'risk' as applied to health promotion is 
reviewed. This third part of the chapter gives special attention to the sociological 
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critique of health promotion's approach to 'risk'. The fourth and last part is focused on 
what the literature says about health promotion's specific approach to the risk of the 
sexual transmission of HIV / AIDS, an issue that is further explored in the coming 
chapters. 
THE 'NEW' PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH PROMOTION 
The expression 'health promotion' was first used in 1974 by the Canadian Minister of 
National Health and Welfare, Mark Lalonde, in a document called 'The New 
Perspectives on the Health of Canadians'. The document emphasized the influence of 
environmental factors, individual behaviors and lifestyles on diseases and death. The 
proposed working strategy for health promotion was to combine environmental 
improvements -'a structuralist approach' with behavior changes -'a lifestyle approach'. 
This should reduce morbidity and premature deaths (Macdonald and Bunton 1995). 
Health promotion emerged as a fundamental strategy of a movement that intended to 
renovate the field of public health. It was a response to many factors, amongst which, 
" ... growing disillusionment with the limits of medicine, pressures to contain medical 
care costs, and a social and a political climate emphasizing self-help and individual 
control over health" (Minkler 1989, p.18). As opposed to the 'old' public health, which 
focused on individual causes of diseases, the new movement emphasized social and 
environmental influences on health patterns (Lupton 1995a). Those ideas were further 
discussed in the context of WHO conferences and, in 1986, at the WHO conference in 
Ottawa, the ideological basis of health promotion was finally formulated (Tones and 
Tilford 1994). 
The Ottawa Charter (World Health Organization 1986, p.220) defines health 
promotion as " ... the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to 
improve, their health", which represents a recognition of the importance of power and 
control for health promotion. The document also proposes a positive view of health, 
highlighting its importance for a socially and economically productive life. Health is 
seen as " ... the resource for everyday life, not the objective of living". It is " ... a 
positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as physical 
capacities" (World Health Organization 1986, p.220). 
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The directions proposed by the WHO for the 'new' public health and health promotion 
point towards the need to reduce social inequalities, constructing an active and 
empowered community. Health is seen as influenced by physical, socio-economic, 
cultural and environmental factors. Health promotion is to invest in the 'engineering' 
of these factors, aiming at maximizing opportunities for health and to avoid disease 
and disability (Tones and Tilford 1994). The success of such an 'engineering' should 
facilitate 'healthy decisions' and 'the healthy choice' should become the "easy choice" 
(Tones and Tilford 1994, p.7). 
As the WHO (1994, p.236) states, "the essence of health promotion is choice", 
meaning that health promoters should inform the public" ... of the merits and demerits 
of the various options open to them and resources should be made available to make 
the option chosen possible". The 'new' approach to public health with its emphasis on 
the multidimensional nature of health-related problems, along with that on informed 
choice, opens up the 'investment on the health of the populations' to all sorts of 
professional expertise. Petersen and Lupton (1996, p.5) argue that "the new public 
health encompasses such concepts and strategies as health promotion and health 
education, social marketing, epidemiology, biostatistics, diagnostic screenmg, 
immunisation, community participation, healthy public policy, intersectoral 
collaboration, ecology, health advocacy and health economics", among others. At the 
level of strategies, the 'new' public health counts on the cooperation between state 
institutions, private agencies and 'the public'. As Petersen and Lupton (1996) suggest, 
"with this expansive agenda, involving professional experts, bureaucrats 
and ordinary citizens, everyone is, to some extent, caught up within what 
has become an expanding web of power and knowledge around the 
problematic of 'public health'" (pp. 5-6). 
The changes in the field of 'public health', in particular the creation of the health 
promotion movement, have brought about fundamental changes in the underpinning 
principles of health education. In the 'old' public health, health education had a sole 
focus, which was the prevention of diseases. The 'new' health education should 
overcome the biomedical conceptualization of health and encompass wider aims. 
Health is no more only the absence of disease, but a resource of life. So, in its 
contemporary version, health education no longer aims at simply preventing diseases 
but at preparing the individual for the fight for a healthier life. Within the 'new' 
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paradigm the individual should be encouraged to make decisions about hislher own 
life. This notion of autonomy creates an ideal of self-governance. As Lupton (1995b) 
puts it, "the self that is being privileged and normalized in such discourses is that of the 
enterprising and entrepreneurial self, the individual who is interested in and willing to 
take action to improve his or her health status" (p.61). 
In political terms, a new form of political rationality that has been predominant in 
modem western societies, that is neo-liberalism, supports health promotion's emphasis 
on individual autonomy and choice. As Rose (1989) argues, underpinning this form of 
rationality is the idea that the 'public' should not be allowed to interfere in individuals' 
private life. Freedom is to be regulated by individuals themselves, who have to be 
committed to choose a way of life that 'respects' the moral code of society. This 
freedom exercise takes place in the form of consumption. Optional products are 
legitimized and promoted in a variety of ways; yet the chosen products are experienced 
and justified as personal desires (Rose 1989). Rose points out that this new form of 
rationality has a great impact upon the 'self', as "every aspect of life, like every 
commodity, is imbued with a self-referential meaning; every choice we make is an 
emblem of our identity [ ... ], each is a message to ourselves and others as to the sort of 
person we are ... " (Rose 1989, p.231). He goes on to suggest that within the neo-liberal 
society 
"The self is not merely enabled to choose, but obliged to construe a life in 
terms of its choices, its powers, and its values. Individuals are expected to 
construe the course of their life as the outcome of such choices, and to 
account for their lives in terms of the reasons for those choices. Each of the 
attributes of the person is to be realized through decisions, justified in 
terms of motives, needs and aspirations made intelligible to the self and 
others in terms of the unique but universal search to find meaning and 
satisfaction through the construction of life for oneself" (Rose 1989, 
p.231). 
The next section focuses on health education, a very important strategy of health 
promotion. It discusses the co-existence of conflicting forms of health education. It 
shows how difficult it has been to apply the ideological background of health 
promotion to health education, especially because the emphasis of the health 
promotion rhetoric on autonomy and choice conflicts with the goals of health 
education. 
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Health Education 
Despite the new propositions, it has not been easy to avoid the traditional discourses of 
public health in the contemporary practice of health education (Lupton 1995a). There 
has been a confusing overlap between ideological positions (often conflicting old and 
new positions) and technical definitions of what it is to educate people about health. A 
number of different models of health education can be found in the terrain of practice. 
For instance in Britain alone, Rawson and Grigg (1988) discovered seventeen 
taxonomies of health education. While it is possible to accommodate all these 
taxonomies into two basic approaches to health education - the 'preventive model' and 
the 'radical model' - the literature shows an awareness that the differences between 
them are not 'clear cut'. Theoretically, and also in practice, there are overlapping 
objectives and perceivable gaps between progressive intentions and real achievements. 
Preventive Health Education 
The "preventive model" of health education (Tones and Tilford 1994, p.12), also called 
"conventional" health education (Rodmell and Watt 1986, p.2), remains influenced by 
the principles of the 'old' public health. Fundamentally located within the biomedical 
model, it aims at preventing disease. Disease prevention is mainly conceptualized 
according to the postulations of two paradigms: behaviourism and individualism 
(Rodmell and Watt 1986). The preventive approach of health education supports the 
idea that individual lifestyles- poor diet, lack of exercise, smoking, etc.- are the main 
causes of ill-health; unhealthy habits being the consequence of mistaken individual 
decisions. Such an emphasis on the individual produces a representation of ill health as 
a 'personal moral failure'(Doyal and Pennell 1991) and a master discourse that blames 
the victim for herlhis own misfortune (Crawford 1977). The aim of preventing diseases 
is to be fulfilled by means of persuading individuals to adopt healthy lifestyles, or 
behaviours considered by medical professionals as compatible with health. In sum, the 
preventive model of health education assumes that health professionals 'know' what 
constitutes a healthy lifestyle and that the adoption of a medically oriented healthy 
lifestyle is a matter of personal choice. The individualistic tone of such a discourse is 
highly problematic and, as we see next, has been a target of critique. 
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Individualism and the Problems of the 'Preventive' Model of Health Education 
Amongst the critics of the preventive model of health education there is a consensus 
that, considering the holistic principles of the 'new' public health (see pages 13-14), it 
is difficult to see such an individualistic enterprise as a health promotion strategy 
(Crawford 1977; Naidoo 1986; Thorogood 1995). And here, the criticism addressed to 
individualism includes a strong questioning of its emphasis on 'free choice', also a 
feature of the health promotion movement (see previous section on health promotion, 
p.13). Naidoo (1986, p.17) defines 'individualism' as " ... the ideology which views 
individual free choice as both an accurate account of the status quo, and as a desirable 
goal for which to aim". In her analysis, individualistic health education can be 
questioned on the basis of at least three arguments. Firstly, because it does not consider 
the influence of the 'social' in determining, structuring and patterning illnesses, it 
reduces health, a social product, to a thing that the individual shall be able to control. 
Secondly, in ignoring the 'social', it seems to consider that everyone lives under the 
same social conditions and so will be equally able to take care of themselves (as long 
as they have the knowledge to do so). And thirdly, an individualistic health education 
is ineffective in its own terms. It invests in education about prevention in the belief that 
this will directly result in behavioural change and healthier lifestyles. Such an approach 
has proved to be highly inefficient (Naidoo 1986) as some contemporary classic 
examples indicate, HIV / AIDS prevention being one of the most representative of all. 
Empirical research has already firmly suggested that even when well informed about 
forms of contamination people may yet not adopt the preventive measures prescribed 
by health professionals (Hillier, Harrison, and Warr 1998; Holland et al. 1991; 
Woodcock, Stenner, and Ingham 1992). Individualistic health education ignores that 
behaviour is always interactive; meaning that individuals' lifestyles are the product of 
an interplay of socio-cultural and individual factors. Environmental circumstances, 
including the social norms to which individuals are subjected and among which few 
have the power to change, and the well-established cultural values that organize 
everyday life, have a direct impact on the choices made, for they constrain available 
options in the first place. 
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Individualism is then a problematic feature of the use of the notion of 'lifestyles' in the 
messages of 'preventive' health education (Calnan, Boulton, and Williams 1986; 
Rodmell and Watt 1986). But this association between health and individual lifestyle is 
a problem that goes beyond the question about the mistaken idea that health and 
diseases result from personal behavioural choices. The first difficulty is that it implies 
an oversimplification of the notion of 'lifestyles', which tend to be classified according 
to the binary category of 'rights' /'wrongs' (a judgment obviously biased). As Rodmell 
(1986) points out, the presumption that there are 'lifestyles' that should be 'reformed' 
to become more 'healthy' is generally informed by medical stereotypical perceptions 
about the 'adequacy' of certain ways of life. The judgment of individuals' behavioural 
'adequacy' is usually based on health professionals' perceptions about the patterns of 
behaviour of the groups to which these individuals belong. Thus, it is common to see 
health educators targeting specific social groups (adolescents and women, for 
example), which are usually taken as particularly inclined to 'deviance'. In 
pathologising typical conducts, preventive health education contributes to the 
reinforcement and reproduction of dominant ideologies, facilitating the social control 
of individuals and groups. Considering WHO's affirmation mentioned earlier (see 
p.20) about 'choice' being the 'essence' of health promotion (World Health 
Organization 1994), it is indeed difficult to think of a form of health education that 
imposes certain options as a health promotion strategy. 
There is a second problem resulting from this idea that individual lifestyles might be 
the cause of diseases and that, if necessary, they must be changed on the basis of what 
is considered a 'medically correct' behaviour. This assumption may promote human 
behaviour being dependent upon a medically-defined 'correctness'. The resulting 
jurisdiction of medical profession over people's lives, also called "medicalization of 
life" (Illich 1990, p.86), has two consequences. First, it imposes the social acceptance 
of medicine as the legitimate source of truth, transforming it into an institution of 
social control. In addition to that, given the fact that the focus on 'lifestyles' implies 
the possibility of multi-causal diseases, preventive interventions undertaken by public 
health professionals may also result in a proliferation of medical interference in 
extended areas of human life (Armstrong 1993; Bunton, Nettleton, and Burrows 1995; 
Illich 1990; Zola 1972) 
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The ideology of individualism has also influenced the choice of persuasion as the main 
educational method of preventive health education (see examples given by Naidoo 
1986). Unhealthy lifestyles are seen as related to ignorance about the 'medically 
correct' way of life. The provision of health-related information is then seen as the 
solution. By teaching individuals about the association between 'incorrect' behaviour 
and diseases, health educators expect to persuade them to behave 'adequately'. To 
regard education as a simple 'transmission of information', in the sense of a "banking 
education" (Freire 1972, p.58), is to see the educational enterprise in a conventional 
way. In such a context, the learner is seen as a passive recipient of the knowledge that 
shall be provided by the 'know-all' teacher. The effectiveness of a 'banking education' 
is evaluated by assessing the quantity of knowledge acquired. The knowledge 'learned' 
after the intervention of the expert is expected to be higher than that acquired before 
the intervention. The 'know-all' teacher is supposed to use hislher expertise to 
deliberate on what kind of knowledge the learner needs to learn. The top-down 
imposition of knowledge to be learned, the active position of the 'teacher', and the 
passive role of the learner is exactly what happens when health educators invest in 
individual behavioral changes (Downie, Fyfe, and Tannahill 1990; Katz and Peberdy 
1997; Watt 1986). 
In his analysis of diverse forms of talk about health, Beattie et al.(1993, p.265) suggest 
that different strategies for promoting health are based on different political standpoints 
which are often not explicit and yet very influential. In a similar vein, it has been 
argued that to opt for an individualistic approach to health education has everything to 
do with specific political positions (Beattie et al. 1993; Crawford 1977; Tuckett 1979). 
To Beattie, persuasion campaigns commonly used to change individual behaviour are 
compatible with the biomedical model of health because of the proximity they both 
have to 'conservative' political ideology. Under the influence of this sociopolitical 
philosophy, health is seen as related to ideas like 'individual inadequacies require 
correction' and 'risks to order require control', among others. Beattie (1993) comments 
that "this [Philosophy] no doubt sees such campaigns as an acceptable 'minimal' 
intervention by the State: giving people information 'for their own good', so that if 
they don't act upon it, that's 'their bad luck'" (p.265, author's emphases). 
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Like Beattie, Crawford (1977) also argues that individualistic positions and 'victim 
blaming' discourses have not become essentials to health education in a vacuum. The 
reference to the American origin of the ideology of individual responsibility elucidates 
the emergence of the 'victim blaming' discourse for the promotion of the public 
health? Crawford (1977) regards it as a response to a health crisis in the USA, which 
had two conflicting pillars: the increasing concern about the social construction of 
disease and the inefficiency of a costly medical system. The author affirms that, in this 
context, to blame the victim for hislher illness was a political strategy that operated in 
an ideological form. As Crawford states, the 'victim blaming' ideology reflects the way 
contemporary society is structured, as well as its contradictions. The social 
circumstances of the development of the 'victim blaming' ideology are seen by 
Crawford (1977, pp.665-668) as related to three political phenomena: "a crisis of 
costs", due to increasing costs of insurance and health benefits in the industrial sector; 
"the politicization of the social production of disease", reSUlting from the political 
appropriation of public concerns about environmental health dangers and occupational 
health; and the view of "medical care as a right", at a time when people's dependency 
on medicine grows and medical credibility drops. 
Even though Crawford's analysis of the origins of the 'victim blaming' discourse was 
formulated more than twenty years ago, his arguments seem to offer clues to 
understanding its continuing powerful influence on the present shape of the preventive 
model of health education. To Crawford (1977), 
"At a time when people seem to want medicine most, its continuing 
availability and expansion threaten [ ... J economic and political interests. 
Further, [ ... J medicine is clearly inadequate in dealing with the 
contemporary social production of disease, and is ... unable to perform its 
traditional role of resolving societal tensions which emerge when people 
identify the social causes of their ... pathologies. In the face of these trends, 
it is ... revealing that we are witnessing the proliferation of messages about 
our own personal responsibility for health and an attack on individual life-
styles and at-risk behaviours" (p.668). 
2 As Macdonald & Bunton (1995) state, the conceptual development of health promotion is largely 
influenced by the developments in Europe and North America. That is why to understand the origins of 
the 'victim blaming' discourse in the USA helps to grasp its importance in health promotion discourses 
in other parts ofthe world. 
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The links between the focus of preventive health education on lifestyles, its investment 
on individual behavioural change and the production of 'victim blaming' discourses 
can be explained in yet another way. In an analysis of the history of health education 
Minkler (1989) argues that in the implementation of the health promotion program in 
the United States the program was directed towards two distinct goals: health 
promotion (focusing on behaviour and lifestyles changes) and health protection 
(focused on the physical environment). This dichotomy, the authors suggests, may have 
limited the successful production of a broader view of health promotion. Using the 
words of another commentator, Minkler argues that "we Americans allowed our health 
promotion terrain to be restricted to lifestyle determinants of health but we also 
allowed lifestyle to be interpreted too narrowly as pertaining primarily if not 
exclusively to the behaviour of those whose health is in question" (L. W. Green, cited 
by Minkler (1989, p.19). One can perhaps conclude on the basis of what has been said 
so far that the simplistic conceptualization of lifestyles as the result of personal choices 
constitutes a fundamental difficulty of the preventive model of health education. 
Even though health education has gained importance in the context of health 
promotion, it has been a struggle to incorporate the holistic proposals of this 'new' 
movement into health education practice. One may suggest that the predominance of 
medical professionals in the field has complicated the adoption of a theoretical 
framework other than the biomedical for the development of health education 
discourses and practices (Rodmell and Watt 1986). The contemporary 'epidemic' of 
health educational campaigns - practice safer sex!, exercise your body regularly!, do 
not smoke!, do not drink and drive!, eat fruit and vegetables! - aiming at promoting 
'free' informed health-related choices, underscores the importance of 'medical 
prescriptions' for the current project of health education. In spite of the proposals of 
the supposed 'new' approach to public health, health education usually remains 
concentrated on the prevention of diseases and focused on individual responsibility 
(Naidoo 1986). With that, the social causes of ill health are left practically untouched 
and the goal to promote health as a life resource rather than an end in itself has 
remained a matter of rhetoric. 
But if it is true that the implementation of a veritable 'new' health education is still 
problematic, and that for the health educators caught up in the proposed transition it 
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has been a struggle to cope with the conflicts between new theories and old practices 
and also with the powerful influence of the medical model, it is also true that there 
have been attempts to overcome the difficulties. The next section focuses on the 
'radical' model of health education, which encapsulates the proposals of the health 
promotion movement, its principles standing in direct opposition to those of the 
preventive model. 
Radical Health Education 
In opposition to the 'preventive' health education, a modem approach has emerged. It 
has been a response to the new ideological premises of the health promotion movement 
described earlier (see section on page 13). It encapsulates the complexities of the 'new 
public health' and modem approaches to education. Its main aim is to promote health 
in a positive sense. In educational terms, the "radical model,,3 (Tones and Tilford 1994, 
p.16) is centered on "critical consciousness raising" (Tones and Tilford 1994, p.20), a 
term associated with Paulo Freire's notion of 'conscientizayao'. Tones and Tilford 
(1994, p.20) argue that such an objective can be achieved by following a four-stage 
process: 
"1- Fostering reflection on aspects of personal reality; 
2- Encouraging a search for, and collective identification of, the root 
causes of that reality; 
3- Examination of implications and 
4- Development of a plan of action to alter reality". 
Instead of working with individuals, considered as isolated targets, radical health 
education seeks to achieve its goals by working with groups. A group environment is 
expected to facilitate "critical consciousness raising" (Tones and Tilford 1994, p.20) 
because of its potential in promoting the exchange of ideas amongst its members. The 
dialogue created in such a context is believed to result in a collective understanding of 
living conditions and in the realization of both the individuals and group's potential for 
change. The 'radical' approach rejects the use of persuasion for promoting behaviour 
3 The term' radical' is used by Tones and Tilford to indicate the need to reveal the roots of ill health. It 
is also used in the sense of questioning the dominant ideology, represented by the preventive medical 
model. 
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change. This doesn't mean that it is not to do with behavioural changes. What is 
different is that it seeks to achieve the aim of social rather than personal change (Tones 
and Tilford 1994). 
'Radical' health education intends to promote individuals' involvement in decisions 
related to their own health and those concerning the social groups to which they 
belong. Conscious individuals are supposed to be able to take responsibility for their 
personal health, not only in the sense of responsible health-related decisions but also in 
relation to their ability to articulate responsible interventions in the environment in 
order to maintain their health status. In order to achieve this level of active 
participation, the educational process is to be developed through an egalitarian 
relationship between the learner and the educator in which both recognize the value of 
the other in the dialogue established (Laura and Heaney 1990). 
In the same way as health promotion (see pages 18-21), 'radical' health education 
emphasizes power as a fundamental condition for the success of its enterprises. 
Therefore there is the need to incorporate the empowerment of individuals and 
communities as a 'sine qua non' condition for the fulfillment of the health education 
objectives. (Tones and Tilford 1994) 
Within the radical model, to empower individuals and communities goes beyond 
promoting "critical consciousness raising"; it also includes the provision of relevant 
information about health and life skills (Tones and Tilford 1994, p.20). Empowered 
individuals and empowered communities are not exactly the same although they have a 
reciprocal relationship, that is, one is a pre-requisite for the other. To be empowered 
means to have autonomy to make informed choices, which as mentioned earlier (see 
section on health promotion) is seen by the WHO as the focus of health promotion. 
While the 'radical' model is in theory congruent with the proposals of health 
promotion (see pages 18-21), its focus on the promotion of autonomy via education has 
been the target of criticism. The critics have also exposed the contradictions of health 
promotion as well as its privileging of behavioural interventions and neglecting the 
proposed structural approach. The next section reviews the main issues raised by the 
critics. 
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Autonomy and the Problems of the 'Radical' Model of Health Education 
Even with the support of a powerful institution like the WHO it has been highly 
problematic for health educators to apply the principles of health promotion to health 
education practice. The aim of promoting individual's autonomy is pointed out by the 
critics as the main difficulty. Weare (1995) summarizes the problem: 
"The logical consequence of accepting autonomy as a goal is to agree that 
if educated people choose to act in an unhealthy way then, provided it does 
not impinge on the freedom of others, this must be seen as an acceptable 
end result of an educational process" (p. 71). 
The notion of 'empowerment' as a key strategy for promoting autonomous choices 
with regard to health is particularly problematic. For health professionals, it may be a 
dilemma to forget the scientific knowledge concerning health and disease and accept 
others' life perspectives and values, in which the biomedical conceptions of health may 
not be included. Also, for those who got used to the conventional health education 
practice, it may not be easy to abandon the pastoral role of 'helping' people to make 
their decisions about health (Weare 1995). 
The discussion about autonomy brings back the question of authority, which as 
commented on earlier in the chapter, is seen by the critics as a problematic point of 
'preventive' health education (see pages 16-17). As a matter of principle and in direct 
opposition to the traditional model of health education, the radical model does not 
accept 'impositions' of any kind, because it is considered antithetical. 'Imposition' 
means a lack of respect for individuals' will. From that, some questions emerge which 
may not only be applied to the specific field of health education but more 
fundamentally to health promotion as a whole. How can one deal with the 
contradictions posed by the task of promoting freedom and health without imposing 
particular beliefs about what is health and what is freedom? Is it possible to respect 
individual's decisions, and, at the same time, take into account the health-related 
consequences of individual's freedom of choice? 
The problem is not that it is impossible to promote choices; the problem starts when 
the task is to promote 'free' choice, which seems to be a goal compatible with that of 
the promotion of autonomy. Baelz (1979) reminds us that choices do not happen in a 
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vaccum, but are made with reference to the material and social context within which 
they are determined. If we accept the assumption that the environment imposes limits 
to our everyday choices, then we may agree that even with no direct interference of 
health educators to promote this or that health-related choice, it would be an illusion to 
think of the 'act of choosing' as the result of and resulting in freedom. 
A number of commentators have argued that health educators need to acknowledge the 
complex framework that stands behind decisions, whose elements are often not 
controllable by individuals (Naidoo 1986; Thorogood 1995; Tones and Tilford 1994). 
For Thorogood (1995), the empowerment of individuals and communities as a form of 
promoting free and rational healthy choices, is subjected to pre-determined norms and 
values. The promotion of healthy choices in such a biased environment may well be 
seen as more likely to reinforce social inequalities than result in emancipation (Lupton 
1995b; Rhodes 1994; Thorogood 1995) . 
Another point that has been raised in the literature with respect to the empowering 
goals of health promotion and health education concerns the uncritical acceptance of 
the proposition of an egalitarian relationship between health educators and learners. 
Baelz (1979) remarks that any learning process implies reciprocal influences between 
the educator and the learner, which may lead to the conclusion that the promotion of 
health-related choices through education is not exactly the promotion of absolute 
independence. It has been argued that even for conscious radical health educators it is 
hard to promote a balanced distribution of power in their relationships with the 
subjects of their actions. Health professionals are usually seen as 'experts' and this may 
undermine the health educators' (usually health professionals) investment in the 
promotion of 'free choice' (Jones and Cribb 1997). 
With respect to the 'natural' pressure of the health professionals' knowledge on 
peoples' choices, it is also important to bear in mind that in some cases the promotion 
of autonomous decisions is further complicated because it may involve class, gender, 
age and race power relations. The conflict between the pursuit of freedom to choose 
and the promotion of health for building a healthier society demonstrates the moral 
contradictions implicit in health promotion's discourses and in its model of health 
education. Jones (1997b) captures the dilemma faced by health promoters: 
"On the one hand we have noted that the ethical basis of health promotion 
includes a commitment to enhancing autonomy; on the other, the search for 
the 'healthy society' requires people to value their own health more and to 
make healthy choices rather than unhealthy ones. How is to be ensured that 
people make healthy choices if making up their own minds about health 
matters is also high on the agenda?" (p.99). 
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Jones and Cribb (1997) suggest that the answer to those questions lies in the 
development of a healthy public policy, which might result in making the healthy 
choices easier, a point also made by others (see for example, Tones and Tilford 1994). 
Whatever the arguments, it is worth noting, the moral imperative of 'being healthy' 
(whatever the meaning of it) holds true. 
The investment in autonomy has also been seen as problematic in the arena of 
community development. Lupton (1995a) argues that the empowerment of 
communities is contradictory in two senses. Firstly, the term 'empowerment' is linked 
to "individualistic meanings of rationality, autonomy and responsibility" (p.60). 
Secondly, empowerment implies the paternalistic idea of power 'transmission' from a 
powerful person to a powerless one. Lupton also remarks that the well-known 
difficulty of modem health educators to overcome the conventional individualistic 
approach is also a problem for the empowerment of communities. Although some have 
argued that the choice of an active learning constitutes progress from the traditional 
preventive approach of health education (Tones and Tilford 1994), Lupton (1995b) 
maintains that the empowering model or 'radical' health education remains focused on 
the acquisition of individual skills. To Lupton, these skills are results of a training 
process through which people are expected to acquire "appropriate ways of thinking 
and doing" (p.60, author's emphasis). She also emphasizes that apart from a 
normalizing effect on social groups, health education has achieved few results in the 
empowerment of communities. 
An important point made by Lupton (1995b) refers to the effects of the dependency of 
health promotional activities, like 'radical' health education, on scientific expertise and 
so on state social policies and capitalist ideologies. She argues that "while health 
promotion shares the rhetoric of other social movements [ ... ] the origins of health 
promotion lie within the state rather than directly challenging the state" (p.61). In such 
circumstances, Lupton comments, the aim of promoting empowered communities and 
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political action tend to be approached as short-term commitments as other state 
projects that rarely last more than a few years. Citing Stevenson and Burke, Lupton 
points out that "this fundamental paradox ensures that health promotional activities, for 
all the rhetoric about social change and challenging the status quo, will inevitably be 
limited in their political scope and objectives" (Lupton 1995b, p.61). 
Like Lupton (1995b), Jones and Cribb (1997) also remind us about the difficulties of 
health promotion and 'radical' health education. They argue that in the 'new' public 
health, 'old' individualistic ideas - like 'lifestyles' - appear to be 'new' ones - the 
'healthy choices' - just because they are expressed in a modem way. The influence of 
individualism on 'radical' health education is obviously related to its emphasis on 
behaviour, which implies a neglect of its proposed structural approach (for an account 
of health promotion's working proposals, see the section on the 'new' public health 
and health promotion). In maintaining 'behavioural change' as one of its goals 
(Macdonald and Bunton 1995), health promotion cannot avoid the use of the same 
contested focus of the 'old' health education model, which is the change of individual 
'lifestyles' . 
In spite of the criticism addressed to the individualism embedded in the notion of 
'lifestyles,4, it remains a theme on the agenda of the WHO. But the organization has 
dealt with the issue with care. The recognition that discourses on 'lifestyles' can blame 
the victim if used without consideration of the influence of environmental factors on 
health behaviours has led the WHO to emphasize that if health is to be promoted, the 
social determination of patterns of behaviour must be taken into account. In the words 
ofMilio, quoted by the Health Education Unit of the WHO (1994, p.230), 
"Lifestyles are patterns of (behavioural) choices made from the alternatives 
that are available to people according to their socio-economic 
circumstances and to the ease with which they are able to choose certain 
ones over others" (p.230). 
In the rhetoric of the WHO, the notion of the social construction of 'lifestyles' has 
additional implications. It implies that patterns of health behaviour are not fixed 
because they are dependent on the flow of life, which is dynamic. In this respect, the 
WHO (1994, p.230) states, 
4 See page 27 for the critiques of 'lifestyles' as applied to health education. 
"An individual lifestyle is made up of the standard reactions and behaviour 
patterns that are developed through processes of socialization. They are 
learned through social interaction with parents, peer groups, friends 
and ... through the influence of schools, the mass media, etc. They are 
continually interpreted and tested out in social situations and are therefore 
not fixed ... but subject to change based on experience and reinterpretation" 
(p.230). 
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To accept the WHO's statement means also to recognize that 'the social' is not only 
the social material from which 'patterns of behaviour' are developed but also the 
framework within which these behaviours are situated. In accepting the developmental 
character of 'lifestyles' and its consequent social contingency one may reach the 
conclusion that 'lifestyles' are not necessarily individually controllable. In addition, 
one should recognize that if a pattern of behaviour is developed in response to social 
experiences, then it may not be easy for a member of a social group to change hislher 
conduct just because health professionals recommend people to do so (Rodmell and 
Watt 1986). 
Another question involving power and health education is related to the fact that since 
its earlier times, the 'new' public health has been theoretically defined and made 
visible to professional and lay people through discursive means and practices. Health 
professionals have usually invented the language used in the discourses of the 'new 
public health'. The medical management of the public health 'glossary' has been 
regarded as reinforcing the contradictions of the rhetoric of community empowerment 
(Lupton 1995b; Rhodes 1994). What is 'public', what is 'healthy', what is 'unhealthy', 
what is 'community', what is 'empowerment' are some of the definitions established 
under an almost complete dominance of health professionals. 
The last two sections have exposed the contradictions of the 'new' public health. They 
show that the 'environmental engineering' project of health promotion (see pages 19-
21) and the goal to intervene in the structural causes of ill-health are actually 
abandoned when health education becomes its primary strategy. As we have seen, it 
has been easier to develop a holistic theoretical approach to health than to transform 
this theory into practice. As some commentators have argued, while the idea that health 
is more than just the absence of disease is well accepted nowadays, in practice, 
contemporary health education is still focused on disease prevention (Lupton 1995a; 
Seedhouse 1986). 
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Lupton (1995a) questions the alleged progress made by health promotion from an 'old' 
to a 'new' model of health education by suggesting that even the differentiation 
between health promotion and health education has been rather elusive. She comments 
that sometimes health education is identified as part of the health promotion project, 
sometimes it is seen as having an interchangeable meaning with health promotion. She 
also considers that the contemporary simultaneous use of 'old' and 'new' strategies for 
preserving the health of populations may confirm that previous approaches have 
remained influential. As examples, she cites the use of "health protection" or isolation 
for preventing contagion, of "preventive medicine" for treating illness in its earlier 
stage, of "health education" for promoting healthy lifestyles, of a "healthy public 
policy" for intervening in the structural causes of ill health and of "community 
empowerment" for promoting the development of social groups (Lupton 1995a, p.52). 
Lupton agrees with Rawson (1992) when the latter argues that the difference between 
health education and the 'new' public health is, perhaps, " ... more a shift in title than a 
true paradigm shift" (p.204). 
Considering the literature review undertaken here, one can conclude that health 
promotion has been facing big challenges posed by its own internal contradictions. 
How to promote 'free' choice and, at the same time, aim at informing health-related 
decisions through education? Will not the provision of health information restrict the 
possibility of freedom? Is it not true that 'free' choice is incompatible with the pre-
establishment of options, like those based on the biomedical definition of health? How 
to forget all these years of knowledge about the scientific meanings of health and 
accept alternative conceptions that may be behind individuals' choices? How to accept 
people's free choices when they are not compatible with the 'common sense' ideal of 
the pursuit of a medically-defined healthy living? How to promote rational decision-
making without advocating particular 'rationalities' and repressing others? These are 
some of the questions that are still to be answered in the discourses and practices of 
health promotion. 
It seems to be clear that, as Lupton (1995b) remarks, despite the critiques, 'health' 
continues to be seen in the terrain of the 'new' public health and health promotion in 
an individualistic way. In the new approach, Lupton argues, health' has predominantly 
been represented as a matter of personal responsibility and a sign of a 'good' use of 
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individual autonomy. It is conceptualized as the outcome of rational decision-making 
concerning personal behaviour. To Lupton, despite the discourse of innovation, in 
practical terms, the 'new' public health, health promotion and health education are still 
focused on promoting individual behavioural change. The focus on individual causes 
of diseases that is supposed to have been overcome in the 'new' public health has been 
replaced by another form of individualism, which is that of the emphasis on individual 
autonomy. A good indication of that is the proliferation of empirical research and 
theories in the field that are based upon psychosocial models of behaviour, such as the 
Health Belief Model and the Theory of Reasoned Action (see for example Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1980; Jemmott and Jemmott 1991; Rosenstock, Strecher, and Becker 1988). 
In this respect Lupton (1995a) remarks: 
"Although the term 'theory' is commonly employed in the health 
promotion literature, that use is generally limited to explaining links 
between attitudes and behaviour, adopting a cause-and-effect model, rather 
than overarching attempt to construct an epistemology of public health" 
(p.55). 
As Lupton stresses, the very names of those models suggest the importance of 
rationality and cost-benefit calculations for contemporary health promotion and health 
education. At the basis of this emphasis on rationality there is the assumption that 
knowledge is directly related to change in attitudes and change in attitudes should 
result in behavioural change. This linear progressive logic has been applied to all sorts 
of recognized public health problems. Such problems are seen as likely to be solved by 
means of health education, which are to teach individuals how to behave properly in 
order to keep their original healthy living. 
With the help of the literature, I have tried to delineate a picture of contemporary 
health promotion and health education. I have also presented most of the elements that 
appear in their discourses and the criticism that those discourses have generated. But 
this picture would not be complete without reference to 'risk', a theme that has gained 
increased relevance in contemporary societies as a whole and eespecially in the general 
rhetoric of medical sciences where public health and health promotion are located. The 
next three sections are focused on 'risk'. The first presents the sociological approach to 
'risk', which is dominated by theories on the centrality of 'risk' in the constitution and 
organization of modernity. The second section looks at the way the notion of 'risk' has 
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been incorporated into health promotion discourses and practices. In the third section 
we shall see that although 'risk' is a later addition to health promotion discourses and 
despite critiques, the way health promoters have theorized about the question of 'health 
risk' is still very much focused on an individualistic approach. 
RISK 
'Risk' originates from the French word 'risque' and was initially employed in a neutral 
sense. It could mean 'good' and 'bad' risk (Gabe 1995), an interpretation that lasted 
until the beginning of the nineteen-century (Ewald 1991). As the definition that 
appears in the dictionary demonstrates, 'risk' is nowadays equated with 'bad risk' 
(Douglas 1990). According to 'The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English', 
'risk' means "the chance or possibility of danger, loss or injury" (Allen 1990, p.1 040). 
The mentioning of 'chance or possibility' to define 'risk' indicates that it incorporates 
in its meanings the property of 'objectivity'. Other sources of defining 'risk' 
corroborate this argument. For instance, The Royal Society has similarly 
conceptualized 'risk' as "the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a 
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge" (quoted in Heyman 1998a, 
p.5). 
While the term 'risk' is not new in our vocabulary and it has become a very popular 
word in contemporary day-to-day life, there is no consensus about the meanings of 
risk. This is perhaps a surprise, given the objectivity of the definition of 'risk' that 
appears in the dictionary. But, along with the 'risk is' approach there are assertions that 
put in doubt a common sense definition of 'risk'. Affirmations such as "defining risk 
can be risky" (Arnett 1996, p.465) and "people disagree more about what risk is than 
about how large it is" (Fischoff 1985, p.89), found in the risk-related literature, suggest 
that 'risk' is not always perceived in the same way. 
As we will see in the section below, modernity provides material for the production of 
an array of risk meanings. In everyday life we do not make sense of 'risk' by looking 
for its meanings in the dictionary. What we mean by 'risk' depends on a number of 
elements that constitute the context where risk meanings are to be applied. This theory 
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about the association between risk contexts and risk meanings in circumstances of 
modernity is at the core of the sociological approach to risk, which is presented next. 
Risk, Modernity and the Socio-Cultural Approach to Risk 
This section reviews the theories on the socio-cultural aspects of risk in circumstances 
of modernity. The socio-cultural approach has been, along with a more technical 
theorizing of risk (see section on page 47), a way of seeing risk that is much 
emphasized in the literature. The present section will be mainly focused on the work of 
Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Mary Douglas and their followers. Giddens, Beck and 
Douglas are the exponents of the sociological and anthropological debate about the use 
of the notion of risk in modernity. My aim here is not to give a full account of their 
theories, as this goes beyond scope of the thesis. The themes presented were selected 
according to the interests of this thesis, and are, in one way or another, re-visited in the 
analytical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5). The selected themes are used for the elaboration 
of my thesis about the epistemological nature of 'risk' , in which I make the point about 
the influence of the discourses that permeate life in modernity in adolescent women's 
ways of seeing 'risk'. 
Nowadays there has been an increase in the general level of concern about safety and 
risk (Jones-Lee 1989). From dangers of nuclear products to risk in business and 
finance, from the hazards of medical treatments to the risks of urban violence, every 
moment of modern day-to-day life has been immersed in what Giddens calls a "climate 
of risk" (1996, p.114). In the academy, risk issues have increasingly been the focus of 
research within a number of different disciplines, such as medicine, epidemiology, 
statistics, philosophy, sociology and anthropology. Amongst the disciplines that have 
developed a special interest in risk issues, medicine is perhaps the most interested of 
all (Heyman 1998a). In a study carried out by Hayes (cited by Heyman), 100,000 
references to risk were found in the Medline database over the period 1985-1991. 
Heyman (1998a) comments that it was not until the mid-1990s that social science 
began to develop interest in 'health risk'. 
Both Giddens and Beck agree that a combination of factors is involved in the 
proliferation of risk discourses in modernity. The authors point out the development of 
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science as the main factor involved in the establishment of the climate of risk that 
dominates modernity. For them, because ofthe development of science, a multitude of 
experts' networks have been created and, with it, a growing number of uncertainties. 
They also argue that in modernity the reliance on experts' knowledge to reduce 
uncertainties has resulted in an increase in the reflexive potential of everyday life. All 
this, they affirm, has put scientists at the forefront of risk discourses. In the next 
paragraphs I present how those points are explored in Giddens' and Beck's specific 
theories. I start by presenting Giddens's view. 
In spite of arguing for the importance of 'risk' in contemporary societies, Giddens 
(1996) stresses that to affirm that "modernity is a risk culture" (p.3) is not to say that 
nowadays our life is more risky than it was in the past. Rather, the contemporary 
climate of risk has to do with the high relevance of the 'risk' construct in the 
organization of current social life. Giddens (1996) refers to 'modernity' as "the 
institutions and modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but 
which in the twentieth century have become increasingly world-historical in their 
impact" (p.1S). To Giddens, modernity means the "industrialised world" (p.1S) and the 
changes in social life it entails: industrialism - the new forms of social relations 
attached to production processes; capitalism - a competitive system of commodity 
production; and systems of surveillance - the basis of organisational power that 
emerges in circumstances of modernity. 
In Giddens' view science plays two roles in the establishment of a 'risk culture' in 
"high modernity"s (1996, p.243). On the one hand progress creates new risk 
parameters. On the other, it brings the possibility of predicting and protecting 
individuals against the new and the old risks. According to the author, the increased 
production and diffusion of scientific and technological information has created a 
social environment in which everybody is more or less aware of the possibility of a 
"self-inflicted harm" (Jones-Lee 1989, preface) and of controlling the extent of damage 
from man-made and natural causes. Also, everybody knows that it is impossible to live 
5 "High modernity" is an expression used by Giddens (1996) for designating "the current phase of 
development of modem institutions, marked by the radicalising and globalising of basic traits of 
modernity" (p.243). 
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in a totally risk-averse environment because it is not feasible to know everything about 
the natural world. 
Giddens (1996) talks about the increased specialisation of forms of expertise as a 
feature of modernity. He argues that if on the one hand it is fair to affirm that the 
knowledge incorporated in those forms of expertise is in principle available to 
everyone, it is also correct to say that experts cannot be experts in more than one or 
two fields of knowledge. In Giddens' view, it follows that when it comes to risk 
knowledge, we are all lay people because to have expertise in one small field 
necessarily leaves many others uncovered. A given situation or problem may have 
different interpretations, depending on the expertise that is used in its framing. Also, 
the same form of expertise can change its knowledge on the basis of new information. 
In modernity, Giddens argues, there are many risks that cannot be clearly assessed, 
because of the mutable knowledge environment that frames risk assessment. From that 
he concludes that "the risk climate of modernity is thus unsettling for everyone; no one 
escapes" (1996, p.124). 
Science reveals the uncertainties of late modernity. Although contradictory, the 
increasing development of technology seems to reinforce human incapacity for 
understanding nature. The more people learn about the world, the more they become 
aware of how much more they have to know. This seems to be implicit in the 
contemporary use of the concept of 'risk' itself. If some future outcome is guaranteed, 
there is no risk. In other words, as Yates (1994) comments, "every conception of risk 
requires that there must be uncertainty about the outcomes of prospective actions" 
(p.ll). To Giddens (1996), in circumstances of modernity, "to accept risk as risk, an 
orientation that is more or less forced on us [ ... ], is to acknowledge that no aspects of 
our activities follow a predestined course, and all are open to contingent happenings" 
(p.28). The word 'risk' incorporates, then, the uncertainties produced and 
communicated by science. 
Giddens is emphatic about the association between the climate of uncertainty created 
by modernity and reflexivity. To Giddens (1996), "modernity's reflexivity refers to the 
susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature, to 
chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge" (p.20). This reflexivity 
is an effect of the proliferation of expert systems and of lay people's need to trust the 
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knowledge that is incorporated into those systems. The future, Giddens argues, " .. .is 
continuously drawn into the present by means of the reflexive organisation of 
knowledge environments" (p.3). He claims that in modernity knowledge becomes 
hypotheses and systems of accumulated expertise are created as sources of authority 
over knowledge. Without 'certainty' about which knowledge to take on board or which 
knowledge is more valid, Giddens (1996) argues, these systems are likely to be 
externally and internally contested. According to the author, this creates the "principle 
of radical doubt" (p.3), which is the product of, and also stimulus for, the production of 
new scientific knowledge. 
Another point made by Giddens is that the reflexive character of modernity has 
implications in the formation of self-identities. He argues that in the same way that 
reflexivity is at the core of late-modernity, it is also at the core of the 'self. That is, in 
modernity, the 'self becomes a reflexive project. Giddens asserts that in pre-modem 
societies, changes in individuals' identities occurred as natural processes of transition 
between for example, childhood and adulthood. This transition was based on traditions 
that were passed on from generation to generation; identity change had a more or less 
static reference. In late-modernity, however, Giddens argues, the 'self has to be 
continuously constructed in a reflexive process that connects personal and social 
change. In late-modem societies, to have a given lifestyle is a conscious choice 
amongst an array of possibilities. To Giddens (1996), the implicit uncertainties of a life 
that is the result of personal decisions and always involves some sorts of risks generate 
anxiety. "Risk assessment is crucial to the colonisation of the future; at the same time, 
it necessarily opens the self out to the unknown" (Giddens 1996, p.182). Giddens 
reinforces his argument by asserting: 
"In the reflexive project of the self, the narrative of self-identity is 
inherently fragile. [ ... J A self-identity has to be created and more or less 
continually reordered against a backdrop of shifting experiences of day-to-
day life and the fragmenting tendencies of modem institutions" (p.186). 
According to the author, in an environment dominated by doubt and multiple choices, 
the notion of lifestyle takes on particular significance. He explains: " ... because of the 
'openness' of social life today, the pluralisation of contexts of action and the diversity 
of 'authorities', lifestyle choice is increasingly important in the constitution of self-
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identity and daily activity" (Giddens 1996, p.5). He goes on to comment that to choose 
a lifestyle and a consequent identity includes to reflect upon what risks to avoid and 
what risks to accept, which suggests that the importance of 'risk' in modernity is to do 
with the identity work that it stimulates. In that sense, Giddens (1996) asserts: 
"reflexively organised life-planning, which normally presumes consideration of risks 
as filtered through contact with expert knowledge, becomes a central feature of the 
structuring of self-identity" (p.5). 
Giddens suggests that in circumstances of modernity, there is a tendency to see 'risk-
taking' as a product of irrationality. He comments that there have been two ways of 
interpreting 'risk-taking', either as the effect of misleading information about the true 
levels of risk of a given action or because individuals are not sensitive to risk 
information. To Giddens, both interpretations are not satisfactory. His theory is that 
specific practices are usually clustered into lifestyle habits and the risks that they 
involve are not assessed as separate items in their respective domains. 
"Life-planning takes account of a 'package' of risks rather than calculating 
the implications of distinct segments of risky behaviour. Taking certain 
risks in pursuit of a given lifestyle, is accepted to be within 'tolerable 
limits' as part of that overall package" (p.125, authors' emphasis). 
I have so far presented the main points of Giddens' theory about the elements of 
modernity that have contributed to the proliferation of risk discourses. Giddens talks 
about the importance of scientific knowledge for the creation of a number of forms of 
expertise, the influence of experts' knowledge in the generation of high levels of 
uncertainty and reflexivity and about the impact of uncertainty and reflexivity upon the 
importance of 'risk' in our lives. Beck's theory does not differ much from Giddens', 
although Beck's analysis is focused on the contemporary multiplication of risks at a 
macro level. That is, the risks referred to by Beck are those resulting from global 
threats, like ecological and nuclear disasters. I present below the main points discussed 
in Beck's theory about how the notion of 'risk' has become important in circumstances 
of modernity. 
In his book 'Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity' (1992) Beck, like Giddens, also 
points at the links between experts' knowledge and the contemporary pervasiveness of 
'risk'. To Beck, the existence of risk experts' networks, which hold the responsibility 
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for the production and communication of risk knowledge, guarantees the sustaining of 
the contemporary western 'risk society'. Similarly to Giddens, Beck argues that one of 
the features of modernity is the multiplication of uncertainties and risks and that 
uncertainty is an implicit characteristic of risk. Beck suggests that it is the 
amalgamation of uncertainty and risk that makes the latter dependent on knowledge, 
especially scientific knowledge. 
Beck argues that "risk consciousness" (1992, p.53) results from two types of what I 
would call 'risk education': the acquisition of risk information and personal risk 
experience. Affirming the importance of the acquisition of risk information for the 
development of "risk consciousness" (p.53), he concludes that those who have more 
access to risk information, like rich people and rich countries, are more likely to 
acknowledge the risks. 
These reflections are followed by the affirmation that 'risk' creates new forms of social 
organization, which differ from the traditional model of class division. Beck (1992) 
suggests that in the past, class positions dictated people's fate, in the sense that if "one 
was born into it, it stuck to one .. .it was contained in everything, what one ate, how and 
with whom one lived ... " (p.52). In the present time, however, he argues, the 
knowledge of risks has come to play an important role in the determination of the 
boundaries of pre-existent social groups. Beck remarks that the reference for a sense of 
'belonging' to a certain group is not clearly visible anymore because it is now 
dependent on "external knowledge" (p.53), rather than on cognitive experiences as it 
was in the past. To Beck (1992), the essential difference between "class and risk 
positions" (p.53) is determined by differences in knowledge. "In class positions, being 
determines consciousness, while in risk positions, conversely, consciousness 
(knowledge) determines being" (Beck 1992, p.53, author's emphasis). These 
differences in knowledge are particularly related to personal experience. Beck (1992) 
states that knowledge about the threats of a class situation is shared by everyone 
affected by them. In that case, there is no need of an external knowledge to configure 
the dimensions of such 'affliction'. In a "risk society" (p.1), however, "the affected 
parties are becoming incompetent in matters of their own affliction" (p.53). 
"Whether DDT is contained in the tea or formaldehyde in the cake, and in 
what dose, remains outside the reach of their own knowledge just as much 
as does the question of whether and in what concentrations these 
substances have a long- or short-term deleterious effect". (Beck 1992, p.53) 
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Beck insists on the importance of knowledge for the existence of 'risk'. His theory 
seems to suggest that the distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' risk is a 
fiction. In this respect, Beck writes: 
"The latency phase of risk threats is coming to an end. The invisible 
hazards are becoming visible .. .It is not clear whether it is the risks that 
have intensified, or our view of them. Both sides converge, condition each 
other, strengthen each other, and because risks are risks in knowledge, 
perceptions of risks and risks are not different things, but one and the 
same." (p.55, author's emphasis) 
Another point emphasized by Beck is the political importance of scientific knowledge 
in the 'risk society'. He suggests that the rationality of scientific conceptualizations of 
'risk', understood as 'the risk', may be challenged by 'perceptions of risk' but that it is 
always possible to avoid confrontation by using scientific-oriented judgments through 
which deviant understandings of 'risk' may be classified as 'irrational' or resulting 
from 'ignorance' (Beck 1992). Until a given 'risk' is legally, medically, 
technologically, or socially recognized, he argues, it does not exist; at least not in a 
concrete way, or in a way that it can be prevented, treated or compensated for. For a 
given 'risk' to have a recognized existence, Beck suggests, there is the need to prove it 
on the grounds of scientific knowledge. "Scientific judgments' monopoly on truth 
therefore forces the victims themselves to make use of all methods and means of 
scientific analysis in order to succeed with their claims" (Beck 1992, p.71). Beck 
argues that the recognition of modernization risks involves not just knowledge but also 
collective knowledge of them and belief in them. It is also an outcome of the political 
illumination of cause and effect systems. For Beck, "where this happens the risks 
develop an incredible political dynamic". He refers to this political dynamic as 
"dynamics of reflexive politicization" (Beck 1992, p.77, authors' emphasis), dynamics 
that produce risk consciousness and conflict, which in his view open new areas of, and 
opportunities for, action. 
In the same way as Giddens, Beck also makes the point about the increased reflexivity 
of modernity. To Beck (1992), modernization is in the process of becoming reflexive. 
That is, modernization is in the process of becoming its own theme because it produces 
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'risk' and also knowledge about 'risk'. The knowledge of the risks created by 
technological processes of modernization are always open to re-consideration and 
everything depends on scientific disputes, that are also political disputes, over the 
truthfulness of risk knowledge. 
It has been suggested that although Beck and Giddens agree about the importance of 
reflexivity for the constitution of modernity, their approaches to reflexive 
modernization are different (Lupton 1999). While Beck argues that late modernity is 
reflexive because of an increase in the production of risks, Giddens asserts that the 
centrality of the notion of 'risk' in late modernity does not mean that we are 
experiencing more risks now than in the past. To Giddens, the difference is that 
nowadays we are more interested in knowing the 'risks', for they are to be given 
importance in our 'projects ofthe self. 
The emphasis that Giddens gives to 'trust' can also be regarded as a difference between 
his theory of modernity and that of Beck's. Giddens contends that in contexts of 
uncertainty and multiple choice the notion of trust is particularly important. He makes 
a distinction between trust as a generic phenomenon of personal development and as 
specific life resource in circumstances of proliferating "abstract systems - the 
"symbolic tokens and experts systems taken generically" (p.242). In generic situations, 
trust is used to achieve a sense of security, as is the case of the trust established 
between a child and its caretakers. Trust here protects the 'self against the potential 
threats of everyday life. In the latter case, trust, a medium of interaction with abstract 
systems, results from the reliance on expert knowledge produced by unknown people 
to alleviate uncertainties. To Giddens, without trust in 'abstract systems' individuals 
would not be able to face risks and take action in a 'risk culture'. 
Along with Giddens' and Beck's theories about the association between modernity and 
the proliferation of risk discourses, the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas has 
also been influential in the way 'risk' has been theorized in the context of social 
sciences. Douglas' work explores the connections between cultural contexts and risk 
meanings. I look next at the main points of Douglas' theory on risk. 
In a series of essays the anthropologist develops the theory that risk perception is 
culturally, politically and morally biased (Douglas 1994). She argues that risk 
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perception theorists should study risk-taking and risk-aversion within a cultural 
framework. In Douglas' theory of risk, culture is defined as "the publicly shared 
collection of principles and values used at anyone time to justify behavior" (Douglas 
1986, p.67). Douglas asserts that 'culture' includes the institutional foundations of 
behaviour, that is, the principles and values that uphold forms of institutional life. In 
that sense, 'culture' also represents the individuals' awareness of the social 
environment, in which individual and collective interests coexist. 'Culture' is then 
" ... the coding principle by which hazards are recognized" (Douglas 1986, p.68). 
"The cultural standards of what constitute appropriate and improper risks 
emerge as part of the assignment of responsibility. They are fundamental to 
social life. When asked about the risks he takes, an individual has to make 
his answer start from some culturally established norm of due carefulness. 
So a daring mountaineer will rather boast of how he refused to budge when 
certain bad weather signs appeared; an Olympic skier will rather boast of 
his care equipment. Both denying that they take risks, but assert they avoid 
silly risks" (Douglas 1986, p.68). 
Douglas makes the point that the answer to the question "how safe is safe enough" 
(Douglas 1994, p.41) cannot be found without reference to the cultural context where 
'safety' and 'risk' are defined. 
"Some cultures demand public commitment from individuals, while some 
expect individual self-interest to be the dominant motive, others expect 
nothing of the sort; some respect compromise that enables all disputants to 
seem to have won, others fiercely reject ambiguous solutions" (Douglas 
1994, p.41). 
Douglas suggests that the question about 'risk' should be "how safe is safe enough for 
this particular culture" (Douglas 1994, p.41). In her view we select certain risks to take, 
and others to avoid, based on an evaluation of the probable losses and gains of our 
choices. Those choices, she suggests, are outcomes of personal judgments, which are 
preceded by a revision of personal and collective values. In that respect she writes: 
"A real life risk portfolio is not a selection made by private ratiocination. In 
real life the social process slides the decision making and the prior editing 
of choices onto social institutions. Shared values do more than weight the 
calculation of risks. They work on the estimates of probabilities as well as 
on the perceived magnitudes of loss" (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p.85) 
Douglas argues that "risks are always political" (p.44). This suggests that even in the 
case ofrisk experts' perceptions of risk, it is problematic to affirm neutrality. Similarly 
47 
to Beck, she also emphasizes the risk analysts' political commitments as evidence of 
their biased risk calculations. Also, similarly to Giddens and Beck, Douglas talks about 
the uncertainty of contemporary life and of its links with the increased use of the notion 
of risk. She points out that there is a sort of irony of timing in the political use of the 
notion of risk. At a time when politics needs the authority of science - certainty- the 
most, the probabilistic analysis of risk cannot promise certainty. 
Douglas (1994) rejects the scientists' view that lay people lack the ability to think in 
probabilistic terms. She contends that they exercise this calculation in their everyday 
lives, but not in the formal way carried out by science. Arguing that cultural theory can 
provide the means to understand how lay people make their risk calculations, Douglas 
stresses that they "scan frequencies and assess them in everyday decisions" and that 
their probabilistic thinking does not approach risks as technical matters but as moral 
and political ones. Risk experts, Douglas argues, take the individual as a 'decision-
making unit'. It is then excluded "from choice any moral or political feedback that he 
may be receiving from his surrounding society" (1994, p.67). 
We have learned so far that, from a sociological point of view, although scientific 
knowledge has much to do with the emergence of 'risk' as a fundamental concept of 
modernity, risk meanings are not restricted to technico-scientific theories (Lupton 
1999). They also encapsulate social, cultural and political meanings. A basic conflict 
between the sociological and the technico-scientific perspectives is that the former 
affirms that risk is not definable in a value-free process and the latter argues the 
opposite. The next section will review the sociological debate about the supposed 
'objectivity' and 'neutrality' of technico-scientific theories on risk. This is important 
because it constitutes the basis of the sociological critique of the predominance of 
'scientific risk' in the field of public health and health promotion, a matter that will be 
discussed on page 53. 
The 'Technico-Scientific' Approach to Risk and Sociological 
Critiques 
As Lupton (1999) suggests, diverse disciplines inform the 'technico-scientific' 
approach to 'risk', such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, 
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epidemiology and economics. She cites cognitive SCIence, an approach based on 
psychology, as an example of a major area that adopts the technico-scientific 
perspective. Such disciplines, she argues, associate the notion of danger with 
calculations of probability. 
The association of danger and probability that underpins 'technico-scientific' theories 
of risk can be clearly identified in the definition of 'risk' that appears in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary - "the chance or possibility of danger, loss or injury" (Allen 1990, 
p.1040). Dictionaries are supposed to present the common sense meanings of words 
and expressions of a given language. This suggests that, as a number of commentators 
have argued, the daily use of the notion of 'risk' is influenced by the technical 
approach of science (Beck 1992; Giddens 1996; Lupton 1995a; Petersen and Lupton 
1996). Lupton (1999) describes how the proponents of a technico-scientific approach 
to 'risk' develop their work by commenting on the nature of the debates over risk that 
they produce and on their tendency to know 'risk' in a calculable way: 
"Debates over risk in these technico-scientific fields tend to revolve around 
issues of how well a risk has been identified or calculated, the level of 
seriousness of a risk in terms of its possible effects, how accurate is the 
'science' that has been used to measure and calculate risk and how 
inclusive are the causal or predictive models that have been constructed to 
understand why risks occur and why people respond to them in certain 
ways" (p.18). 
One important feature of what Lupton calls 'technico-scientific' conceptions of 'risk' 
is that they tend to present the knowledge produced in their risk calculations as 'the 
truth'. The objectivity, rationality and neutrality that are supposedly implicit in any 
scientific enterprise, are also understood as valid here. To understand what the 
emphasis on the objective character of 'risk' means or what effects this has on the 
discourses of 'risk' that this approach produces, one may begin by considering the 
definitions of 'objectivity' and 'objectivism' that appear in the dictionary. The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary defines 'objective' as "external to mind, actually existing; real" and 
'objectivism' as "the belief that certain things [ ... ] exist apart from human knowledge 
or perception of them" (Allen 1990, p.817). 'Risk' is seen by the proponents of the 
technico-scientific approach as a phenomenon that exists independently of human 
perception; that is, it is statically out there waiting to be discovered and rationally 
explained, calculated and controlled (Heyman 1998a; Lupton 1999). The scientific 
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exploration of 'risk' is to be undertaken by means of scientific methods, mainly 
probabilistic risk assessment, for they are believed to be value-free and to guarantee a 
neutral and objective knowledge of facts (Gibson 1986; Lupton 1999). 
We have learned from the sociological theories on risk discussed so far that, as 
opposed to the affirmation of the objectivity of 'scientific risk', sociologists believe 
that the attachment of meanings to risk is always biased. As proponents of the 
sociological approach to risk, Petersen and Lupton (1996) comment: 
"the focus on the social construction of risk is not to argue that there are no 
'real' dangers and threats to which humans may fall prey [ ... ] but rather is 
to contend that our understanding of these dangers and hazards, including 
their origins and outcomes, are constituted through social, cultural and 
political processes. It is through these processes that dangers and hazards 
become risks" (p.18). 
A major problem pointed out by the critics of scientific interpretations of risk is that, 
despite the alleged objectivity and neutrality of science, scientific theories on risk are 
subjectively produced and so can be externally manipulated to direct risk discourses 
towards specific interests (Beck 1992; Castel 1991; Gabe 1995; Heyman 1998a; 
Lupton 1995a; Lupton 1999; Petersen and Lupton 1996). The critics argue that because 
scientific calculations of 'risk' are not neutral, nor objective, they should not be 
uncritically accepted as picturing the reality about risks. For the critics, risk assessment 
always involves some sort of subjective judgment, which is influenced by social and 
cultural bias (Beck 1992; Gibson 1986; Lupton 1995a; Lupton 1999). In that sense, it 
would be a mistake to distinguish subjective ways of seeing risk from objective 
conceptions of risk. 
Heyman (1998a, p.5) makes a meticulous analysis of what he sees as the critical points 
of an objective approach to 'risk'. He argues that objective definitions of 'risk' 
represent it "as a property of the world rather than of our knowledge" and that, in doing 
so, tend to attach pre-determined meanings to it. The author makes his point clearer 
when he examines minutely The Royal Society's definition of 'risk' presented earlier. 
In his view, to define 'risk' as "the probability that a particular adverse event occurs 
during a stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge" (quoted in 
Heyman 1998a, p.5) is problematic in five different aspects. First, the notion of an 
"event" presupposes a sort of categorization of heterogeneous phenomena, which may 
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vary not only between individuals but even between different groups of professionals. 
Secondly, the use of the word "adverse" implies an externalisation of adversity onto 
events, ignoring the fact that 'adversity' is a concept internally defined by individuals 
and social groups on the basis of their values. The third critique has to do with the idea 
of "a stated period of time", which seems to imply that the temporal frame of 'risks' 
can be externally established. Fourth, The Royal Society uses the notion of 
"probability" as a way to externalise uncertainty, in the same way of "adversity" as an 
"externalisation of value" (Heyman 1998a, pp. 5-6). In addition, to work with the idea 
of 'probability' rather than 'probabilities', Heyman argues, is to forget that, on the 
basis of a combination of uncertainties, one can correctly attribute more than one 
probability to the same event. To him, the tendency of science based cultures in 
externalising uncertainty, " ... creates a cognitive illusion that multiple probabilities of 
the same event are logically impossible" (p.7). The last critique pointed out by Heyman 
refers to the reduced focus of The Royal Society's definition - a single "adverse event"-
which fits with the tradition of science in investigating and managing isolated 
problems. In this respect, Heyman (1998a) remarks, 
" .. .individuals who manage personal risks are not usually concerned with 
predicting the probability of one form of adversity in terms of multiple 
indicators, but with its obverse. They seek to predict the multiple 
consequences, positive and negative of a single type of action" (p.6). 
One indication of the ideal of objectivity implicit in the disciplines that adopt a 
technico-scientific perspective is their emphasis on numerical representations of 'risk' 
(Lupton 1999l Allen and Crump (1986) define quantitative risk assessment as "that 
portion of the overall risk management process concerned with the quantitative 
estimation of risk, relating numerically specified levels of exposure to probabilities of 
response" (p.129). One of the fields where quantitative risk assessment is more 
common is the field of public health, in which probabilistic estimations of risk are used 
as a scientific and rational support for political and professional decisions concerning 
health-related risks (Gabe 1995). Allen and Crump (1986) exemplify with the case of 
cancer the ways in which quantitative estimations of risk may assist public health 
professionals: 
6 See section on 'risk and epidemiology', page 55. 
Because of the many known or suspected carcinogens encountered in the 
workplace, released to the ambient environment, or imposed by lifestyle 
choices, it is important to decide what levels of risk are entailed, which 
carcmogens should receive attention, and how risks might be reduced 
(p.129). 
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Douglas (1990) argues that the word 'risk' has been substituted for 'danger' in a 
number of professional discourses because the former is considered to be 'more 
scientific' than the latter and so subject to 'precise' calculations. Danger was 
transformed into 'risk' to attend the demands of contemporary western societies. 
Lupton (1993) explains how the numerical logic that underpins objective approaches to 
'risk' works: 
" ... risk analysts speak ofthe statistical likelihood that an event may occur, 
and use the mathematical model produced to assist in decision-making in 
such areas as economics and management. The risk, or likelihood, of an 
event happening can be calculated to numerical odds - one in fifty chance, 
one in a hundred, one in a million - as can the magnitude of the outcome 
should it happen" (p.426). 
Gibson (1986) also offers her critique of the alleged objectivity of quantified risk. She 
affirms that quantitative risk assessment is potentially manipulative, because it is 
carried out according to a certain background and the choice of this background is 
always value-laden. One indication of the subjective character of discourses of risk 
produced through a technico-scientific approach is reflected in the disputes over health 
risk matters that are daily presented in the media.7 Gibson (1986) gives an example 
how subjective and influential the choice is of the referential point against which 
conceptions of risk are produced: 
"Which of indefinitely many possible comparisons among risks one elects 
to make is not a neutral matter. When we are told that the risk of death to 
any individual from a nuclear power accident in any given year is less than 
the risk many of us take each day driving or riding in an automobile, it is 
being suggested that we ought to accept the nuclear risk" (p.181). 
According to Thompson (1986), the proper goals of quantitative risk assessment 
suggest the mistaken conception of 'risk' that underpins the technico-scientific 
7 An example is the current debate about the safety of British beef in the case of the human form of 'mad 
cow disease' . 
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approach. As the author notes: " ... the need to reflect one's level of confidence 
probabilistically and [ ... ] to evaluate events constitute sufficient demonstration of the 
inadequacy of founding the concept of risk wholly on how things stand in the world" 
(p.279). 
For the proponents of the socio-cultural approach to 'risk', technico-scientific 
discourses of risk do not acknowledge the implicit need to make choices in order to 
attach meanings to 'risk' and the consequent involvement of the 'self in such an 
operation. The conceptions of 'risk' produced according to technico-scientific 
perspectives are believed to be unbiased pictures of reality. Supposedly, they represent 
the only correct way of looking at the risks in question. From scientists' point of view, 
scientific theories of risk are the product of scientific rationality. So, they cannot be the 
result of subjective choices as, allegedly, there is no more than one option. 
But if the literature shows how problematic it is to affirm the objectivity of 'risk', it 
also indicates that an expansion of risk meanings is equally complicated. Heyman 
(1998a) recognizes those problems by suggesting that whatever the approach, 
conceptions of risk are dependent on a value judgment, for example, about the 
importance of each of the multiple consequences of a given situation. Such a judgment, 
he points out, necessarily involves a subjective reasoning that is socially and culturally 
contingent. Gibson (1986) makes a similar point. She exemplifies her position with the 
case of air pollution. In the example the association between the choice of the 
background within which to carry out risk assessments and conceptions of risk is clear. 
"Sulphur dioxide contributes not only to acid rain, but also to respiratory 
disease and distress. So, when we measure or state the risks of sulfur 
dioxide, do we include only respiratory effects, or all potentially harmful 
effects ... ? And against what set of initial conditions do we determine what 
all the potentially harmful effects are?" (p.l8l) 
For those who adopt a technico-scientific approach to risk (and who usually suggest the 
absolute correctness of their knowledge about it) there seems to be no other option than 
to distinguish the 'right' - objective view of risk - from the 'wrong' version of risk -
subjective view of risk - (see pages 58-62). The literature shows a number of examples 
of studies in which lay people's perceptions of risk are investigated with the implicit 
aim of establishing the gap between what they know about 'risk' and the scientific and 
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'correct' knowledge of risk (Hemmelstein 1995; Moore and Rosenthal 1991; Moore 
and Rosenthal 1992; Weinstein 1984). 
An individualistic notion of behaviour underpins such explanatory projects. It is 
believed that it is because lay people have a subjective and biased approach to 'risk', 
which results in the use of a 'wrong' knowledge to make decisions, that they do not 
behave properly. In that case, the solution to the problem of 'wrong knowledge' and 
'wrong behaviour' is addressed in conformity with tradition, that is, via education and 
the provision of 'correct' information. Lupton (1999) comments on the distinction 
between 'objective risk' and 'subjective risk' that was proclaimed in the Royal 
Society's report on risk. According to Lupton (1999) "it was argued in this report that a 
range of 'objective' risks exist in any situation, to which individuals and social groups 
respond in more or less 'subjective' ways" (p.19). This question of the 'subjective risk' 
will be further discussed in the section on the social psychology approach to risk 
(pages 58-62). 
We will see next that, following its traditional scientific orientation public health and 
health promotion have not taken into consideration the socio-cultural contents of risk. 
For public health workers in general, and health promoters in particular, 'risk' is a 
'technico-scientific' construct, that is to say, 'risk' is defined from a technico-scientific 
perspective (Lupton 1999). The technico-scientific approach to risk adopted in the field 
of public health has often drawn on two disciplines: epidemiology and social 
psychology. The former has theorized 'risk' in terms of the calculation of risk 
distribution in populations and the latter has developed a particular understanding of 
the 'subjective' features ofrisk and risk behaviour. The specific use of both disciplines 
in the theorizing of health risk will be discussed elsewhere.8 
'SCIENTIFIC RISK' AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
Over the last two decades the notion of 'risk' has become key to the production of 
public health discourses, in particular those of health promotion (Lupton 1995a; 
Nettleton and Bunton 1995; Petersen and Lupton 1996). Lupton (1995a) classifies the 
discourses of 'risk' produced in the field from two main perspectives. The first one 
8 See page 55 for the epidemiological approach and page 58 for the social psychology approach. 
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focuses on risk as a threat to the health of populations. Pollution, nuclear waste and 
other environmental hazards represent the danger. In such a perspective, the health of 
'the public' is seen as threatened by external dangers over which people have little 
control. 'The public' is to be protected by an environmental policy, projected and 
implemented by governmental institutions. The second one sees 'risk' as a result of 
lifestyle choices, as an individual responsibility. The emphasis then shifts from little 
control to self-control. In the latter case, the operation of self-management is opened 
to the interference of health educators who have the responsibility of promoting what 
biomedicine defines as healthy lifestyles. In both cases, conceptions of 'risk' and the 
orientation for risk-management are established in accordance with the risk scientists' 
knowledge. The literature reviewed here primarily focuses on the second perspective, 
for the risk discourses of health promotion are produced around the notion of 'risk' as 
"internally imposed" (Lupton 1995a, p. 77, author' s emphasis). 
The analysis of how 'risk' has been defined and theorized in the context of public 
health suggests that the scientific model of risk underpins the risk discourses produced 
in the field. Objectivity, individualism and the tendency to use numbers to refer to 
'risk' are all features of public health discourses of risk that seem to have been 
inherited from the scientific paradigm. Although epidemiology and social psychology 
take different standpoints, their ways of seeing risk are both recognized as 'objective', 
hence scientific. It is this 'scientific' status that has given both disciplines important 
places within the theoretical background of public health and health promotion, 
particularly in problematizing the question of risk. 
As a modernist institution, scientific medicine is traditionally dependent on the 
knowledge produced by 'science' for gaining and maintaining its credibility. It also 
relies upon 'rationality' for achieving its goals in the fight against diseases. It believes 
in human power over the forces of nature (Petersen and Lupton 1996). In modernity, 
chronic diseases constitute the main public health problem. In contrast to the past, 
when diseases were caused by single pathogens, diseases of modernity result from a 
combination of 'unspecified' factors (Susser and Susser 1996) believed to be the 
consequence of interactions between individuals and environments. And, to follow the 
traditions, diseases of modernity also need to be dealt with by rational means. 
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For obvious reasons, modernist institutions, like scientific medicine, seek to use 
modernist strategies for dealing with the problems of modernity (Petersen and Lupton 
1996). The development of quantitative measures of 'risk' can, apparently, help to 
resolve these problems. Numbers have a 'real existence'. They can be 'rationally' 
handled (Lupton 1995a) and scientifically 'recycled' as material for developing and 
proving arguments. More importantly, they can be useful for materializing phenomena 
that are difficult to visualize. Numbers can tum 'risks' into concrete entities, which 
may then become subjected to external intervention (Lupton 1995a). 
Ultimately, the goal of health risk assessments is "to find out what the risks really are", 
an optimistic goal that relies on the idea that "all risks are discoverable and measurable 
and can be controlled with the requisite skill and expertise" (Gabe 1995, p.2). Risk 
assessment and management has been introduced in the health care systems of 
industrialised countries as a way of reducing risks and controlling costs (Gabe 1995; 
Lupton 1993). Epidemiological calculations are the most common means utilized for 
the 'new' public health workers to problematize health-related risks. The next section 
discusses the use of epidemiology in the field. 
'Quantitative Risk' and Epidemiology 
There is an intrinsic relation between 'risk' and 'epidemiology'. As some have argued, 
epidemiology can be seen as "the study of disease and illness and their risk factors as 
they occur in groups rather than in individuals" (Petersen and Lupton 1996, p.27). 
However, as Susser (1996) remarks, although the definition of epidemiology refers to 
'groups' as targets, epidemiology usually focuses on the individuals within those 
groups. Similarly, while public health conceptions of risk are mainly based on 
(epidemiological) studies of groups, the definition of problems of health-related risks, 
and also of their solutions, remains focused on the individual (Lupton 1999). It is not 
surprising, then, that the alleged progress of public health from the 'old' individualistic 
approach to a 'new' holistic one has been contested. 
The aim of epidemiology is to identify "patterns in diseases at a population level, 
seeking to discover reasons for certain groups developing diseases over other groups" 
(Lupton 1995a, pp.65-66, my emphasis). Public health workers have utilized 
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epidemiology not only for finding out 'where' and 'what' the potential problems are 
but also, and more importantly, for pointing out 'why' they are there. The 
determination of 'why' is used to reveal who the potential risk subjects are, who in the 
case of self-imposed risks are obviously taken as the origin of related problems. 
In his review of the history of epidemiology, Susser (1996) remarks that when the 
epidemic of chronic diseases emerged in the latter half of twentieth century, the need to 
find out the origins of the diseases resulted in the development of descriptive studies of 
disease distribution. Also, it resulted in the development of exploratory research, which 
had the aim of finding out the potential risk factors. Susser comments that later the 
procedures were gradually refined with the help of statistics and analytical methods and 
became known as 'epidemiology'. 
'Epidemiology' has the same etymological roots as the word 'epidemic' (Lupton 
1995a). To call a phenomenon an 'epidemic' means "to label a collection of cases of an 
illness or disease", which is the same as to "give certain meaning to these cases" 
(Lupton 1995a, p.65). 'Epidemic' also suggests a "societal disorder" that suddenly 
spreads without warning, and "the need for harsh and decisive measures to be taken to 
keep the disease in check" (Lupton 1995a, p.65). Given the scientific status of 
epidemiology, its methods are understood as 'rational' ways of dealing with such an 
emergent situation and so of "re-establishing the social order" (Lupton 1995a, p.65). 
Ideological and political reasons are behind the interest of the 'new' public health in 
the quantification of health-related risks (Petersen and Lupton 1996). To begin with the 
ideological reasons, one can follow Lupton's affirmation that in contemporary 
societies, diseases may threaten social life by exposing the fragility of social order, an 
affirmation that relies on the ideological assumption of human progress and rationality 
(Lupton 1995a). In affecting a large number of people, epidemics can be particularly 
threatening. They may threaten human beings' power over nature (Lupton 1995a, 
p.63). They may also challenge the competence of 'rational' methods of traditional 
medicine for dealing with sickness (Lupton 1995a). 
Once again one can argue that the ideology of individualism influences the way the 
'new' public health approaches risk (see section on health education, p.16), as the 
emphasis on individuals' responsibility for health seems to be behind the interest in 
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epidemiology. The environment may frame individuals' behaviour but, in the end, it is 
the response of the individuals to their environmental circumstances (or their lifestyles) 
that can threat their health status. In the 'new' public health individuals are not 
considered in isolation. They are part of the' social', an idea that expands the notion of 
'environment' and re-conceptualizes it in holistic terms. The individual is seen as 
having a dynamic and symbiotic relationship not only with the environment as a 
material world, but also with the political, social and economic aspects of it. In this 
sense, the 'social' also incorporates the relationships between individuals within a 
given material world (Petersen and Lupton 1996). In such a context, the state of health 
of an individual body affects the health of the others, and so of the 'social body'; just 
as the 'social' also influences the health ofthe individual. In order to control the health 
of the 'social body' it seems necessary to develop mechanisms of surveillance through 
which a 'clear picture' of individuals' behaviour can be obtained. 
Castel (1991) argues that in preventive medicine the assessment of risk factors is used 
as an innovative strategy of surveillance, in which there is no need for an actual contact 
between the agent and the subject of prevention. In this new system of administration, 
he stresses, the monitoring of the "assisted subjects" (Castel 1991, p.287) is now 
undertaken through the prediction (and anticipated prevention) of the events that may 
result in "undesirable modes of behaviour" (Castel 1991, p.287). In this sense, "risk 
does not arise from the presence of particular precise danger embodied in a concrete 
individual or group. It is the effect of a combination of abstract factors that render more 
or less probable the occurrence of undesirable modes of behaviour. (Castel 1991, 
p.287, author's emphasis). 
As Yen (1995) remarks, this focus on 'risk factors' indicates an understanding of the 
individual based on an understanding of the group of particular risk factors he/she 
displays. To represent an individual as a collection of risk factors has the effect of 
reducing the integrated person to a "limited set of behaviours and characteristics" (Yen 
1995, p.35). If that is true, then, to be a patient is no longer confined to manifesting 
symptoms of ill-health (Castel 1991). For someone to be seen as a patient (and 
subjected to health professionals' intervention) it seems to be enough to display the 
characteristics defined by the experts as 'risk factors'. The dissociation of the notion of 
'risk' from that of 'danger', Castel (1991) argues, may result in a multiplication of 
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possibilities for experts' intervention, for virtually everyone may display a number of 
risk-factors. More specifically, it opens up the definition of what health is or what an 
individual or group required to be considered as healthy according to medical 
professionals' judgments. And this involves biased decisions. 
Citing Frankenberg, Petersen and Lupton (1996) stress that when epidemiology deals 
with risk situations two initial choices are posed: first, "which outcomes to focus upon" 
and second, "which risk factors ought to be given priority" (Frankenberg 1993, p.236). 
Along with Frankenberg, Petersen and Lupton suggest that those choices are biased as 
they "are surrounded by culturally defined moral problems in which power relations 
always have a central position" (Frankenberg 1993, p.236). Petersen and Lupton (1996, 
p.47) exemplify the argument by commenting on the usual representation of the causes 
of smoking: 
" ... the 'web' of causation that is often constructed to show why individuals 
may choose to smoke draws attention to such factors as stress, lack of 
knowledge about the side-effects of smoking, addiction to nicotine, low 
self-esteem and low self-efficacy. While the sociocultural context is clearly 
important here, it is generally reduced to the individual level: a person feels 
stress and smokes to alleviate it, lacking the self-esteem and self-efficacy 
she or he requires to give up". 
But if epidemiology has been useful for the general purposes of the public health, 
helping with the identification of individuals and groups 'at risk', social psychology 
has served more specific purposes. While the former informs the definition of risk and 
the identification of 'risk subjects', the latter is used in the study of how 'risk subjects' 
perceive the 'risk' in question or what needs correction in this 'process of perceiving'. 
'Subjective Risk' and Social Psychology 
Psychology is used in the field of public health to fill the space created between 
external and internal conceptions of 'risk'. By being mostly concentrated on 
individual's risk perception, psychologists' studies of 'risk' obviously adopt an 
individualistic approach.9 Health promotion's individualistic approach to risk has 
much to do with the psychologisation of risk. 
9 See for example Hemmelstein 1995; Irwin Jr. 1993; Moore and Gullone 1996; Weinstein 1982. 
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Psychologists' study of the subjective character of risk has been focused on risk 
perception, or to be more precise on 'lay people's risk perception'. Risk perception is 
understood as a 'mere' subjective and often mistaken process of making sense of 
scientific risk, which is supposedly the objective, neutral and correct way of seeing 
risk. Research subjects rarely include scientists. Scientists are not supposed to 
'perceive' but, 'to know for sure'. Strikingly, as the sociocultural analysis of scientific 
risk discourses reviewed so far suggests, it is precisely because scientists perceive 
'risk' in the way they do that they 'believe' it is only others' perceptions that need to be 
investigated (Beck 1992; Giddens 1996; Heyman 1998a; Lupton 1995a; Petersen and 
Lupton 1996). 
Adolescents are common targets of research on risk perception. Here are some 
examples of the focus of this type of research: 'adolescents' perception of the risk of 
drug use' (Hemmelstein 1995); 'adolescents perception of AIDS sexual risk' (Abrams 
et al. 1990; Bartelli et al. 1996; Maswanya et al. 1999; Moore and Rosenthal 1991); 
adolescents' perceptions of health-related risks (Moore and Rosenthal 1992; Weinstein 
1984), adolescents' perceptions of the risk of sexually transmitted diseases (Moore and 
Rosenthal 1994). 
A common aim of psychology is to explore the gap between technically defined risks 
and public perceptions of them (Gabe 1995), which is allegedly one of the main causes 
of risk behaviour. 10 As Gabe (1995) argues, the focus on personal perceptions of risk 
rather than on impersonal 'risk factors' should result in understandings that could be 
less technical than those resulting from epidemiologists' studies, for example. 
However, this is not the case. As a scientific discipline, psychology seeks to develop 
theories in a 'rational' and objective 'environment'. This purpose has lead 
psychologists to use quantitative methodology to assess people's perceptions of risk (as 
it is seen as more scientific). Thus, similarly to epidemiologists, psychologists have 
also produced a body of knowledge on 'risk' supported by what Gabe calls a "technical 
risk assessment" (1995, pA). Lupton (1999) calls this type of operation "psychometric 
risk analysis" (p.21), a quantitative analysis to measure the relationship between 
cognitive factors and lay people's attitudes and behaviour concerning risk. Those types 
10 See section on page 65 for the limitations of risk perception research to explain the specific case of 
sexual risk behaviour. 
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of studies seek to examine the cognitive processes through which lay people perceive 
'risk' and act accordingly (Denscombe 1993). 
Here is an example of how the focus on individual risk perception may orient the 
definition of a given health risk-related problem. On the basis of the assumptions that 
"perceptions of vulnerability predict preventive health behaviour" and "people's 
comparative risk judgments are optimistically biased", Weinstein (1984) carried out a 
quantitative study with the aim of analysing 'how' young people's perceptions of 
susceptibility and risk factors were formed. The author concluded that perceptions of 
susceptibility and risk were constructed through a process of comparative risk 
judgments which basically took into account the relationship between objective and 
perceived risk (particularly with regard to perceptions of risk factors of oneself and of 
others). Self-esteem, egocentrism and optimistic bias were found to be the most 
influential factors affecting such processes. In the concluding comments the author 
pointed out the importance of his findings for the prevention of risky behaviours: 
"Several of the findings reported here-the weakness of the links between 
behavioral risk factors and perceived susceptibility; the tendency for young 
people to view their actions as both desirable and as better than the actions 
of their peers - have clear implications for prevention. It is common for 
public health campaigns to point out risky behaviors [ ... ]. It appears 
necessary, in addition, to strongly emphasize the link between behavior and 
susceptibility, stressing that the people who engage in high risk behaviors 
should see themselves as the ones most likely to suffer harm" (Weinstein 
1984, p.455). 
It seems to be apparent in the statement above that, as Gabe (1995) argues, the 
underlying assumption of this kind of psychological approach to 'risk' is that 
individuals are "free agents in terms of their response to risk, ignoring social factors 
which constrain choice" (p.5). This contradicts the empirical findings of sociological 
research that strongly suggest that 'risk', 'risk perception' and 'risk behaviour' are all 
culturally and socially produced (Frankenberg 1994; Green 1997a; Paiva 1993; Rhodes 
1997) (see section on page 38). 
Most of the theories on health risk behaviour utilized in the field of public health and 
health promotion are based upon the models of behaviour developed by socio-
psychology. The most influential model is the 'Health Belief Model' (HBM). The 
HBM is an explanatory model employed to predict health behaviour. It is based on the 
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assumption that individuals make conscious decisions concerning personal health after 
taking into account a number of factors (Rosenstock 1974; Rosenstock, Strecher, and 
Becker 1988). The HBM hypothesizes that health-related risk behaviour is dependent 
on three categories of factors: the existence of motivation or health concern, perceived 
vulnerability and the belief that it is worthwhile to take a particular health 
recommendation in order to reduce a perceived threat (Rosenstock, Strecher, and 
Becker 1988). Individual rational thinking is thus a major feature of such a theory. The 
focus on individual rationality to theorize risk behaviour can be criticized on the basis 
of the same assumptions used to question the individualistic approach of health 
promotion. Simply put, individual factors cannot be indicators of behaviour, for 
behaviour is socially constructed (Bunton, Murphy, and Bennett 1991). 
The employment of social psychology to theorize health-related risk behaviour has 
reinforced the tendency of health professionals to conceptualize 'risk' as a 
phenomenon that has a 'life of its own' and can therefore be externally visualized, 
defined and studied on the basis of scientific knowledge. Psychology-based theories on 
risk are the targets of the same critiques received by other theories of risk that take a 
technico-scientific approach (see pages 47-53). 
Psychologists' theories of risk perception often do not to take into account the 
influence of the socio-cultural context on the way people perceive 'risk' (Gabe 1995; 
Lupton 1999). Perceptions of risk are assessed as isolated 'facts', which are seen as 
dependent on cognitive and rational operations (Joffe 1999; Lupton 1993; Lupton 
1999). The assessment of 'perceptions of risk' constitutes an attempt to find out how 
those cognitive operations work (Joffe 1999), using behavioural theories as a 
theoretical background. Joffe argues that such inquiries draw on "information process 
models", which are focused on " ... the 'errors' that interfere with logical processing" 
(Joffe 1999, p.138, author's emphasis). Within such a paradigm, risk behaviours are 
supposed to result from internal cognitions and individual rationality. What matters in 
these studies is "the lone thinker's subjective processing" (Joffe 1999, p.138). The 
social is either taken as secondary or irrelevant. 
The sociological critique of the alleged objectivity of 'technico-scientific' approaches 
to risk imply the affirmation of the subj ective and biased nature of conceptions of risk, 
which the proponents of the technico-scientific approach to 'risk' seem to accept only 
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when it comes to lay understandings. As commented earlier, technical risk assessment 
and related knowledge are supposed to be 'immune' to subjective judgments and, thus, 
to be far more accurate than any lay attempt to assess the risks by themselves. In that 
sense, Lupton (1999) points out: "such risk calculations tend not to acknowledge the 
role played by the 'ways of seeing' on the part of experts themselves that produce such 
calculations" (p.19, author's emphasis). Whatever the background, either scientific or 
lay, to deal with 'risk' always entails some sort of subjective calculation (Giddens 
1996). 
Along with the argument that conceptions of risk extrapolate the technico-scientific 
meanings of risk and the affirmation of the subjective character of risk, the sociological 
literature also develops another important argument. Some sociologists have argued 
that public health workers' emphasis on the individual perspective of risk has had 
implications for the production of individuals' subjectivities. This argument is further 
developed in Chapter 5 (page 156), where I make the point about the influence of 
health promotion on the ways in which the girls whom I talked to make sense of 
themselves in their responses to the risks of sex. The section below points out the main 
issues raised by the sociologists that make the point of the relationship between 
'subjectivity' - the sense one makes of oneself - and 'risk'. 
Subjectivity and Risk 
Considering the literature reviewed, we can assume that in the view of sociologists risk 
has been defined in the field of public health as a person-centered problem, with an 
obvious effect on the production of identities and forms of governance. It seems that, 
as far as the 'new' public health is concerned, we are legitimate gatekeepers of our own 
health and, thus, surveillance needs to be doubled. We need to be externally and 
internally monitored; we become not only a target of health professionals' surveillance 
but also, and more importantly, we need to be constantly controlled by ourselves. It has 
been argued in the sociological literature on risk that this discourse of self-governance 
that is incorporated into conceptions of 'health risk' has had a great impact on the 
production of new shapes for the 'self (Greco 1993; Nettleton 1997; Ogden 1995; 
Petersen and Lupton 1996; Petersen 1996). 
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In contemporary society, risk is not considered as external to the 'self as it was 
perceived in the past (the risk of being invaded by a virus or harmed by pollution), but 
located within the 'self. In Ogden's words, " ... the individual has become at risk from 
his or herself' (Ogden 1995, p.413). Petersen and Lupton (1996) make a similar point. 
They remark that by having the moral commitment of protecting the 'self against the 
health-related risks that can be produced by lifestyle choices, the individual may 
" ... become 'at risk' from their own ignorance or lack of self-control" (Petersen and 
Lupton 1996, p.115). AIDS is cited as a case in point. II "The HIV virus itself is no 
longer a risk to health: the individual's ability to control their sexual behaviour is now 
the risk" (Ogden 1995, p.413). As we will see in Chapter 4 (page 130) this association 
between 'risk' and 'self-control' is not, however, limited to health hazards and sexual 
relationships. It can also be incorporated to other risk contexts of everyday life. 
To Greco (1993, p. 357), 'to be well' has become a 'duty' in an environment where to 
live is to be increasingly 'at risk'. 'To be well' is perceived as a possibility as long as 
the individual takes care of himselflherself. "The mastery of the self is thus a 
prerequisite for health" (p.36l). And, suggesting that the imperative of self-
government created by risk discourses is implicated in the production of 'selves', 
Greco remarks that 'risk' is " ... directly associated with biography, meant as the path 
between the different things that one is and becomes, rather than with the 'objective' 
circumstances met thorough life" (p.360, my emphasis). 12 
Petersen and Lupton (1996) add another point to this question of the production of 
'selves' within a context that relates 'risk' to health to individual behaviour. They 
argue that members of specific groups (gay male, women, the poor, etc.), who are 
portrayed as more 'risky' than the members of other groups are also expected to 
regulate themselves for the sake of the others. The "risky persona" (p.117), the authors 
argue, is not only a risk to himself or herself but also a source of risk to other people. In 
the case of a failure of self-control, he or she should be blamed for hislher misfortune 
and also for the misfortune of the others. 
11 See page 65 for a specific discussion of the way health promotion has dealt with the case of AIDS risk. 
12 See Chapter 5 for the development of the argument in my own work. 
64 
Nettleton (1997) agrees with the argument that the new forms of surveillance that 
emerged within the context of health risk discourses have contributed to the formation 
of a "risky identity or risky self' (p.322). But she argues that this is not to say that 
people are simply shaped by the dominant discourses of the day. For her, the 'risky 
identity' forged by contemporary surveillance techniques and by the proliferation of 
discourses on risk is constituted by an active interaction of the 'self with its risky 
environment. We will see examples of this in my own work (see Chapter 5). 
Nettleton comments that as a member of a liberal and democratic society and a 
consumer of health promotional goods the individual has the right to choose between 
'buying' these goods or not 'buying' them at all. To Nettleton (1997), the possibility of 
resisting the advice of health promoters and deciding to take the risks is a condition for 
the success of the forms of governance that rely on techniques of surveillance. 
Nettleton (1997) goes on to argue that: 
"the decision to follow or not the expert's advice is part of an ongoing 
process of the formation of this new conceptualisation of 'self, one which 
is perpetually both cognisant of, and resistant to, risk" (p.314). 
I will return to this question of the identity work that the notion of risk generates in 
Chapter 5. I will argue there that health promotion's discourses of risk play a 
fundamental role in the way the girls I interviewed see the risks of sex. My point will 
be that health promoters' emphasis on 'self-care' influences a great deal the girls' 
production of their 'selves' as 'sexual risk subjects' and that this impacts upon their 
ways of seeing and responding to the risks of sex. 
Before concluding the present chapter I wish to address one more issue, one which 
refers to a crucial problem of modernity, and one that may represent the struggles of 
modem societies to dominate nature and to move towards the incorporation of 
rationality and self-governance as individual and collective ideals. That is the problem 
of 'HIV/AIDS risk'. The next section is concentrated on health promotion's response 
to the case of the sex-related HIV/AIDS risk, one of the biggest challenges faced to 
date by the 'new' public health. It draws on the socio-cultural theories of health risk 
presented above and on the sociological critiques of the 'new' public health approach 
to the HIV I AIDS epidemic. 
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The Case of the Sex-Related HIV I AIDS Risk as a Health Promotion 
Problem 
I do not offer here an extensive account of the literature about how HIV I AIDS risk has 
come to be defined as a 'health promotion problem', for much of what could be said 
was presented in the sections above. It is sufficient to say that HIV I AIDS is " ... a late 
addition to the growing portfolio of risks which individuals are expected to manage in 
the everyday worlds" (Scott and Freeman 1995, p.161). The contemporary production 
and use of risk discourses, scientific conceptions of health risk, ideological basis of the 
'new' public health and health promotion are all constitutive elements of the 
framework employed in the definition of HIV/AIDS risk as another 'health promotion 
problem'. 
As has happened with other 'public health problems', the theorization of HIV/AIDS 
risk has predominantly been informed by the biomedical model (Guizzardi, Stella, and 
Remy 1997; Plummer 1988; Waldby 1996). Those who have AIDS are under strict 
surveillance of medical professionals. From HIV tests to the HIV I AIDS language, from 
HIV I AIDS treatment to research on vaccines, everything involving HIV I AIDS has 
become incorporated into the rhetoric of medicine (Plummer 1988). Those who do not 
have HIV I AIDS are also in the limelight. Epidemiological surveillance is put in place 
in the name of the general population's protection against the risk of HIV infection. 13 
Everyone is, in principle, at risk, risk levels depending on epidemiological risk 
estimates. 14 
There is nowadays a consensus that, in spite of all the efforts and recognized advances 
in biomedical interpretations of HIV I AIDS, the future of the epidemic is currently not 
in physicians' hands (Aggleton 1989; Plummer 1988; Wiseman 1989). As long as 
biomedicine does not discover the cure for HIV I AIDS or a vaccine to prevent the HIV 
infection, it appears that the only means to reduce the spread of the epidemic is to 
promote behavioural change. As Scott and Freeman (1995) argue, "AIDS exemplifies a 
process by which the incapacities of state and expert systems come to require the 
13 See page 56 for Petersen and Lupton's argument on the need to protect the social body through the 
surveillance of the individual body. 
14 See pages 57-58 for a discussion of Castel's and Yen's arguments on the matter. 
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individual management of risk" (Scott and Freeman 1995, p.155). To the authors this 
has resulted in a ''personalisation of risk politics" (p.155, authors' emphasis), that is, 
public policies are now focused on individual responsibility (Scott and Freeman 1995). 
In the terrain of AIDS prevention, public policies have relied almost entirely on health 
education (Wilton 1997). While HIV/AIDS and health education are both guided by 
biomedical professionals, the aim of promoting individual responsibility and 
behavioural change has directed much attention to the cooperation of the so-called 
'general public', in an attempt to make them partners of public health (where medical 
professionals predominate) in its preventive projects. One consequence of using the 
biomedical model to problematize the HIV/AIDS sexual risk is that the resulting 
theories are very simplistic. 
As in other areas, health promotion's theories of sexual risk-taking are informed by 
social psychology and its reduced emphasis on the cognitive aspects of sexual 
behaviour (see page 58). Risk perception and individual factors that are believed to 
contribute to, or impede the (right) perception of, HIV/AIDS as a threat to personal 
health are common foci of this type of research. It is understood that once scientists 
know about how 'risk perception' operates at the level of the individual, responses 
about why some groups 'dare' to resist to the sexual behavioural change recommended 
by HIV/AIDS experts will emerge. Beneath this logic lies the idea that one's exposure 
to the risk of HIV I AIDS sexual infection is either the outcome of irrational individual 
decision or of an inadequate and subjective cost-benefit calculation. 
Another factor that contributes to the limitations of health promotion's definition of the 
problem of the HIV I AIDS sexual risk is the frequent employment of questionnaires as 
a research method to investigate sexual risk behaviour. Just to cite an example of this 
type of research, Maswanya and colleagues (1999), carried out a questionnaire survey 
in Tanzania with the aim of evaluating" ... the relationship between HIV Irisky sexual 
behaviour and anti-condom bias, as well as, with AIDS-related information, 
knowledge, perceptions and attitudes" among Tanzanian students of secondary schools 
(p.185). On the basis of their questionnaire data they concluded that, although the 
respondents were well informed about the risk of HIV infection in sexual relationships, 
they tended to take sexual risks due to a widespread prejudice against condoms. The 
researchers argued that the main problem outlined in the research findings was that 
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there was a gap between perceptions of risk and behaviour. The suggested solution was 
the improvement of educational measures in schools and communication with teachers, 
classmates, health educators and parents. Behind this suggestion there seems to be the 
simplistic assumption that knowledge is directly connected to behaviour. 
In a similar vein, Fawole and colleagues (1999) carried out research aimed at 
comparing knowledge, attitudes and sexual risk behaviours of 223 Nigerian secondary 
students who received a comprehensive health education intervention with a group of 
217 controls who did not. A post-test concluded that the participants of the intervention 
increased their knowledge of HIV / AIDS transmission and prevention and that the 
reported number of sexual partners decreased, while it increased among the 217 
controls. The researchers also concluded that consistent condom use increased among 
the members of the intervention group, which they believed to corroborate the 
argument that "the education programme succeeded in improving students' sexual 
practices" (p.681, my emphasis). The authors went on to explain that this 
'improvement' occurred especially with regard to behaviours like the frequency of 
sexual intercourse and the number of sexual partners. In their final remarks the authors 
suggested that schools have an important role to play in the prevention of HIV 
infection. For them this would be achieved by teaching students to adopt safer sex 
practices or to abstain from sexual intercourse. 
It has been stressed that questionnaire data are too restricted to give an account of the 
complexities of sexual behaviour determinants (Ingham, Woodcock, and Stenner 
1992). It is based on simplistic definitions of the variables taken into account, such as 
'knowledge', 'risk perception', 'sex' and 'sexual risk'. Also, the choice of the variables 
to be considered is biased, for the variables taken as characterizing risk behaviour and 
'at-risk' situations are strictly informed by biomedical knowledge (Bastard and Cardia-
Voneche 1997). This may well be the reason why the concepts employed in the study 
of the problem of sexual risk behaviour are often narrowly defined. It is often the case 
that, as in the research commented upon above, the suggested solution to the problem 
of sexual risk behaviour is the provision of information. It is usually implicit that 'more 
information' means 'more technical information', suggesting that the only type of 
knowledge that is significant in the prevention of HIV infection in sexual relationships 
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IS the scientific knowledge concernmg modes of transmission and prevention 
techniques. As Hart and Boulton (1995) argue, 
"this essentially epidemiological account of risk for HIV infection, while 
informing us of the 'mechanical' dynamics of transmission (excluding 
biological parameters such as infectivity, or individual susceptibility) does 
not address an entirely separate, but equally significant dimension of risk, 
notably how and why this occurs to particular individuals, in specific 
contexts and at certain times. That is, it cannot (and is not intended to) 
inform our understanding of the social determinants of risk". (p.55). 
Similarly, 'sex' is usually limited to sexual penetration, meaning that sexual behaviour 
or sexual practices are only to do with sexual intercourse. In consequence, the 
definition of 'sexual risk' is also restricted to the possibility of negative outcomes 
resulting from heterosexual and homosexual penetration, such as HIV infection and 
other sexually transmitted diseases. As some have argued, the use of such a restricted 
way of defining sex and the risks of sex can result in a very partial conception of 'safe 
sex' which would consider safety as strictly related to protection against sexually 
transmitted diseases, especially AIDS (Hillier, Harrison, and Warr 1998, citing Singer, 
1993). 
One can suggest that when the focus of the research is knowledge and behaviour 
concerning HIV / AIDS risk, it is 'natural' to reduce the definition of key concepts to 
their disease-related meanings. But the problem is that AIDS is more than a disease. As 
many have argued, it is also a social and cultural phenomenon, thus a problem whose 
definition(s) goes beyond biomedical problematization. 15 The use of a single "health-
rationality perspective" (Flowers et al. 1997, p.82) is problematic. It reduces sexual 
risk behaviour with regard to HIV / AIDS to a matter of personal significance, for 
instance, giving importance only to individual health. This inevitably simplifies a 
problem that has already proved dependent on a multifaceted association of individual 
and socio-cultural factors (Crawford 1994; Frankenberg 1992; Holland et al. 1991; 
Merchan-Hamann 1995; Stiffman et al. 1995). The use of a theory of AIDS that fails to 
embrace its complexities results in the proposition of simplistic solutions to the 
problem (Scott and Freeman 1995). 
15 See for example Ingham and Zessen 1997; Patton 1990; Watney 1989. 
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Guizzardi et al (1997) make an important point concerning the problematic emphasis 
of a simplistic health-related rationality in the domain of HIV / AIDS prevention. The 
authors contend that the problem is that behaviour is tied to two different forms of 
rationality that exist side-by-side in the same social context: "that proposed by medical 
knowledge, which is abstract and considered to be universal, and a concrete, pragmatic 
rationality that has come about subjectively, worked out in small networks of social 
relationships" (p.160). What is more distinct in both rationalities, the authors argue, is 
the logic that they follow. In the HIV / AIDS case, "the [ ... ] medical logic attempts to 
impose an order in which health is paramount, whereas the individual, subjective logic 
arranges itself and adapts the unruly dimension of pleasure to medical discourse ... " 
(p.160). 
Following their general approach to risk (see pages 37-53), sociologists have criticized 
the logic of 'individual rationality' that forms the basis of the conception of sexual risk 
behaviour adopted by health promotion. The critiques follow the general lines that are 
applied to other risk-related matters. Firstly, the critics argue that it is inappropriate to 
apply the logic of 'individual rationality' to situations like sexual encounters, which are 
individual experiences, but also social and interactive events (Bloor 1995; Ingham and 
Zessen 1997; Ingham, Woodcock, and Stenner 1992; Moatti, Hausser, and Agrafiotis 
1997). Sexual relationships are also social relations and the practice of unsafe sex may 
well be the result of a power imbalance within relationships. Secondly, a monolithic 
'individual rationality' is said to be inappropriate for the development of theories of 
sexual behaviour because sexual behaviour is produced through a range of rationalities 
that operate at the same time (Bastard and Cardia-Voneche 1997; Ingham, Woodcock, 
and Stenner 1992). 'Individual rationality' is then rejected as a predictor of sexual risk 
behaviour. Following the argument of the sociological approach to risk (see pages 37-
53), it is emphasized the need to adopt instead what Bloor calls a "situated rationality 
approach" (1995, p.22). 
Researchers who adopt a 'situated rationality approach' investigate sexual risk 
behaviours by taking into consideration risk takers' own accounts of risk-taking. 16 
Bloor points out that those studies have been very efficient in questioning the 
pathological view of risk-taking as the product of irrational thinking (Bloor 1995). He 
16 See for example Ingham, Woodcock, and Stenner 1992 and also Paiva 1993. 
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remarks that "instead, researchers have stressed the situated rationality of their 
subjects' decision-making in terms of the subjects' own definitions of the situation" 
(pol2). As Bloor contends, those types of research also present some difficulties. While 
they have been illuminating, their conclusions are limited to specific contexts and 
subjects. So, those theories cannot be applied to other contexts without problems 
(Bloor 1995). They are consequently inadequate for generalizations, which might be 
regarded as a problem if the aim is to respond quickly to the epidemiologically-defined 
urgencies of the HIV I AIDS epidemic. 
In health promotion's theories of sexual risk behaviour, the phenomenon is over-
simplified. Along with a reduced conception of 'rationality' there are other 
simplifications. Ingham and van Zessen observe that most of the recent research on 
sexuality has been carried out with the aim of developing theories of AIDS, which has 
reduced the focus on sexuality almost entirely to a health concern (Ingham and Zessen 
1997). The result has been that, from the point of view of health promotion, sexual 
risks encapsulate only disease risks, which are nowadays predominantly focused on 
HIV/AIDS risk. The authors quote Gagnon's analysis of the consequences of this. 
First, " ... what is interesting about sex is what the disease makes interesting" (Ingham 
and Zessen 1997, p.96, citing Gagnon). And second, 
" ... sex itself can become confused with disease and being sexual in various 
ways becomes treated as an illness or as evidence of illness ... Even within 
the constraints of a concern for AIDS, a narrow view of sexual behaviour 
may be effective if all that we are concerned with is social book-keeping 
and epidemiological modelling, but it will be inadequate to the task of 
understanding behaviour in a way that results in behaviour change. Sexual 
conduct is embedded in culture and in social relations-as we begin to deal 
with this dimension ... we will need to know a great deal more about the 
why". (Ingham and Zessen 1997, pp.96-97, citing Gagnon, author's 
emphasis). 
Ingham and van Zessen (1997), along with others, assert that there is the need to pay 
more attention to the contextual and interactive character of sexual behaviour in order 
to develop a fair understanding of the complexities of individual's sexual-risk taking. 17 
For example, in research carried out in Australia with young women Hillier et al 
(1998) found out that the loss of a good reputation was a sexual danger shared by every 
17 See also Ahlemeyer 1997; Hillier, Harrison, and Warr 1998; Holland, Ramazanoglu, and Scott 1990. 
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young woman in the town. The authors suggest that, according to their research, the 
current concept of 'safe sex' is inadequate to accommodate meanings other than 
biological ones, a point already made by other commentators (Gorna 1996; Scott and 
Freeman 1995). They note that in spite of their concern with reputation the girls 
interviewed never mentioned this risk when explicitly asked about the meaning of safe 
sex. They wrote: "it may be that this is because "safe sex" campaigning has rendered 
the word "safe" inaccessible as a descriptor of culturally and socially based, as opposed 
to biologically based dangers of having sex" (Hillier, Harrison, and Warr 1998, p.26, 
authors' emphasis). 
In a similar vein, Holland et al. (1990) call for an expansion of empirical knowledge 
about the meanings of 'safe sex'. Referring specifically to the case of the risks facing 
young women, the authors argue that it is necessary to contextualize the notion of 'safe 
sex'. That is, conceptions of 'safe sex' have to be formulated in conformity with 
" ... the ways in which young women identify risk and negotiate definitions" (Holland, 
Ramazanoglu, and Scott 1990, p.132). 
Ahlemeyer and Ludwig (1997) argue that in the specific case of HI VIA IDS risk-related 
sexual behaviour it is necessary to investigate 'meanings' rather than 'thinking'. The 
authors stress that when qualitative research pays adequate attention to individuals' 
perceptions of situations involving sexual risks it is not knowledge about HIV 
transmission and prevention that are the first focus but for instance, "knowledge related 
to factors of good health, to other sexual risks such as pregnancy, being seduced, 
isolated or loved" (p.30).18 
Qualitative exploratory research on sexual risk-taking suggests that a significant 
amount of relevant data is lost when the questionnaire method is employed as the main 
research tool. It also suggests the inappropriateness of the use of individual rationality 
to make interpretations about the production of sexual behaviour. To Ingham and van 
Zessen, as opposed to what social psychology theories of rational behaviour proclaim 
(see page 55), risk perception is not static, that is, it changes over time and space 
(Ingham and Zessen 1997). If that is true, present perceptions of risk will then not 
necessarily inform future sexual behaviour. This makes it difficult to predict sexual 
18 For examples in my own work see Chapter 5. 
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behaviour on the basis of data on perceptions of risk. The authors also argue that, as 
opposed to what questionnaire-based studies seem to suggest, the balance between 
costs and benefits of sexual risk-taking cannot always be anticipated through previous 
attitudes towards the risk in question. Costs and benefits of a given sexual practice are 
also time and space contingent. The authors call attention to the fact that, in general, 
those types of studies are simplistically focused on a specific behaviour, like condom 
use, and make their points on the basis of the relationship between very few variables 
such as attitudes to condoms and actual condom use, which contradicts the already 
proved complexity of combined variables attached to sexual behaviour. 
Qualitative research has demonstrated that when carrying out cost-benefit analysis with 
regard to sexual risk-taking, individuals do not consider only the association of 
condom use and health risk reduction (Browne and Minichiello 1994; Davies and 
SIGMA 1992; Holland et al. 1992; Ingham, Woodcock, and Stenner 1992; Rhodes 
1997). For example, Ingham and van Zessen found out that young people calculate the 
costs and benefits of condom use on the basis of reputation, fear of not having a good 
sexual performance or appearing to have lack of trust and concerns about infection risk 
(Ingham and Zessen 1997). In their research with young women Holland et al. (Holland 
et al. 1991; 1994a) found out that reputation, trust, love and power constituted key 
elements in the decision-making process concerning condom use. In a study with 
Australian adults Browne and Minichiello found that heterosexual couples' condom 
use was dependent on mutual sexual decision-making and that the interviewees 
negotiated condom use differently on the basis of their perceptions of the 'appropriate' 
sexual behaviour for men and women (1994). Gender norms were then at the core of 
their decisions to practice safe sex. 
The problems of the cost-benefit analysis are directly related to the restricted 
conception of rationality employed by social psychology theories of behaviour. What it 
means to be 'rational' in situations involving sexual decision-making is key to the 
definition of the problem of sexual risk-taking (Davies and SIGMA 1992). Mistaken 
interpretations of sexual behaviour as non-rational only because it does not follow 
biomedical expectations concerning health risk avoidance have resulted in mistaken 
definitions of the problem of sexual risk-taking. Davies and colleagues found in their 
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research with gay men that the decision to have sex with another men, either with or 
without a condom, was not simply the result of a rational evaluation of individual 
susceptibility to HIV / AIDS, nor the product of a non-rational or intuitive-like decision 
(Davies and SIGMA 1992). Replicating the findings of other studies, this decision was 
taken on the grounds of interactive factors; not psychological ones as some could 
argue, based on the assumption that the increased practice of anal intercourse among 
gay and bisexual men is a 'relapse to unsafe sex'. According to the authors, their data 
suggested, for example, that one of the reasons for the practice of unsafe sex among the 
men interviewed was their engagement in long-term or medium-term relationships. 
Commenting on the problematic use of the notion of rationality to understand sexual 
behaviour, the authors point at important questions. The first point they make is related 
to the misuse of the term 'rational' as related to final decisions rather than to the 
process of decision-making itself. They remark: 
" ... a decision is rational if it is made after a consideration of the available 
evidence in the light of the circumstances pertaining at that time. By 
contrast, an irrational decision is one which ignores, dismisses or otherwise 
deems irrelevant available information" (Davies and SIGMA 1992, p.136). 
And linking their analysis to their research focus, the authors argue that " ... a decision 
to fuck may [ ... ] be right or wrong according to the epidemiological or other criteria, 
but the rationality of the decision process is independent of the rightness of the 
outcome" (p.136). They then map out what could be concluded from that: " ... an 
individual can (i) rationally come to the right decision, (ii) irrationally come to the right 
decision; (iii) rationally come to the wrong decision; (iv) irrationally come to the 
wrong decision" (p.136). The authors finally argue that the criteria to evaluate if a 
given decision is right or wrong is distinct from that used to judge if a process is 
rational or irrational. While questioning the employment of the rational model for the 
theorizing of sexual behaviour, the authors point out that it is unclear if the model has 
been used in a descriptive - "a representation of what actually happens" or prescriptive 
manner - "a description of the truly rational response" (p.137). As a descriptive 
method, the authors claim, it presents a number of difficulties. They highlight three 
main problems. First, the decision to have a sexual intercourse, they argue, is not made 
prior to the sexual encounter itself, nor does it happen at a given point in time during 
the encounter, but throughout. Second, the authors affirm the interactive nature of 
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sexual decision-making, emphasizing that it involves "a complex social negotiation, 
which we understand poorly" (p.137). Third, and more crucially, they make the point 
that the rational decision-making model is inappropriate to describe the decision-
making process concerning sexual behaviour because it assumes that individuals 
employ perfect knowledge in their decisions. In fact they " ... work with subjective 
probabilities and assess the various elements of the model in different and sometimes 
idiosyncratic ways" (p.137). 
Bloor also criticizes the logic of cost-benefit analysis in the investigation of the causes 
of sexual risk-taking (1995). To him, it does not take into account the habitual nature 
of behaviour. In his research with male prostitutes Bloor concluded that most prostitute 
men who had anal sex with other men did not use condoms because this was a habit 
among their clients (1995). Taking into account the importance of traditional gender 
norms and imbalance of power in the shaping of heterosexual sex, it can be argued that 
habituation appears also to influence the adoption of safe or risky sexual practices 
among heterosexuals (Browne and Minichiello 1994; Goldstein 1994; Hillier, 
Harrison, and Warr 1998; Holland et al. 1991; Ingham, Woodcock, and Stenner 1992; 
Paiva 1993). 
Because sexual risk-taking has been simplistically defined in person-centered terms, 
the proposed solution for the protection of the population against HIV sexual infection 
has also followed the same individualistic logic (Caplan and Nelson 1973). If it is 
believed that it is personal decisions and behaviours that expose individuals to 
infection, then the task of health promotion is straightforwardly put as the promotion of 
the adoption of individual strategies of protection against the HIV infection (Fisher 
1988; Scott and Freeman 1995). Assuming that 'inappropriate' behaviour is the cause 
of HIV infection, health promoters have urged lay people to correct deviant sexual 
practices and adopt what biomedicine calls 'safe sex'. Education is believed to be the 
means 'par excellence' by which the 'safe sex' message is to be disseminated to the 
public. 
'Risk', 'sexual behaviour' and 'individual rationality' have all been fused in the 
expression 'safe sex'. Highly influenced by the biomedical paradigm, 'safe/unsafe sex' 
inherits the limitations of 'the' scientific definition of 'risk' and 'sex'. For health 
promotional purposes, 'unsafe sex' equals 'unhealthy sex' and 'safe sex' means 
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'healthy sex'. The expreSSIOns 'risky sex', 'unsafe sex, 'unprotected sex' and its 
opposite 'safe sex' or 'protected sex' are key to discourses of HIV/AIDS prevention. 
While the biomedical discourses of 'safe sex' intend to promote a linear 
correspondence between risk awareness and risk avoidance, 'safe sex' means the 
consciousness and acceptance of risk (Scott and Freeman 1995). 
Although the expression 'safe sex' is well known amongst the general population, it is 
not quite clear what it means. The meanings of 'safe sex' are confused because 
scientific knowledge about which practices are safe and which are not with regard to 
HIV/AIDS, has frequently changed due to new scientific findings. From 'risk groups' 
to 'risk behaviours', from homosexual to heterosexual risk, from the affirmation of 
'safe' oral sex to the suspicion of its riskiness, there have been several shifts in the 
discourses of HIV I AIDS prevention. In the face of so many changes in the scientific 
knowledge on HIV/AIDS the reliability of new findings has been doubted. For this 
reason each of these shifts have not been completed. That is, the former 'information' 
has never been completely abandoned. This has generated confusion about what 
actually makes sex safe. Both scientists and ordinary people share the idea that present 
doubts may become certainties one day. Because there are still many questions to be 
answered concerning the transmission of the HIV virus and the history of AIDS-related 
diseases, research continues to be undertaken and new findings are expected to result in 
new and more efficient ways of fighting it. 
It has been suggested that 'safe sex' was invented by gay people not so long ago 
(Patton 1990). But, for example in the case of women, the need for protection against 
the negative outcomes of sex, like unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted 
diseases, is not an innovative concern (Dubois and Gordon 1989; Hart 1993). 
Nevertheless, as Hart points out, it was within the American gay community that these 
strategies of protection came to be named as 'safe sex' in response to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (Hart 1993). 
The 'safe sex' message promoted by health education contains simplistic definitions of 
'safety' 'sex' and 'sexual risks'. By aiming at preventing sexually transmitted diseases, 
in particular AIDS, the 'safe sex' message is focused on the promotion of condom use 
during sexual intercourse, which delivers the message that 'safety' means 'condom 
use' and 'sex' equals (hetero- or homo-) 'sexual intercourse'. Informing this definition 
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of 'safe sex', there is the notion that the only significant risks of sex are diseases 
(Hillier, Harrison, and Warr 1998). Pregnancy is another important danger of 
heterosexual intercourse but, given the contemporary priority of AIDS prevention, 
pregnancy may occupy the second place in the order of importance. 
It has been argued that the promotion of sexual safety through the single target of 
preventing sexually transmitted diseases suggests that the message of 'safe sex' 
addresses men's needs, who perhaps do not need to worry about anything else (Hillier, 
Harrison, and Warr 1998). For women, however, sex represents many more dangers, 
which makes women's sexual safety a target not so 'easily' achievable (Hillier, 
Harrison, and Warr 1998).19 Gorna suggests that " ... for many women, the concept of 
'safer sex' may speak more to a woman's need for physical safety from aggression, or 
emotional safety from abuse, than to the longer-term threat of a new virus" (1996, 
p.261). The complexity of women's definition of 'safe sex' is one of the points I raise 
in this thesis (see Chapter 5). 
Although definitions of 'safe sex' can be relatively varied, they contain a similar 
message - to practice 'safe sex' is to use condoms in 100% of penetrative sexual 
practices (vaginal and anal) or not to engage in those practices at all, and also to reduce 
the number of sexual partners. In a book in which several European researchers offer 
their analysis of different conceptual frameworks for the study of HIV I AIDS risk, 
'safer sex' is explicitly defined as "the behaviour that tends to reduce the likelihood of 
sexually transmitted infection, e.g. using a condom, having sex without penetration, 
etc." (Campenhoudt et al. 1997, p.250). For Hart, 'safer sex' is " ... any sexual activity 
which reduces the risk of transmission of HIV infection and some other sexually 
transmissible diseases ... " (Hart 1993, p.73). Both Campenhoudt's and Hart's 
definitions of 'safer sex' show uncertainty about the efficacy of the proposed risk 
preventative measures?O In a more narrow vein and in my view not the most accurate, 
Waldby and colleagues (1993) point out that the official version of 'safe sex' for 
heterosexuals is " ... a combination of monogamy and condom-use, [ ... ] alternatives to 
penis-vagina intercourse; mutual masturbation [ ... ], and oral-genital sex [ ... ]" (p.251). 
19 See examples of the girls' perception of the possible dangers of heterosexual sex in Chapter 5, 
particularly on Fig. 2, page 195. 
20 See Chapter 5 for examples of the uncertainties implicit in the girls' defmitions of safe sex. 
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At least in Brazil, the 'official version' of 'safe sex' for heterosexuals does not go 
beyond penetrative sex with a condom and a reduction of sexual partners. I do not 
recall any official campaign in Brazil in which the word 'sex' ofthe expression 'safelr 
sex' has accepted other meaning than 'penis-vagina' and 'penis-anus' penetration. In 
European countries the position seems to be similar. 
Most of HIV I AIDS-related health promotional interventions are focused on educating 
lay people. As we have seen earlier, there is more than one way of carrying out health 
education. Different models of health education are based on different and conflicting 
ideologies and conceptions of health (see section on health education, pages 22-37). 
Given the ideological, political and social background of contemporary public health, 
the preventive model of health education is now predominant in the field. To be fair, 
there have also been few initiatives, above all from non-governmental organizations, 
which work with a holistic approach. 
Preventive AIDS education works with information provision with the aim of bringing 
about changes in individual behaviour (Aggleton 1989; Scott and Freeman 1995). Lay 
people are informed of "the facts about HIV" (Aggleton 1989, p.223), which include 
modes of transmission and risk-levels, how to avoid the risk of being infected, the 
consequences of infection and the identity of risk-group members. By sharing with 
HIV/AIDS experts 'relevant' scientific knowledge about the risks, lay people are 
expected to modify their behaviours in order not to expose themselves and others to the 
risk of infection (Aggleton 1989). Everything follows the logic of rational decision-
making governing sexual behaviour: 'knowledge - leads to - attitude-change - leads to 
- behaviour change' . 
Patton (1990) argues that while there is an increased awareness that information does 
not change attitudes about AIDS, the AIDS education 'mission' of providing 
information about 'the facts' or 'the truth' is difficult to change, for audiences expect 
answers that are framed in the same way as their questions. 'The truth' about the 
'HIV I AIDS facts' is delivered to the public, Patton suggests, as if it is neutral, but that 
is not the case at all. As the author contends, one cannot negate that AIDS is 
politicized. Stigmatized representations of AIDS as a gay disease and a disease of 
addiction suggest that from the beginning, pre-existing ideological and moral positions 
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toward health, sexuality and drug use have influenced the way scientific knowledge has 
generally been assimilated. 
Holland et al (1994b) make a similar point. They write: 
"Health education policy does not emerge fully formed in response to a 
particular 'new' problem, but draws on a range of existing ideological 
positions. Nor does the language of health education draw only on the 
scientific discourse of health and medicine. Medical and moral positions on 
AIDS interact with each other and can be seen to come together in 
problematic ways in the context of the AIDS public education campaign" 
(p.16) 
They go on to exemplify their argument by referring to the case of the risk of 
HIV / AIDS sexual transmission: 
"Discussion of risk reduction [ ... ] draws on a pre-existing moral discourse 
which stresses monogamy, and thus takes insufficient account of both the 
social context and the actual sexual experience of the individuals whose 
behaviour it seeks to influence" (p.16). 
Information on HIV / AIDS is usually spread through mass media campaigns. Outdoors, 
TV and cinema advertisement and distribution of informative material are all used to 
raise general consciousness about the risk of HIV infection and modes of risk 
protection. HIV / AIDS education campaigns are usually produced and managed by 
governmental public health agencies, sometimes specifically created to deal with the 
HIV / AIDS problem. HIV / AIDS education campaigns emphasize behaviour change as 
the result of personal and responsible choices. Slogans such as "You know the risks, 
the decision is yours" of a British AIDS education campaign promoted by the 'Health 
Education Authority' in 1988 (cited by Holland et al. 1994b), and "To live without 
AIDS depends only on you", a Brazilian national campaign promoted by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health in 1999, are expected to deliver the message of the moral 
accountability for personal welfare. As Holland et al (1994b) stress, this type of 
message neglects the importance of power in choice-making and does not take into 
account the problem of the gap between knowledge and action. A striking detail of the 
two campaigns mentioned above is that although they were produced in very different 
contexts and a decade apart, they express the same meaning. This suggests that the 
neo-liberal discourse of autonomy and responsible choice that permeates health 
promotion (see section on page 19) has had a globalized impact, and also, that there is 
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not much difference in the perspectives taken to define HIV I AIDS risk as a 'health 
promotion problem' in the past and present. 
Further information about the Brazilian campaign makes visible the neo-liberal 
positions of its proponents. The aim of the campaign was to raise awareness about the 
individual responsibility for the fight against AIDS and inform the population on how 
to prevent sexually transmitted diseases. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Health 
that objective consisted in an innovative approach of the Brazilian government to the 
fight against the disease. The Brazilian Ministry of Health stressed that this innovative 
approach was a response to the 'new' evidence that 90% of the Brazilian population 
had already basic information about forms of AIDS contagion and even so only 20% of 
the adult population used condoms. At the time of the launching of the campaign, the 
Health Minister commented: "there is a disparity between consciousness and 
providence" (Correio do Povo 1999, p.4). The campaign meant, thus, to correct such a 
disparity through an appeal to the moral commitment of 'self-care'. 21 
Along with mass media campaigns, school-based AIDS education has also been 
commonly used by health promoters. In the latter case, there is a very specific target, 
that is the adolescent population. Those initiatives work as mass education as large 
numbers of adolescents are expected to be involved (Aggleton and Warwick 1997). 
Apart from the 'quantity' reason, school-based AIDS education is also motivated by 
the taken-for-granted common-sense that adolescents are, by their own nature, risk-
takers 'par excellence', an idea that is based on psychologists' theories of behaviour 
(Aggleton and Warwick 1997). 
The literature on adolescent's risk behaviour has been dominated by taken-for-granted 
assumptions concerning the 'risk essence' of adolescents. Adolescents are 
stereotypically represented as unrealistic optimists (Moore and Rosenthal 1994); 
having a sense of invulnerability (Hemmelstein 1995; Koniak-Griffin et al. 1994; 
Mickler 1993) and a sexual adventure drive (Hein 1992); as featuring cognitive 
problems and being ignorant on risk matters (Abrams et al. 1990; Fawole et al. 1999; 
Irwin 1993). These are the dominant discourses of 'science' concerning the reasons for 
adolescents' risk behaviours (in particular those concerning health), although I 
21 See Chapter 5 for the girls' interpretation ofthe lessons of 'self-care' taught by health promoters. 
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acknowledge that such discourses usually take 'adolescents' as an 'essential' category, 
without distinguishing between 'boys' and girls'. I presume that that is why, for 
example, the masculine stereotype of "sexual adventurers" (Hein 1992, p.9) is taken as 
one of the origins of the problem of adolescents' risky behaviours. As Aggleton and 
Warwick (1997) point out, none of those stereotypes considers gender, culture, race or 
class differences among the members of the adolescent population; they are taken as 
universal. This also has the effect of universalizing adolescents' needs concerning the 
prevention of HIV I AIDS. Affirming the reductionism of such an approach, Aggleton 
and Warwick (1997) write: 
"In many ways this is curious given the care now taken in the literature on 
adults and AIDS to distinguish between gender, social background 
ethnicity and, most eespecially, sexuality, in determining HIV-related risk. 
It is, however, indicative of the extent to which popular ideologies of 
adolescence seem literally to have won the hearts and minds of those 
working in the field" (pp.80-81, authors' emphasis). 
Adolescents' AIDS education and also most other contemporary accounts, the authors 
argue, are monolithically focused on sexuality in its negative sense. The positive 
potentials of sexuality for either adolescents' or adults' lives are often forgotten. 
Referring specifically to the case of adolescents' HIV/AIDS-related health promotion, 
the authors argue that if it " .. .is to be meaningful, it must speak to lived experience" 
(p.81). A meaningful health promotion, they affirm, " ... should engage with what 
young people believe to be true about their own lives - their concerns and aspirations, 
and the everyday dilemmas that confront them" (p.81). They go on to contend that a 
meaningful health promotion is to differ from others "that may seemingly be concerned 
with the promotion of health, but which in reality fail to engage with experience as it is 
actually lived" (p.82). 
While school-based AIDS education is often focused on information provision, it 
sometimes also includes participatory activities. Educational activities like role-play, 
games and skills training are generally understood as empowering strategies. Although 
the rhetoric of 'participation' easily fits the empowering project of health promotion, 
the goals of the 'participatory' approach do not appear to go beyond behavioural 
change. 
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The 'participatory' approach of HIV I AIDS-related health promotion is supposed to 
work towards community emancipation, its ultimate goal being people's autonomy and 
power to construct a healthy living. In spite of the rhetoric, however, strategies 
employed as 'empowering health education', such as role-play and games, still work 
with a maximum participation of 'HIV/AIDS risk authorities' and minimum 
involvement of the 'lay others'. Lupton (1995a) argues that there is a paternalistic 
emphasis on empowering health promotion. Referring specifically to 'participatory' 
health education, she writes: 
"The emphasis on personal learning activities such as role play still focuses 
on the individual acquiring skills to go out and influence events. The model 
used is still that of the health education approach, devoted to training 
people in the 'appropriate' ways of thinking and doing but with little 
emphasis on enhancing the opportunities for collective action born of 
conflict and tensions between subcultures" (Lupton 1995a, p.60). 
Peer education is another strategy that is sometimes employed in HIV I AIDS-related 
health promotion; once again it is one that targets adolescents (Aggleton and Warnick 
1997). It is based on the idea that young people may be better influenced by their peers. 
Peer education works with peer educators in the provision of information, group 
discussions and counseling (Aggleton and Warnick 1997). Similarly to 'participatory' 
HIV I AIDS education, this strategy also seems to operate through persuasion. 
HIV I AIDS-related health promotion is still very restricted. As we have seen, it is 
concentrated on the provision of technical information with the aim of promoting 
behavioural change. As at the beginning of the epidemic, it continues to invest in two 
poles: 'the general population' and specific groups which are seen as especially in need 
of health promoters' help. When the target is the population, mass education 
campaigns is the preferred strategy. When aiming at 'helping' those more 'at-risk', 
face-to-face methods are more common. None of them, however, seems to have been 
effective, as the HIV I AIDS epidemic continues to grow, especially through sexual 
infection. 
Obviously, the aim of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV I AIDS is also the aim 
of promoting health, and projects designed to achieve this are informed by conceptions 
of 'health' (Gorna 1996). This makes the current AIDS education activity a field full of 
contractions. Informed by overly simplistic definitions of the problem of sexual risk-
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taking, with 'sexual risk' meaning simply 'disease risk', AIDS education has addressed 
the message of 'safe sex' towards disease prevention. And this creates a paradox. 
AIDS education is a crucial arena of contemporary health promotion and for health 
promotion 'health' is supposed to be more than the absence of disease. But the notion 
of health education inserted in the current model of AIDS education does seem to 
encapsulate the premises of the (supposedly overcome) preventive model and its 
'victim blaming' discourses. Contradicting its proposal of community empowerment 
(see page 20), official health promotion projects, which have financial support to 
actually make a difference, are yet insisting on individual behavioural change as the 
recipe for a successful HIV I AIDS risk prevention. 
There is plenty of evidence of the social dimension ofHIV/AIDS.22 Also, governments 
and public health corporations have already admitted that to be healthy or unhealthy is 
not only a matter of individual decision (see page 33). Nevertheless, it is still on the 
basis of individualistic theories of behaviour and emphasis on responsible choices that 
official programs of HIV I AIDS prevention have been carried out. This emphasis on 
choice has led health promoters to invest in information provision in the hope that this 
will persuade people to adopt safer sex practices. However, as Denscombe (1993) puts 
it, "selling personal health as a preference will be effective in so far as people are in a 
position to 'buy'" (p.515). In a similar vein Goma (1996) remarks, "the technicalities 
of preventing HIV infection are remarkably straightforward, it is the contexts within 
which risky behaviour takes place which complicate matters" (p. 260). 
This subject of how health promotion has dealt with HIV/AIDS prevention is re-visited 
in the conclusion of the thesis. That is where I address the implications of my research 
findings upon current HIV I AIDS education contents and methods, specifically in the 
context of adolescent women's protection against the risks of sexual relationships. 
In sum, the sociological critiques of the health promotion's approach to 'risk' suggest 
that its difficulties originated from the simplistic way in which the problem of risk 
behaviour is defined. Although referring to 'social problem' in a different context, 
Caplan and Nelson (1973) make some points about the importance of the definition of 
22 See for example Barbosa and Villela 1996; Guizzardi, Stella, and Remy 1997; Holland et al. 1991; 
Rhodes 1997. 
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a given problem for the 'production' of its solution that can be also applied here. They 
do this in a discussion about the use of psychological research and behavioural science 
in the understanding and improvement of 'social problems'. 
By 'social problem' they mean "problem behavior" or "social pathology" (p.199), 
which are exemplified by delinquency, drug abuse, mental health and unemployment 
(and I would add 'health- related risk behaviour'). Central to their critique of the way 
psychology has researched 'social problems' is the idea that, in general terms, 
problems are defined on the basis of "assumptions about the causes of the problem and 
where they lie" (p.200). To the authors those assumptions are essential for the 
definition of a given problem as they determine how the problem shall be approached. 
In the specific case of "social problems" the authors argue that there are two 
possibilities of problem explanation: through a "person-centered" and through a 
"situation-centered" causation (p.200). They cite 'delinquency' as a case in point. 
Taking into consideration a "person-centered" (p.200) explanation to the problem, like 
"inability to delay gratification" or "incomplete sexual identity" (p.199), it is logical, 
the authors argue, to deal with it at an individual level. In such circumstances, person-
change treatment techniques", "intervention strategies", "medical solutions" and 
"confinement" can be employed (p.199) in order to change and correct deviant 
behaviour and make it more conventional. As the authors emphasize, this way of 
approaching the problem can have two immediate consequences. First, " ... those 
officially defined as delinquent would have to relinquish autonomous control over their 
behavior and other rights in the service of the common good" (Caplan and Nelson 
1973, p.199). Second, the structural causes of deviance would be left 'untouchable'. 
" ... where person-centered interpretations provide the foundation on which 
corrective intervention is based, little need to be done about external 
factors since they would presumably be of lesser or no etiological 
significance in the determination of such behavior" (Caplan and Nelson 
1973, p.200). 
If, on the other hand, the problem of delinquency is defined in "situation centered" 
terms (p.200), they stress, the intervention will aim at changing the social factors that 
might be causing the problem. Delinquency can be seen, for example, as the result of 
poverty. In that case, the targets for change can be the social and economic structure 
rather than "individual psyches" (p.201). Although the authors recognize that this 
84 
"either-or" model of causality is very simplistic, they nevertheless take it as a reference 
point because they consider that this is the usual notion of causality used by the public 
and that political actors often take advantage of it. 
For Caplan and Nelson, the origin of the difficulties of the psychologists' approach to 
'social problems' is their usual focus on individuals and "their mental states" (p.202), 
like thoughts and attitudes. According to the authors, psychologists tend to see these 
factors as " .. .independent variables, that is, antecedent and causal in relation to other 
behavior. .. "(Caplan and Nelson 1973, p.202). The authors go on to argue that 
" ... when it comes to the ... study of ... why he [sic] behaves as he does, we 
[psychologists] are more likely to limit our search for etiological evidence 
to what goes on between his ears and to ignore or exclude from 
consideration a multitude of external impingements that could justifiably 
be hypothesized as causal" (1973, p.202). 
The authors argue that such an approach results in 'person-blame' definitions of social 
problems and obvious projections of 'individual change' solutions. If the intervention 
fails, the failure will seldom be considered as resulting from a mistaken interpretation 
of the problem. The blame will be located in the target group and the failure interpreted 
"as a further sign of the seriousness of the pathology being dealt with" (Caplan and 
Nelson 1973, p.201, authors' emphasis), reinforcing dominant stereotypical ideas. 
As the literature indicates, similarly to delinquency, 'risk behaviour' is also a problem 
of society. Like the so-called 'delinquents', 'risk-takers' are also believed to be deviant 
people whose problematic behaviour is not only a threat to their own safety but also to 
the safety of society as a whole. In the same way as delinquency, 'risk behaviour' is 
usually scientifically defined in person-centered terms, which results in blaming the 
'risk-taker' for hislher deviancy. Because 'risk behaviours' are seen as caused by some 
'natural' characteristics of 'risk-takers' and/or by their choices, research usually 
focuses on the analytical deconstruction of individual behaviour in the belief that this 
would provide clues about solutions for risk behaviour problems. Also, a person-
centered definition of a given risk behaviour problem entails individual correction via 
individual behavioural change. Like in other situations involving the implementation of 
individual solutions to social problems, if this intervention fails its subjects are to be 
blamed. The failure will reinforce not only the 'bad behaviour' of those people but also 
the correctness of targeting them as the subject of intervention. It will also support the 
85 
argument that more research is needed in order to find out how to reach those who are 
'hard to reach'. As it has been noted, in a such situation the influence of the social 
system on health risk-taking will tend to be forgotten. 
When doctors, epidemiologists, engineers, and psychologists (amongst others) 
approach 'health risk' in an objective way, advocating individual solutions to resolve 
social problems, they seem to be applying what Archibald (cited by Caplan and Nelson 
1973, p.202) called a "clinical orientation" to social scientific knowledge, which is 
characterized by the assumption that "if the shoe doesn't fit, there's something wrong 
with your foot" (Archibald 1970). 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical framework of this thesis, focusing on the 
main issues raised in the sociological debate on health promotion and risk. The aim of 
the chapter was to contextualize the argument of my thesis which is that 'risk' in 
general, and 'HIV/AIDS sexual risk' in particular, are epistemological constructs. We 
have learnt here that, from a sociological point of view, the increased importance of the 
notion of 'risk' in modernity has much to do with the development of science and 
technology. We have also learnt that in the context of health promotion 'risk' has been 
defined in 'technico-scientific' terms and that this has had an impact in the way health 
promotion has approached the problem of 'health-related risks', like HIV/AIDS. 
Technico-scientific theories on the HIV/AIDS sexual risk define 'risk' as an objective 
entity, one that can be observed, analysed, calculated and interpreted in a value-free 
process. My thesis develops a counter-argument. Drawing on the literature reviewed 
here and on my data analysis, I will argue throughout this thesis that 'risk' is an 
epistemological construct, for it is not an event 'per se', but an event constructed 
through knowledge (Beck 1992; Heyman 1998a; Thompson 1986). 
With my work I intend to contribute to the sociological critique of technico-scientific 
theories on risk. By doing that, I hope to be able to offer a theoretical alternative for the 
sociological understanding of adolescent women's responses to sexual risk, especially 
HIV/AIDS. 
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The next chapter presents the history of the research process through which I develop 
my thesis. It will provide a detailed picture of my fieldwork and of my trajectory in the 
process of making sense of the data gathered. 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
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In this chapter I describe how and why I came to collect and interpret the empirical 
data in the way I did. I am making three arguments. The first argument is that for the 
particular purposes of my research, and despite all the limitations which I will discuss, 
the 'focus group' technique was the best research procedure available. The second 
argument is related to the idea that problems in translations from spoken to written 
language were significantly compounded by the need to translate, also, from 
Portuguese to English. The third argument impacts in particUlar on the ways I 
understood the data and this is to do with the formation of subjectivity from a feminist 
post-structuralist perspective. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the research 
problem. The second gives an account of the research design, making explicit the 
research questions and describing the fieldwork. This part also presents a discussion 
about the reasons why I have made some particular methodological choices, including 
the choice of following a qualitative research paradigm. The third and last part of the 
chapter describes the processes through which I have organized and interpreted the 
data gathered. 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
When it comes to theorizing the responses to a given communicated message it is 
important to take into account the receptor's understanding of it and what contributes 
to the production of this particular understanding. In addition to that, if the 
communicated message is intended to change the receptor's behaviour, it is also 
relevant to understand what lies between the reception of the message and the adoption 
or not of the prescribed behavioural change. If we are to understand HIV I AIDS sexual 
risk-taking and responses to programs developed to promote safe sex behaviour it is 
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crucial to map out the meanings attached to HIV / AIDS sexual risk-taking and the 
processes through which people make sense of it. 
The research process that resulted in this thesis is based on the assumption that the way 
people see the HIV/AIDS sexual risk is not 'immune' to what they know about the 
world they live in. On the contrary, it is actually produced by it. Also, at a more 
specific level, it assumes that the meanings of HIV / AIDS sexual risk do not stand on 
their own. That is, they are part of a much wider and general risk discourse that has 
been increasingly used in contemporary western societies. 
We have learned from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 that health promotion 
defines 'risky sex' and 'safe sex' in terms of their health-related meanings established 
by scientific medicine (see section on page 65). We have also learned that, for 
sociologists and anthropologists (Beck 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Giddens 
1996; Lupton 1995a), scientific knowledge is only part of the knowledge background 
used by lay people to make sense of risk (see pages 47-53). As argued in Chapter 2, 
this suggests that there might be similarities between what biomedicine means by 'safe 
sex' and 'risky sex' and what so called 'lay people' understand by it. However, along 
with those similarities there may be also important differences. 
The sociocultural nature of 'risk' indicates that risk meanings cannot be externally 
imposed, for they are dependent on what we value in life and also on the knowledge we 
use to make sense of it, personal values and acquired knowledge being context-
dependent (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Gibson 1986; Heyman 1998a; Thompson 
1986). We are not static and isolated entities and our beliefs are not separable from 
public discourses. Individual behaviours cannot be understood outside the boundaries 
of cultural contexts. We learn about the meanings of risk through social interactions 
and we act upon this knowledge in a social context (Kitzinger 1994a). 
To explore what health promoters' audiences understand by 'safe/risky sex' and the 
mechanisms through which this understanding is constructed is important for the 
theorizing of their responses to scientifically defined sexual risks, such as HIV / AIDS 
risk. The aim of this research is to investigate how adolescent women, a usual target of 
health promotion discourses, make sense of 'risky sex' (and consequently of 'safe sex') 
when the 'risk' in question is that of the personal HIV / AIDS infection. Particular 
89 
attention will be given to the meanings attached to 'risk' as applied to sex-related 
situations and the ways in which those meanings are constructed. With this I intend to 
produce knowledge about the epistemological nature of risk. It is also my objective to 
contribute to the sociological critique of the limitations of health promotion's 
definition of the problem of HIV/AIDS sexual risk-taking, in particular when the risk 
subjects considered are adolescent women. 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Questions 
The following question and sub-questions orient the research: 
How do adolescent women see the personal risk of catching HIV I AIDS in heterosexual 
relationships? 
• What are their views? (what are their theories about adolescent women's sexual-risk 
taking with regard to sexual risks, in general, and HIV I AIDS risk, in particular?; 
how do they position themselves within those theories?) 
• How are those views constructed? (what are the meanings implicated in those 'ways 
of seeing'? what do they mean by 'risk' in general, and 'risky sex' in particular? 
how does 'risky sex' become personal?) 
• What are the implications of the research findings for health promotion in the 
specific context of adolescent women's protection against the sexual transmission of 
HIV/AIDS? 
Why Qualitative Methodology? 
Apart from more general considerations, like the methodological traditions of the field 
where my thesis is located and my previous methodological preferences, specific 
motives concerning my particular research interests influenced my decision to use a 
qualitative research methodology. The very nature of my research problem was the 
main point considered. Given my interest in the exploration of meanings and processes 
of 'meaning making', I believed that the only way to carry out my research would be 
by using the inductive potentials of a qualitative mode of research design. Also, the 
recognition of the impact of the researcher's and the researcher subjects' participation 
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upon the data gathered reinforced the idea that I would need to use a qualitative 
approach, in which this is not only accepted but also valued as an important part of the 
research process. Another point taken into consideration was my intention to carry out 
the data collection in a flexible way, that is, through a methodology that could allow 
me to change the directions of the research process as it progressed. 
Amongst an array of possibilities, I chose to use a qualitative research procedure that 
seemed to be the most suitable for the type of research I intended to do, which was the 
'focus group' technique. Next I present the main features, potentials and limitations of 
the technique as well as the accounts of focus group researchers and theorists about its 
use as a qualitative research procedure. 
'Focus Groups' as a Methodological Option 
'Focus group' is a" ... a semistructured group session, moderated by a group leader, 
held in an informal setting, with the purpose of collecting information on a designated 
topic" (Carey 1994, p.227). Kitzinger points out that in 'focus groups' "the group is 
'focused' because it involves some kind of collective activity - such as viewing a film, 
examining a single health education message or simply debating a particular set of 
questions" (Kitzinger 1994b, p.103). Morgan argues that " ... it's the researcher's 
interest that provides the focus, whereas the data themselves come from the group 
interaction" (Morgan 1997, p.6). 
Commenting on when it is appropriate to use 'focus groups', Kitzinger and Barbour 
affirm that the technique is " .. .ideal for exploring people's experiences, opinions, 
wishes and concems."(Kitzinger and Barbour 1999, p.5). They go on to emphasize that 
"the method is particularly useful for allowing participants to generate their own 
questions, frames and concepts and to pursue their own priorities on their own terms, 
in their own vocabulary" (p.5). 
Developed by Merton and his colleagues (cited by Catterall and Madaran 1997) in the 
40s, the 'focus group' technique was first used for marketing research purposes. More 
recently, 'focus groups' have been increasingly employed in the context of social 
sciences research, particularly in health-related inquiries (Carlini-Cotrim 1996). A 
range of research topics related to sexuality have been investigated via 'focus groups', 
91 
such as perceptions of sexual behaviour (Stanton et al. 1993); peoples' understandings 
of HIV/AIDS media messages (Kitzinger 1994b); HIV/AIDS risk-related behaviour 
(Koniak-Griffin et al. 1994); drug abuse (Carlini-Cotrim 1996); social and sexual 
identities (Mann 1996) and sexual decision-making (Rosenthal, Lewis, and Cohen 
1996). 
Along with the reliance on the researcher's interest for the establishment ofthe 'focus', 
the 'focus group' technique is also characterized by its emphasis on group interactions 
(Catterall and Maclaran 1997; Kitzinger 1994b; Rosenthal, Lewis, and Cohen 1996). 
Morgan sees the strengths and weaknesses ofthe 'focus groups' technique as related to 
its two main features: "the reliance on the researcher's focus and the group's 
interaction" (Morgan 1997, p.13). For him, being oriented by the researcher's interests 
'focus groups' can " ... produce concentrated amounts of data on precisely the topic of 
interest" (p.13), which could be regarded as a way of increasing the efficiency of the 
data collection. Nevertheless, he argues, 'focus groups' are not always uniformly easier 
to carry out than individual interviews, particularly because groups are sometimes 
more difficult to assemble. For Morgan, the possibility to direct the 'focus groups' 
according the research interests can also have a negative impact upon the data 
collected, as the researcher or the group moderator has the power to influence the 
group's interactions. This, the author argues, may compromise the accuracy of the data 
collected. However, as Morgan points out, this is not a particularity of 'focus groups', 
for "the researcher's influence on the data [ ... J is an issue in almost all qualitative 
research, and those who rely on focus groups must attend to it because it does affect the 
quality23 of the data" (pp.14-15). For Morgan, the second source of strength of 'focus 
groups' is that related to the use of group interaction as data generator. Other authors 
also highlight this advantage. 
Kitzinger and Barbour argue that "crucially, group work explores how accounts are 
articulated, censured, opposed and changed through social interaction ... " (Kitzinger 
and Barbour 1999, p.5). Richard Krueger suggests that group interactions facilitate the 
sharing of ideas, allowing participants to make use of others' concepts in the 
23 As far as I understand, the author is not referring to 'quality' as 'a degree of excellence' of the data but 
as its 'nature'. Throughout the thesis I will use the word 'quality', when referring to data, in the same 
way. 
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formulation of personal opinions (Krueger 1995). Rosenthal comments that in a focus 
group discussion the research participant can raise issues that are not anticipated by the 
researcher (Rosenthal, Lewis, and Cohen 1996). The group dynamics, Catteral and 
Maclaran claim, " ... become an integral part of the procedure with participants engaged 
in discussion with each other rather than directing their comments solely to the 
moderator" (1997, p.1). For Merton et aI, the use of group interaction as a generator of 
data is productive in the sense that it widens " ... the range of responses, activating 
forgotten details of experience, and releasing inhibitions that may otherwise discourage 
participants from disclosing information" (cited by Catterall and Maclaran 1997, pp.1-
2). Citing his work with Krueger (1993), Morgan argues that " ... the comparisons that 
participants make among each other's experiences and opinions are a valuable source 
of insights into complex behaviors and motivations" (p.15). He also calls attention to 
the importance of groups' discussions for the investigation of issues related to 
consensus and diversity. In a similar vein, Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) argue that 
"focus groups [ ... J enable researchers to examine people's different perspectives as 
they operate within a social network" (p.5). 
As for the weaknesses that resulted from the focus groups' reliance on interactive data 
Morgan comments on the 'group-effect' on individuals' contributions. This would 
influence the data gathered in two ways: individuals can feel constrained by the group 
and not say things that they would be able to say in private. In contrast, individuals can 
feel more comfortable to say things in a group environment than in private. Another 
issue raised by Morgan is the influence of the group on the ability of a specific set of 
participants to discuss a given topic. Some topics can be controversial; others can be of 
a greater or lesser interest to some research participants. 
Taking on board the potentials and limitations of 'focus groups' highlighted in the 
literature and also considering all the other options of qualitative research methods, I 
came to conclude that 'focus groups' would ideally fit into my research design. In the 
next section I present the main reasons for that. 
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'Focus Groups' as a Personal Choice 
A number of personal reasons informed my decision to use 'focus groups' to collect 
data for the research. The first motivation was related to my argument that 'risk is an 
epistemological construct'. The idea that 'risk' does not exist until it comes to be 
known leads to the assumption that 'risk' is defined on the basis of a combination of 
subjective and sociocultural elements and that its meanings originate from social 
interactions. So, from the beginning, I assumed that to investigate the girls' 'ways of 
seeing' their personal risk of HIV I AIDS infection in the context of heterosexual 
relationships I should find a method that allowed their own perspectives to emerge. I 
believed that it would be through the analytical exploration of their discourses that I 
would be able to understand their various ways of making sense of risk in general, and 
HIV I AIDS risk in particular. I was looking for a method in which my own ideas about 
how girls see or should see HIV I AIDS risk could interfere as little as possible with the 
girls' expression of personal views. In addition, the presumption that risk meanings are 
both 'individual' and 'collective' led me to think of a method that could provide a 
setting for social interaction; where individual positions could become visible 'in 
relation to' group perspectives and where the 'collective' could be expressed not as a 
fixed pattern but as a dynamic combination between individual and group perspectives. 
Ideally, it should be a method based on group conversation. In this way, I thought, I 
would be able to gather information about 'ways of seeing' HIV/AIDS risk, and also 
about the processes of production of those 'ways of seeing' and the knowledge 
involved in it. So, the initial motivation to choose 'focus groups' had to do with my 
own 'way of seeing' 'risk' and the specific HIV I AIDS risk. And it was the literature on 
'focus groups', a procedure that was entirely new for me, that provided the first clues 
about its adequacy for my research design. 
The second general motivation resulted from my wish to carry out my research by 
following a 'feminist style of knowing,24, which coincidentally (or perhaps not) ended 
up by being compatible with my personal conceptions of the epistemological nature of 
'risk'. Arguing that feminist research is research 'for' women, rather than 'on' women, 
Klein stresses that sometimes what is supposed to be feminist research actually 
24 I am inspired here by the Hilary Graham's phrase "a female style of knowing" (Graham 1983, p.136) 
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contributed to the perpetuation of the dominant androcentric research because of 
mistaken methodological choices (Klein 1983). Referring to this type of inquiry as 
research 'on' women, Klein argues that it is " ... often [ ... J conducted without careful 
examination of the suitability of the methods used for feminist scholarship and the 
researchers do not state why they chose a particular method and what problems 
occurred during the research project" (p.90). For Klein, this results in research that may 
make women visible but not in "a feminist frame of reference" (p.90). She stresses that 
in order to use this frame it is necessary to employ research methods that take women's 
experiences into account. 
In her analysis of the usefulness of 'focus groups' in feminist research Wilkinson 
(1999) argues that while this is a procedure of increasing interest in social sciences, it 
is still limited among feminists. She cites as evidence the limited appearance of 'focus 
groups' in texts on feminist research methods texts and the fact that in her own 
literature review she did not find more than two dozen publications reporting the use of 
the method in feminist-oriented studies. 
Although it has been argued that there is no special method for feminist research, 
feminist methodology follows some principles. Those principles are all juxtaposed to 
the supposed objectivity and neutrality of scientific inquiries, which are recognized as 
androcentrically derived ideals (Code 1991). Renzetti and Lee summarize the basic 
orientation of feminist methodology: 
"(a) open acknowledgment by the researcher of her or his assumptions, 
beliefs, sympathies, and biases ... 
(b) rejection of the traditional separation of the researcher from the 
researched; and 
(c) adoption of the goals of the research as consciousness-raising and 
empowerment" (Renzetti and Lee 1993, p.177). 
Feminists criticize more traditional methods of scientific inquiry, particularly those that 
postulate an objective positivism (Wilkinson 1999). As Wilkinson (1999) points out, 
feminist researchers usually stress the contextual nature of data. Researchers or 
research participants do not think or act in isolation. And this is true regardless of the 
method used. Wilkinson (1999) therefore suggests that, since they rely on interaction, 
'focus groups' can offer feminists what is lacking in other methods. 
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In considering the influence of the context on the research process a number of other 
motivations to use 'focus groups' started to emerge. One was related to the nature of 
the topic to be investigated. The disclosure of information about sexual experiences or 
beliefs and attitudes about sex-related issues involves revealing intimate data. I 
assumed that a degree of intimacy and friendship among the research participants and 
between them and myself should facilitate our conversation about such sensitive 
topics. And that was what I could promote with the use of 'focus groups', taking 
advantage of the possibility of incorporating the group interaction as a research 
facilitator. 
While the 'focus groups' technique was consciously chosen according to my personal 
interests, it also intended to fulfill the objective of making the data collection process 
enjoyable and somewhat useful for the research participants. I was willing to include as 
an explicit research interest the development of a research process 'for' the adolescent 
women I was about to talk to. My commitment to this particular task was primarily due 
to the feeling that because the girls let me invade their private lives and showed a 
willingness to provide the intimate information I wanted, lowed them something in 
return. I was, I suppose, thankful for that, recognizing that probably only very few 
intimate friends would have ever had access to such information. One can perhaps 
argue that with my thesis I would, in one way or another and at least indirectly, give the 
research participants something back. Even agreeing with that, I could not help feeling 
that the data collected would be the result of a sort of exploitation. In the end, I think 
that the intention of making the data collection environment pleasurable worked very 
well in both ways, either with respect to the interests of the research or of the research 
participants. The fact that the girls did not seem to find it difficult to talk about their 
sexual experiences or other sex-related issues, which appears to be demonstrated in the 
richness and depth of the data gathered, can, perhaps, be regarded as evidence of the 
positive effect of the group environment in the data collection. Also, the fact that 
against the girls' wishes I had many times to interrupt the session because we had 
already exceeded our proposed limit of two hours, seems to suggest that the girls 
enjoyed their participation in the focus groups sessions. 
It has been argued that 'focus groups' are social events (although not 'natural' ones) 
that are enjoyed by its participants, regardless of the personal level of involvement with 
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the topic discussed (Catterall and Maclaran 1997). I would agree with this as far as the 
potential of 'focus groups' for providing enjoyable moments to research participants is 
concerned, but I consider that the more the interest in the research topic, the higher the 
motivation and the level of interaction among the research participants. In the case of 
my research I think that the girls' motivation to engage in the discussions during the 
focus group sessions was especially influenced by the importance of the matter of 
'sexuality' in their day-to-day life. And this contributed to making the 'focus groups' 
experience more enjoyable. While knowing that because of their interactive nature 
'focus groups' are expected to be more enjoyable than other types of data collection 
procedures like questionnaires and individual interviews, I still tried to enhance the 
participants' pleasure and involvement with the research by starting each meeting with 
what I call an 'integrating activity', a sort of 'warming up' game. I will explain in 
detail what I mean by that later on. For now I think it is sufficient to say that those 
activities were designed to stimulate interaction, spontaneity and intimacy and 
constituted an important addition to the meetings, contributing a great deal to the group 
interaction and making the meetings enjoyable. 
Before going on any further, I wish to clarify why I use the word 'sensitive' when I 
refer to the intimate nature of the issues to be investigated in my research. As Farquhar 
and Das (1999, p.48) argue, 'sensitivity' is a subjective construct, in the sense that 
"what feels sensitive or threatening to one may not to another" (p.48). It should then be 
clear who is judging the research as 'sensitive', what is being considered as 'sensitive', 
and to whom the research is 'sensitive'. In my case, I take issues related to sexuality as 
'sensitive' in both ways, either with respect to the girls' or to my own feelings. For the 
girls, to express personal positions about sex meant to release private information 
about sexual knowledge and experiences into the public space of our meetings. And 
because the research involved pre-existing groups whose members had a continuing 
relationship before and after the fieldwork and within and beyond the context of the 
research, this could signify the danger of seeing secrets being spread out into the 
community. I also consider my research 'sensitive' because to talk about 'risk-taking' 
may involve the disclosure of perceived moral failures. This can be especially 
problematic for research participants when the risk one talks about is recognizably a 
health risk (like HIV / AIDS) and the person who is supposed to guide the conversation 
is, like me, a health professional. Although 'risk' is not commonly taken as a sensitive 
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research topic, few authors have recognized that, in certain research settings, research 
participants can feel inhibited to disclose stories involving personal risk-taking because 
it can be disapproved by others?5 
For myself, even being an adult women, married, with two adolescent daughters and 
with experience in the field of sex education, I still cannot talk of sex in a relaxed way 
and the reason for that is quite simple. I find that to talk about issues surrounding 
sexuality 'touches' the most intimate dimension of me, involving my own intimacy 
with my 'self and revealing the complexities and contradictions that are combined in 
'who' I am. Feelings, values, knowledge, beliefs, experiences are all parts of me and 
are revealed through my talk about sex. In a way, when talking about sex I feel like I 
am exposing my own body to 'others'. And the same is true when I think of the 'other' 
who is involved in the conversation with me. I always try to anticipate the 
embarrassment that certain questions or assertions can create to others. In sum, I 
categorized my research as 'sensitive' because its two main research topics -
'sexuality' and 'risk' - potentially involved embarrassing topics of discussion, either 
for the girls or for myself. 
Kitzinger and Farquhar (1999) argue that in focus group research on sensitive topics 
the style of the group moderator is crucial. On the one hand, they suggest, it is 
obviously important to avoid asking highly personal questions; on the other, to 
marginalize some issues simply because one assumes that no one could possibly want 
to disclose private experiences to other group members is also ethically problematic. 
One way of dealing with this dilemma is, the authors suggest, to let sensitive 
discussions to be maintained by the research participants rather than the researcher. I 
tried to follow this advice by avoiding personalizing my questions, in particular when 
they could involve the assumption that the girls were already sexually active (although 
I knew that some of them had already had sexual intercourse experiences). I assumed 
that this could embarrass them for, from what I have experienced, adolescent women's 
sexual activity is generally still a taboo in Brazilian society. So, it was not the case that 
sensitive questions were off my agenda but that I tried to formulate them in a way that 
would not directly implicate the 'self with them. If the 'self became visible it was 
25 See for example Green and Hart 1999. 
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because the participants themselves were interested in making 'the personal' visible. 
Despite my intentions, I cannot be sure that this was always the case. If the researcher 
is very much involved in the group interaction, like I was, it is difficult to always 
maintain a certain level of rationality and self-consciousness about how the decisions 
should be taken or which rules they were supposed to be following. In my particular 
case, the flow of the focus group discussions was very often their own regulator. 
Issues surrounding sexuality are commonly taken as 'sensitive' topics (Farquhar and 
Das 1999). Power and gender relations, the question of sexual identity, the social and 
cultural norms that organize sexual behaviour, race, religion, age, etc. are all social 
determinants of the 'sensitivity' of talk on sexuality. This 'sensitivity' is ultimately 
constructed according to the norms and taboos of a given culture (Farquhar and Das 
1999). As Farquhar and Das argue, because individuals belong to different groups at 
the same time, they are likely to experience different sets of norms and taboos and, in 
consequence, different levels of 'sensitivity' to the same topic. 
Sensitive topics are not new on feminist researchers' agenda. Feminists have 
characterized 'sensitive research' as research in which the revealing of the 'private' to 
the 'public' is an expected outcome. Bergen (1993) describes her research on marital 
rape as 'sensitive' because of the dangers faced by women who share their private 
sexual experiences with the researcher. Edwards (1993) considers her study 'sensitive' 
because it investigates women's accounts of family lives, which involves the 
uncovering of private information. Bendelow's report (1993) of a research project on 
gendered notions of pain highlights the sensitivity of pain perception, for it involves 
emotions and feelings. In my case, the 'private' to be revealed by the girls I was about 
to talk to would also be expressed with a mixture of emotions and the information 
disclosed would likely represent a threat to their moral integrity. 
Apart from reasons related to the sensitive nature of the research and the aim to make 
the group meetings pleasurable, the option for 'focus groups' was also based on my 
desire to create within the research limits a forum for individual and collective 
reflection. I assumed that this was not commonly available to girls, either in research 
contexts or in the more natural settings of everyday life. Girls' narratives of personal 
sexual stories or expression of points of view about sex-related issues are traditionally 
under adults' surveillance. This has the effect of reducing the spontaneity of girls' 
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conversations on sexuality, limiting the possibility of sharing of experiences. The less 
directive character of the 'focus group' technique could, and indeed did, offer the girls 
a chance to expose and share more freely their ideas, and time and space to rethink and 
change points of view before expressing them. Considering the specific benefits of this 
to the research participants, in terms of reducing their vulnerability, and also to the data 
collection itself, one can say that rather than feeling pressured to give immediate 
responses to satisfy the researcher (as it is usual in one-to-one and in more directive 
group interviews), the girls would" ... have the potential power to redefine the topics of 
conversation (Burgess 1984, p.1 07). 
Because focus groups allow spontaneity, the girls should be able to discuss the topics, 
directing the conversations towards their own interests (Burgess 1984). Confirming my 
expectations, the consequence of this was a reduction of the gap between the power 
held by me as the researcher and the power made available to the girls as research 
participants. It would be obviously naIve to affirm that this had the effect of eradicating 
the power differences inherent to researcher-researched relationships (Maynard 1994; 
Stanley and Wise 1993). Even in such an informal environment and with the emphasis 
on interaction and good intentions to distribute power, my role as the 'mentor' of the 
research process did not permit me to give away my task of coordinating the fieldwork. 
What was possible to achieve was a partial opening of the research process to the 
research participants' guidance. In fact, from the beginning, the data collection was 
designed to foresee the acceptance of that guidance. 
The 'focus group' technique has already been recognized as a research method that can 
fulfill the feminists' goal of doing research in which research participants are not mere 
'objects' of the research (Wilkinson 1999). Wilkinson highlights this question of the 
distribution of power in focus group research as one of the key features that makes the 
method useful for feminist research. She recognizes that " ... focus groups are a 
relatively non-hierarchical method: that is, they shift the balance of power away from 
the researcher towards the research participants" (Wilkinson 1999, p.64, authors' 
emphasis). 
This question of hierarchical power relationships as intrinsic to research processes has 
been a traditional concern among social researchers, receiving particular attention from 
feminists (Maynard 1994; Stanley and Wise 1993). Research that does not take into 
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account the influence of the researcher upon the data gathered takes the research 
participants as " ... passive givers of information, with the researcher acting as a sponge 
soaking up the details provided" (Maynard 1994, p.15). Maynard argues that feminists 
reject the inevitability of the power imbalance generated in this type of researcher-
researched relationship and that they propose, instead, a non-exploitative interaction 
between them. She writes: "research becomes a means of sharing information and, 
rather than being seen as a source of bias, the personal involvement of the interviewer 
is an important element in establishing trust and thus obtaining good quality 
information" (Maynard 1994, p.16). 
Maynard affirms that feminist scholars have dealt with the dilemma of the biased 
involvement of the researcher in the research process through an emphasis on the 
importance of researchers' reflexivity. By being reflexive, the researcher is able to 
follow herlhis personal trajectory in the research process as it is developed and to 
become aware of the bias that is behind a given conclusion or decision. So, it is not the 
case that subjective thinking is avoided. On the contrary, it is stimulated, accepted, and 
ultimately, desired. In a similar vein, Stanley and Wise argue that researchers cannot 
separate themselves from the research process. They write: 
"one's self can't be left behind, it can only be omitted from discussions and 
written accounts of the research process. But it is an omission, a failure to 
discuss something which has been present within the research itself' 
(Stanley and Wise 1993, p.161). 
Without referring to the specific advantages of 'focus groups' for feminist research, 
Carey's affirmation that in a focus group " ... group members can describe the rich 
details of complex experiences and the reasoning behind their actions, beliefs, 
perceptions, and attitudes" (Carey 1994) suggests that, whatever the approach adopted, 
the technique may increase the reflexive potential of the research process. In a group 
conversation both the researcher and the researched can, according to their interests, 
shift their positions from passive observers or listeners to active members of the group 
discussions. By being allowed to keep some distance from the research setting, both 
have the opportunity to reflect on individual experiences or assess personal beliefs, 
knowledge, attitudes about the issues that are being raised, and this may have 
implications in the 'quality' of what is being asked and the answers it produces. 
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If it is argued that the dialogue between the researcher and the researched is important, 
it has also been recognized that for the researcher it is equally important to be able to 
listen to the research participants, especially when the research deals with sex-related 
issues (Kitzinger 1994a). For Kitizinger, this " ... gives the group facilitator time to 
acclimatize to, for example, their preferred words for speaking about sex" (p.160). She 
also emphasizes that such circumstances" ... [prevent] the researcher from prematurely 
closing off the generation of meaning in his or her own search for clarification" 
(pp .160-161). This advantage highlighted by Kitzinger was indeed very significant for 
me as, like her, I was interested in the exploration of meanings - what do the girls mean 
by risk, sexual risks, risky/safe sex, and HIV/AIDS sexual risk? And how are those 
meanings produced? 
In sum, the decision to choose 'focus groups' had two main reasons, both related to the 
epistemological starting points of the research. First, it would allow me to investigate 
'HIV/AIDS risk' in the way I understand it; that is, as a sociocultural construct. 
Second, with 'focus groups' I would be able to conduct the research process in the way 
I believed it should be conducted in order to fulfill not only my research interests but 
also those of the research participants. Kitzinger (1994a) captures exactly what I had in 
mind when I chose 'focus groups': "group work ensures that priority is given to the 
respondents' hierarchy of importance, their language and concepts, their frameworks 
for understanding the world" (p.161). 
In reflecting on the judgments I made in order to choose 'focus groups' and discard 
other research methods, I should say that it was a process strongly influenced by 'who I 
am': my views, knowledge, experiences, projects, ideals. So, while the literature 
review helped me to justify the choice of the method, the decision was primarily taken 
on the basis of a reflection on what 'I' wanted to do. Other methodological decisions, 
like those described next also reflected my personal approach to doing qualitative 
research, especially the research I had in mind. 
The Groups' Constitution 
Given the characteristics of my research, I decided to limit the groups I would work 
with to two. I thought that two groups would be ideal due to the limited amount oftime 
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I had to collect the data and also the hard work involved in being a focus group 
researcher involves. I do not consider the small number of groups to be a weakness of 
my research design. On the contrary, it was this feature that allowed me, I think, to 
keep a high level of involvement with the groups and to explore the research topic in 
the expected depth. As Kitzinger and Barbour highlight, "statistical representativeness 
is not the aim of most focus group research" (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999, p.7, 
authors' emphasis). Like the majority of focus group researchers I was not interested in 
making generalizations, in the sense of saying "all girls or even all working class girls 
see this in a particular way". We must be very cautious, given the qualitative and 
small-scale nature of the research. I considered however that it was possible to theorize 
on the basis of the data gathered, seeing it as a sample of available discourses. As we 
will see some of this information can also be seen in the work of others (for example in 
the work of Holland et al. 1991, 1994a, 1994b and Green 1997a). In sum, I was not 
looking for simple generalizations. My objective was to explore the research 
participants' views about the HIV/AIDS risk in heterosexual relationships and obtain 
data about the ways in which those views are constructed. 
Another important reason for me to choose to work with only two groups of girls 
during the whole process of data collection was related to the 'fieldwork logistic'. The 
data collection process was going to rely entirely on me. The planning of the meetings, 
including the provision of material for each meeting and the monitoring of two weekly 
focus group sessions would demand my full-time involvement with the research during 
the twelve weeks of data collection. 
It has been argued that in focus group research there is no rule for the number of group 
sessions as it will depend on the characteristics of the research, including time and 
resource limitations, and the researcher's interests (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999, p.7). 
Morgan (1997) affirms that the number of group sessions is directly related to the 
amount of data gathered. The author emphasizes the impact of the number of groups on 
the size and organizational level of the research team. He says: "conducting many 
groups almost ensures the need for a larger research staff, the only other alternative 
being to extend the data collection and analysis over a longer period of time" (Morgan 
1997, p.43). 
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In the published reports of focus group research I came across the average of group size 
ranged from six to ten members. My original plan included two groups of at least seven 
members. Although I thought that it would be better to work with groups smaller than 
this, I took into account the experience of other focus groups' researchers. Some of 
them advise that it is better to begin with bigger groups because of the potential 
discontinuance of group members during the data collection process (Dilorio et al. 
1994; Morgan 1995). In the two schools from which I drew my groups, however, I 
could not find more than six girls in each interested in participating in the research. 
The data collection happened during the period of the' 1998 Football World Cup'. This 
was a very special time in Brazil, the country of football. Furthermore, the data 
collection coincided with the winter time there (June, July and August). Winters in the 
south are very cold, the days are short and adolescents tend to take advantage of being 
on their school holidays to wake up later in the mornings or simply to have fun 
indoors. Initially, both groups were composed of six members, but as the research 
progressed each group lost one of its members. In the end, the number of five members 
proved to be good, for, as anticipated, the coordination of the data collection proved to 
be a hard task. I had to conduct the group meetings, listen to the tapes after each 
meeting, re-plan the meetings according to the issues raised each week and, after 
finishing the data collection, transcribe about 40 hours of tape recorded group 
conversations, and conduct a qualitative analysis of the huge amount of data that it 
generated. 
Morgan (1997) suggests that the rule for the size of groups in focus group research 
specifies a range from 6 to 10 members. Nevertheless, he points out, one should not be 
limited to the rules when planning the research design. In his personal experience, he 
adds, to have groups of three can also work very well, depending on the level of 
involvement with the topic. This was also experienced by Green and Hart (1999) in 
their study on children's views of accident risks. Morgan suggests that when the 
participants are highly involved with the topic to be discussed, as was the case in my 
research, it is better to work with smaller groups because all the group members will 
then have the chance to participate in the discussions. 
I did not select the research participants directly. I just established the geographical 
context of the fieldwork and advertised the research in two public schools situated in 
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the area. My purpose was to work with working class girls who were genuinely 
interested in participating in the research. The choice of working class girls had to do 
with my commitment to listen to girls whose views on sexual risk matters are more 
likely to remain invisible in the generalizing discourses of biomedicine. This does not 
mean, however, that I consider that upper class Brazilian adolescent women, for 
example, are visible as such in so traditionally androcentric discourses. That is, it is not 
my idea to affirm that, apart from the working class girls, the others are represented in 
scientific discourses of risky sex and HIV / AIDS risk. What, perhaps, might 
differentiate the working class girls from, for example, those from the upper class, is 
that the latter are more likely to share with the well-educated elite of HIV/AIDS 
theorists some of the social knowledge, values and interests that are somehow implicit 
in their discourses. Also, I do not mean to imply that the entire working class 
population of adolescent women is represented in my research. I am not willing to take 
feminine experiences in the risky terrain of sex and its (in)visibility in scientific 
discourses as homogeneous. Nevertheless, I believe that by opening space for working 
class girls to express their understanding of sexual risks, including HIV / AIDS risk, I 
can challenge the monolithic (and androcentric) conception of risky/safe sex used by 
biomedicine to define 'the problem' of girls' sexual risk-taking. It would also be 
relevant to explore what other women (either adolescent or not) have to say about 
risky/safe sex and the specific HIV/AIDS risk, but I think that if we are to start from 
one particular social group, let us start from women who will probably have less 
chance to find a legitimate space to speak out. 
A common feature of each of the two groups I worked with was that the group 
members knew each other very well either because they studied in the same classroom, 
lived in the same neighborhood andlor belonged to a friendship network. Kitzinger and 
Barbour (1999) point out that one of the important decisions to be taken by a focus 
group researcher is whether or not to work with people who already know each other. 
Pre-existing groups, the authors argue, have the advantage of being constituted by 
individuals who are, in one way or another, bound up with each other "through living, 
working or socializing together" (p.8). The authors go on to emphasize the importance 
of those types of social networks for focus group research: "these are, after all, the 
networks in which people might normally discuss (or evade) the sorts of issues likely 
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to be raised in the research session and the 'naturally-occurring' group is one of the 
most important contexts in which ideas are formed and decisions made" (pp.8-9). 
To work with girls who knew each other so well was good because it guaranteed the 
level of intimacy necessary for the discussions of the sensitive topics of the research. It 
also contributed to the level of homogeneity of the groups; 'homogeneity' in the sense 
of the sharing of a very similar sociocultural background. Morgan (1997) refers to the 
'homogeneity' in focus groups' composition as a means to facilitate the flow of 
conversations within groups and also the analysis of the differences between groups. 
He points out that the level of 'homogeneity' among group members, considering 
either race, sex, social class or other common background as the variable, is to be 
decided taking into consideration the research topic. 
It has been recognized that in focus group research it is important to work with group 
members who share a similar sociocultural background. Morgan (1997), for example, 
stresses that "participants must feel able to talk to each other, and wide gaps in social 
background or lifestyle can defeat this requirement" (p.36). However, as Morgan 
(1997) comments, homogeneous background does not mean homogeneity in attitudes 
or in 'ways of seeing' a giving topic as this may result in unproductive group 
discussions. 
In my research at least three variables contributed with the homogeneity of the groups -
sex, age and sociocultural background. The groups were constituted by 14-17 year-old 
girls, who studied in the same school and lived in the same area. Although most of the 
members of the two groups were classmates (with only one exception) they were not of 
the same age due to the way the Brazilian educational system works. Students can stay 
in the same school grade for more than one year, depending on their academic 
performance. Grade retention occurs when, at the end of the academic year, the student 
fails to meet the academic expectations. In Brazilian schools it is common to find 
students of different ages in the same class. 
Having presented how the two groups I worked with were constituted, in terms of who 
the group members where and how they came to participate in the research, I now 
move on to a more descriptive approach. The next sections give a picture of the 
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process of data collection, describing the research setting and the procedures employed 
to collect, record and analyse the data. 
The Research Setting 
The chosen area for the development of the fieldwork was a working class 'villa' of the 
city of Porto Alegre, the capital of the state of Rio Grande do SuI, which is located in 
the very south of Brazil. The city was chosen because I was born and lived my entire 
life there (except for the four years of staying in London for my PhD), which facilitated 
my contacts and actual 'survival' whilst collecting the data. 
Even though I decided to recruit the research participants from two local public 
schools, I did not want to conduct the group meetings within the physical space of a 
school. My desire to avoid the school settings was based on the assumption that the 
context influences the data produced. I was thinking about the sensitivity of the topics 
to be discussed and the potential threat represented by the school environment to free 
discussions about sex. I wanted independence from school rules and bureaucracies. I 
also did not want to 'contaminate' the girls' conversations with the formality of the 
schools' environment. I ended up by conducting the meetings in a room that was used 
by the community for functions. Sometimes this room was also used by the staff of the 
health centre situated nearby for health promotion activities. More than once I could 
not work in the 'function room' because another activity was programmed. On those 
occasions I had to work in one of the small rooms of the health centre building. When 
this happened, it was a struggle to work with some group activities that required more 
space. Also, the group interactions did not follow the same pattern of informality and 
spontaneity that was apparent when the group met in the 'function room'. 
It has been pointed out that there are advantages and disadvantages in working with 
focus group in informal settings (Green and Hart 1999). Green and Hart comment that 
in their experiences, group conversations conducted in informal settings were 'chaotic' 
and more difficult to transcribe than those occurred in formal settings, because of the 
amount of interruption and unstructured ways of talking. The researchers point out, 
however, that this is not necessarily a negative point as it may exemplify how real life 
interactions are constructed (Green and Hart 1999). I cannot say that the informality of 
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the research setting resulted in 'chaotic' discussions. The girls themselves contributed 
a lot to the order of the group discussions. They helped me to get a balance between 
informality and order. Many times, when everybody was talking at the same time and it 
was impossible to get a sense of who was defending this or that point, the girls 
themselves tried to organize their interactions by establishing a 'speaker order' or 
asking for silence or calling attention to one of the group members who was trying to 
make her point. 
While it was not my objective to look at the differences of data produced in different 
contexts, I noticed that, similarly to the children interviewed by Green and Hart (ibid.), 
the girls' involvement with the group discussions was influenced by the informality of 
the 'function room' and the formality of the health centre. In the former, they looked 
more relaxed. In the latter, they seemed to be less spontaneous and apparently did not 
enjoy the discussions in the way they did when we met in the 'function room'. One 
factor that definitely contributed to this shift in attitude was the difficulty in carrying 
out the 'integrating activity' in the small spaces available in the health centre building, 
which also did not offer us enough privacy. Also, it may well be that the girls felt 
inhibited to talk freely about the risks of sex because of the proximity of the medical 
staff, who they reported had already had conversations with some of them about sexual 
risks and the responsibilities of sexual activity. Another factor that could have also 
contributed with the girls' less relaxed attitude in the health centre was the fact that, by 
working in the community, the health centre's staff were likely to know the girls, their 
families and records. The possibility of letting a doctor or a nurse know about their 
sexual experiences and viewpoints about sex-related issues could threaten the girls' 
reputation within their families and the community. And that seemed to be a common 
concern. 
Having described the research setting, I now move on to the description of how I 
conducted the focus group sessions. My research project, fieldwork diary, 
transcriptions of the tape-recorded sessions and my memories will help me to bring to 
the present time a reconstruction of what happened in the past when I put my fieldwork 
plan into practice. 
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The Group Meetings 
General Format of the Meetings 
Each focus group was constituted of three moments: an 'integrating activity' (lasting 
about 35 min.), an interval (lasting about 20 min.) and a focused discussion (lasting 
about 50 min.). As mentioned earlier, I had separate weekly meetings with each of the 
two groups. The focus group meetings were planned in advance, but the plans were 
relatively flexible. The literature recommends that focus group research should be 
preceded by a phase of preparation in which the researcher studies the research topic 
and develops a protocol of broad concepts and guideline questions to be explored in 
the group discussions (Carey 1994; Kitzinger and Barbour 1999). Before starting the 
data collection I had a plan for the fieldwork, in terms of the general format of the 
meetings and the orienting themes for the first five. I did not prepare a plan for the rest 
of the fieldwork because of my wish to work with a 'stratified fieldwork plan', that is 
to say, a plan that was going to be constructed step by step as the data collection 
progressed. 
My idea was to start from the participants' general ideas about risk, which I thought 
were embedded in their views of 'everyday risks', and then move on to the more 
specific 'HIV I AIDS sexual risk'. With this in mind I organized an initial agenda with 
questions and topics that I considered relevant to be answered and/or discussed. 
However, I was prepared to re-think the agendas during the course of the data 
collection, as other relevant topics should emerge from the group interactions. 
Sometimes I just added another topic or question to the initial agenda of the first five 
meetings; at other times I changed the previous plan completely. In sum, the orienting 
themes for the first five meetings, designed before the starting of the data collection, 
were opened to changes and the other subsequent seven meetings were planned as the 
data collection progressed (see Appendix II, p. 221 for the focus groups plan). 
The way I managed to work with what I called a 'stratified fieldwork plan' demanded a 
high level of personal involvement with the research. After each meeting I had the task 
of listening to the focus group recorded tape, writing down in my diary some notes 
about what would possibly be important to discuss in the next focus groups and why. 
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This procedure allowed me to develop a reflexive interaction with the data from the 
earlier stages of the data collection process onwards. The next task was to compare the 
topics listed as relevant with the previous agenda and decided what was going to be the 
topic explored in the next focus group meeting. As I worked with two groups 
separately, I had to follow those procedures at least twice a week. This proved to be a 
demanding and time-consuming task, but also a rewarding one. The more I opened to 
the participants the direction of the focus group discussions, the more I was able to 
approach the 'reading grid' they use to make sense of the risks of sex in general, and 
HIV I AIDS risk in particular. 
I think it is worth explaining that the focused discussions, which occupied the last part 
of each meeting, were concentrated primarily on the same topic explored in the 
integrating activity. For the purpose of planning the topics to be explored in the group 
meetings, I took into account the two groups separately. There was not, however, much 
difference between what emerged in the integrating activities with both groups. So, the 
agenda of the actual group meetings was nearly the same. 
The First Meeting 
As planned, I met the two groups separately. The agenda for this first meeting included 
mainly introductory and organizational issues. I asked the participants, for example, to 
discuss and decide what would be the best day and time for our next 11 weekly 
meetings. The consensus was reached after a negotiation of individual interests. We 
also discussed the rules that would apply to the meetings and to the group members' 
participation, including myself. I explained the points I thought were important for the 
organization of the meetings and group discussions, such as punctuality, commitment 
to the research (in the sense of avoiding discontinuity), respect for other opinions and 
the need to keep the participants' knowledge, opinions, experiences, within the limits 
of the group meetings. They were then allowed to discuss the issues and had an 
opportunity to raise other points not mentioned by me, although in both groups the 
discussion was limited to my proposal. In the end we came up with a list of rules, 
which everyone agreed to. 
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I used this first meeting to get to know the research participants and to let them know 
about me. In both groups I was the only stranger. Although they had already been 
informed about the general design of the research, I described with more detail the 
research procedures and my objectives. In both groups, the girls were proving to be 
very curious, even excited, about the fact that I was living in London and my task of 
writing a thesis in English. Later, during one of our last meetings one girl suggested 
that one of the reasons why she and her friends were interested in the research was 
because, to participate in a research like mine, would make them feel important. 
At the end of the meeting I reminded the participants about the rules we had just set up, 
emphasizing the principle of confidentiality, which should be followed by all the 
research participants. I also emphasized my commitment to this confidentiality. 
Integrating Activities 
What I called the 'integrating activity' (see Appendix II, p. 221) was a sort of 'warm-
up' group activity, lasting approximately 30 minutes and designed with the primary 
purpose of making the group meetings as enjoyable and interactive as possible. 
Secondly, the 'integrating activity' was also thought of as a means to facilitate the 
participants' involvement with the research and to generate focus for the group 
discussions. In the end, what was experienced in an 'integrating activity' - the stories 
created, the jokes, the language used, the roles played, the insights, the issues raised -
became substantive material for the focus group discussions. Like other focus group 
researchers, I developed my own way of getting the participants' involvement in the 
research. Barbour (1999) used vignettes to explore how team members make sense of 
each other's roles and responsibilities. Kitzinger used photographs from TV news 
bulletins to stimulate the participants' interaction with media messages about AIDS 
within the focus group settings. She also employed a 'card game' to explore different 
perspectives on 'who was at risk from AIDS'. As Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) 
recognize, "collective tasks, such as these, encourage participants to concentrate on one 
another (rather than the group facilitator) and may force them to explain and defend 
their different perspectives" (p.12). The authors emphasize however, that such a 
stimulus is not always necessary or even appropriate, as some may feel uncomfortable 
with the idea of participating in activities that sometimes may remind them their school 
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time. They recommend that the appropriateness of group activities should be evaluated 
carefully and monitored throughout the research. 
Although the 'integrating activity' was supposed to be experienced as an imaginary 
situation, the participants' involvement with it was not fictitious. Although imaginary, 
the situation experienced was a representation of something that actually happens in 
reality, one to which the participants had some sort of connection. I tried to ensure that 
connection by working with common themes of everyday life, especially those that I 
assumed were of the girls' interest. To work with a 'stratified fieldwork plan' was 
particularly helpful for the selection of those themes. 
The idea of using 'integrating activities' to begin the group meetings was based on the 
assumption that" ... the point of doing group interview is to bring a number of different 
perspectives into contact" (Morgan 1997, p.46). In this sense, the use of the 
'integrating activity' to provide space for the participants to interact with others on a 
given topic had the advantage of stimulating the awareness and defense of personal 
positions before the actual focused discussion took place (Morgan 1997). The 
differences between personal positions started to emerge and become clear to the 
participants themselves during their involvement with the integrating activity. As a 
result, the participants became more responsive to the themes to be discussed in the 
focused group discussions and the group interaction, which had actually started before, 
was of a high standard. 
Commenting on ways of facilitating the discussion of sensitive topics in focus group 
research Farquhar and Das (1999) cite the recommendations of Hoppe et al (1995), 
according to whom warm-up activities should precede the discussions in research with 
children. In their experience with adults however, Farquhar and Das did not find that 
warm-up activities were welcomed. Even in a group of strangers, they comment, adults 
resisted to participate in such activities, especially if the theme of the activity did not 
appear to be related to the main topic. Farquhar and Das (1999) suggest that the adults 
had a problem with the childish tone of the word 'games.' I was actually worried that, 
for the same reason, the girls would resist participating in the 'integrating activities'. 
After all, they were in a transition between childhood and adulthood, but trying hard to 
present themselves as adults. I did not have any problem with this, however. The girls' 
involvement with the games and role-plays that constituted the 'integrating activities' 
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was, from the beginning, very good. One reason for that was, perhaps, the fact that the 
orienting themes of those activities were partially produced in the actual interactions 
between the participants, either in the focused group discussions or in the integrating 
activities themselves. 
'The simulation of a judgment' is an example of what I call 'integrating activity'. This 
activity was a sort of role-play in which the participants simulated a 'trial' situation. 
There were two 'lawyers', one defending the 'pros' of adolescents' sexual activity and 
another presenting arguments against it. There was also a 'jury', whose responsibility 
was to balance the pros and cons, and after discussing privately, finally reached a 
consensus, presenting its decision and the reasons behind it. During the 'trial' the 
'lawyers' and the members of the 'jury' had the opportunity of discussing their 
arguments. 
When I planned the fieldwork I had the idea that it would not be appropriate to tape-
record the 'integrating activities' because this could threaten the participants' 
spontaneity, for some could feel embarrassed to being involved in 'childish' activities. 
Also, it would be very difficult to transcribe the girls' words in such an informal 
setting. Nevertheless, it was the participants themselves who influenced a final 
decision to use the tape-recorder during the 'integrating activities'. In the first two 
meetings I did use the tape-recorder only during the focused group discussion of the 
day. In my third meeting with one of the groups, the participants asked me why I 
thought it would not be good to use it while they were participating in an 'integrating 
activity'. Strikingly enough, they had voiced the opinion that I was mistakenly thinking 
they would be ashamed of playing games, which they were not. I asked the other group 
if they, too, would not mind if! used the tape-recorder and they said no. I then recorded 
the subsequent meetings almost in their entirety, with the exception of their intervals. 
When I carried out the data analysis, I many times came back to one of the recorded 
'integrating activity' to try to understand what the starting point was for a particular 
discourse explored in the focused group discussion of the day. Apart from the tapes, 
which I did not transcribe, I also used to take notes about the issues raised and also 
about the insights I had during the development of the activity. What would be 
worthwhile to discuss in the focus group? Which questions were occurring to me at 
that time? What points would be useful to explore in more depth? At the end of each 
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integrating activity I usually had a list of topics which constituted the guidelines for the 
focused group discussion that would be conducted shortly after the integrating activity. 
Sometimes, depending on the importance of the issue, it could come to constitute the 
orienting theme for one of the next group meetings. 
Conducting the Focused Group Discussions 
I took advantage of the interaction created in the 'integrating activity' and in the 
subsequent 'interval' (where we used to have snacks, sometimes brought by one of the 
participants, sometimes by myself) to extend the informality and spontaneity to the 
third part of the meeting. All the sessions were conducted in a relaxed way. I tried to 
interfere as little as possible in the groups' discussions. My role as a facilitator 
included reminding the participants at the beginning of the session about the theme to 
be discussed. I sometimes used a question or a statement related to the original theme 
but produced in the 'integrating activity' to start the session and then left the 
participants free to embark on a conversation about it or to present their points of view 
(in a way already displayed to the others in the earlier moments of the meeting). The 
main difference between the display of positions in the focused discussions and in the 
'integrating activity' was that in the former there was more time and space for the 
exploration andlor clarification of ideas. 
As a facilitator I could not be passive, for it was not always possible to leave the 
discussions to the exclusive guidance of the participants. A more "interventionist style" 
(Kitzinger 1994b, p.106) was used to stimulate the continuing exploration of a given 
theme, knowing that this would provide relevant information for the research. At other 
times I simply brought the discussion back to a theme that had been emphatically 
discussed before but in a superficial way. The 'coming backs' were also useful when I 
thought it was necessary to clarify personal positions andlor conflicting discourses 
somehow lost in the heat of the group interaction. Self-evident assumptions were also 
treated as matters for more careful examination within the groups. For example, in a 
discussion about the reasons why some girls do not use condoms in spite of knowing 
the implications of not using them, more than one participant began by stressing that 
the main reason was because those girls do not care. I then asked them to review each 
step a girl has to take in order to be a successful condom user, giving them time to 
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reflect about the answers to questions related to the difficulties of condom use. Is it 
easy for girls to buy condoms? Do they have money? Is it easy to ask for condoms in 
the community health centre where condoms are free? Are there risks in doing that? 
How about the risks to reputation? Even by having easy access to condoms, is it easy 
for the girl to use it consistently? So, in a way I directed their thinking and 
consequently the discussion generated by it. 
When intervening in the group's interaction, I was attentive to the participants' 
reactions to my positions or to my interpretations of their positions. I usually called for 
a more explicit manifestation of those reactions. This had the effect of maximizing the 
interactions between the participants, for to explain a reaction included pointing out its 
reasons and presenting to others an exploration of personal arguments. Once the 
interaction started to be productive, I used to return to a less interventionist style. On 
those occasions I could see the advantages of the use of group interaction in 
exploratory research, as the direction of the discussions was set by the participants' 
themselves. To clarify my point here I use Kitzinger's words as if they were mine: 
"When group dynamics worked well the co-participants acted as co-
researchers taking the research into new and often unexpected directions 
and engaging in interaction which were both complementary (such as 
sharing common experience) and argumentative (questioning, challenging, 
and disagreeing with each other)" (Kitzinger I 994b, p.l 07) 
With regard to my involvement with the discussions, I adopted a position where I was 
not totally open to disclose personal experiences and ideas to the research participants. 
I was continuously worried that my participation could inhibit their manifestations, in 
the sense of setting unintended limits to it. I was aware that to be a middle class adult, 
perhaps representing a 'mother figure', a health professional, a university lecturer, a 
doctoral student, a person who lived in Europe, had an impact in the way the 
participants saw me. I was definitely different, but this was not perceived as such in a 
negative sense. I was seen as a model to be followed. I felt that the differences between 
the participants and me were seen as a gap that most of them would like to reduce, 
indeed an aim that they were trying hard to achieve mainly through education. So, there 
was always a tension between my conscious presence within the group and how much 
of me could be revealed without compromising the presence of the participants and the 
consequent production of data. In the end, I did not follow any self-imposed rule. My 
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tendency was to respond to the participants' demands for my explicit participation in 
the group dynamics. 
Sometimes the participants were keen to hear my opinion about a particular subject, 
especially when there was a strong divergence amongst various perspectives. In such 
situations I usually did not avoid disclosing my opinion. After all, the participants were 
there talking about themselves. So, why would it be more risky for me to mark my 
presence there than for them? I answered their questions, trying, however, to get the 
participants back to the discussion as soon as possible. A good technique to achieve 
this was to ask the participants to explain in what sense their opinions were similar or 
distinct from my own. Another circumstance in which the participants were keen to 
hear from me was when they wanted to check their knowledge about biological 
phenomena such as human reproduction, contraception and HIV / AIDS transmission 
and prevention. On the whole, they were very well informed about all those issues but 
were proving to be insecure about the accuracy of their knowledge. They also wanted 
to know about scientific advances in those fields. Although it was not my objective to 
provide this type of knowledge, when asked I took some time from the group meeting 
to give the participants the answers they wanted. 
So far, I have made very little distinction between the features of the meetings with the 
two groups, which I identify as group 't' and group 'j' after the initial of the names of 
the schools where the group members were recruited. While both groups had focus 
group sessions separately, the fact that I was in both cases the facilitator produced a 
sort of homogeneity in the way the sessions were run. This does not mean, however, 
homogeneous data. Actually, each group meeting and focus group session was seen as 
unique, independently of which group I was working with. If we are to compare the 
data produced in the group discussions one can notice similarities as well as 
differences either across groups or within each group. Soon I realized that I should not 
be worried about setting strict boundaries between the themes proposed to be discussed 
in one group and in the other. I just conducted the meetings by following the same 
principles, including the use of a flexible agenda, and let the data emerge. 
Before starting the data collection I suspected that because the groups were different I 
would have separate agendas for the meetings with each group. As the data collection 
progressed it became apparent that the 'reading grids' the participants of both groups 
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used to make sense of risk, sexual risk and HIV/AIDS sexual risk were very similar. 
What differentiated the participants' perspectives were the values, knowledge and 
experiences that gave shape to the 'reading grid' through which they made sense of 
risk. And, strikingly enough, even those differences did not always follow a pattern. 
The same person could employ congruent, or different, or contradictory 'reading grids', 
depending on the situation (see Chapters 4 and 5). So, I thought, as long as there is 
space for the participants to express their personal ways of reading 'sexual risks', 
including HIV I AIDS sexual risk, it does not matter much if the focus group sessions 
with the two groups occurs in a similar fashion. 
As I have commented above, the agenda for the focus group sessions was constructed 
as the data were being produced. This work-in-progress-type of agenda had the 
advantage of capturing the experiences, meanings, knowledge and views of the 
members of both groups as they were being expressed. What I thought was important 
to explore in one group was often the result of my knowledge of and reflections upon 
the data produced by the other group and vice-versa. So, there had always been an 
intrinsic link between the interactions in-group 't' and in group 'j'. I think that the 
similarities between the two groups were due to my personal interventions but also to 
the features they have in common, like age, sex, class and sociocultural background. 
As the groups I worked with were small in size I did not have a problem ensuring that 
everyone had the chance of speaking. However, individual characteristics influenced 
the amount of intervention each participant made in the group discussions. In group 'j' 
one participant was less talkative than the others. In group 't' there were two who were 
more shy. There were times when I had to intervene to get their views or hear about 
their experiences. Strikingly, more than once, when I asked them to present their 
viewpoints about what was being discussed, those girls came up with a well elaborated 
explanation of the reasons why they saw the issue the way they did. In such situations I 
always got the feeling that before my intervention they were silent because they were 
reflecting on the subject. I had the impression that they were trying to make up their 
minds about something that, perhaps, they never had opportunities to think of and 
develop a related conscious viewpoint. This made me think once again about the 
advantages of focus groups for an exploratory research project like mine. In this 
respect, I agree with Kitzinger and Farquhar (1999) when they suggest that with focus 
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groups "the researcher is creating a setting where, at the very least, a subject is 
addressed in greater depth than usual" and that " often research participants are 
discussing issues [ ... ] which are seldom mentioned in an everyday context beyond the 
routine exchange of jokes and platitudes". The authors go on to suggest that 
"sometimes this will be the first time that they have articulated certain views or 
experiences (to themselves, to each other, or to a particular friend in the group)" 
(p.165). This may have been the case when some of the research participants remained 
silent during the group discussions. 
Before finishing this section I think it is worthwhile summarizing how the agenda for 
each focus group was produced, although on a number of occasions this has already 
been explained in the present chapter. Each focus group session had an orienting 
theme. Before the session I always had a short list of the topics I would like to explore. 
However, this initial agenda was flexible enough to be totally or partially changed in 
order to accommodate new questions or topics of interest brought from the group 
interactions during the integrating activity of the day. The adaptation of the initial list 
of topics to what emerged in the 'integrating activity' did not mean the definite setting-
up of what would be discussed in the focus group. The agenda for the session remained 
flexible. In the end, what was finally discussed in each session was the result of 
interactive guidance exercised by everyone involved in the discussions, including me. 
The opportunity to share the direction of the data collection with the research 
participants is one of the positive features of focus group research. As Greg Myers and 
Phil Macnaghten (1999) comments, in focus groups the " ... participants guide the 
moderator as well as the other way round" (p.181). 
MAKING SENSE OF THE DATA 
The main source of material for data analysis consisted of 24 tapes recording the 12 
focus group sessions I had with the two groups. In addition to that, the fieldwork diary 
where I registered my impressions and notes soon after each meeting also contained 
data. This source of data, along with the tapes of the' integrating activities', was mainly 
utilized to clarify why I took this or that decision concerning the research design in 
general, and the focused discussions in particular. In this sense, it was especially useful 
for making visible the bias that influenced the data collection. With respect to the 
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'integrating activity', the data produced within it was usually explored in detail in the 
focused discussion of the day. So, in my analysis I rarely considered it as substantive 
data, preferring to explore the analytical potential of the more consistent data generated 
in the focus groups. 
To follow my original fieldwork plan I also carried out individual interviews. 
However, as the amount of focus group data proved to be overwhelming and 
sufficiently complex, rich and informative I decided not to use the individual 
interviews as source of empirical data in my analysis. Nevertheless, when analysing the 
focus group data I could not avoid using my memories of what the girls said in our 
private meetings. For instance, although the focus group material did not provide direct 
information about who was and was not sexually active I was actually informed about 
it as this was a sort of data usually revealed during the individual interviews. 
The Transcribing-Translating Tasks 
All the recorded focused discussions were transcribed. Taking into account that I was 
not interested in the actual features of the conversations but in their contents I did not 
transcribe all the sounds and utterances that appeared in the original conversations. The 
transcripts contain only words and pauses. The only exception was the transcription of 
the participants' laughs. 
I could not help feeling that, in spite of considering this decision virtually unavoidable, 
it constituted a sort of deliberate manipulation of the data. This dilemma occurred to 
me once again when I had to carry out Portuguese-English translations. Actually, as far 
as the 'manipulative effect' is concerned, I think that there is no difference between 
transforming spoken into written language and Portuguese into English. The act of 
translating spoken words into written texts is problematic. In an analysis of her own 
dilemmas while transforming Brazilian women's life story narratives into written 
documents, Daphne Patai (1988) affirms that there is "[ ... ] a distance separating the 
spoken word from the written word that is insurmountable" (p.147). Any attempt to 
make this distance invisible, let us say by presenting a spoken discourse in a written 
form has the effect of distorting the former. Patai regards this distortion as inevitable 
and, considering her own work affirms that, face with the need to translate spoken 
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Brazilian Portuguese into written English, this distortion is doubled. I exemplify some 
of the dilemmas I came across when making my transcripts with Patai's description of 
the way she produced written documents that ended up by distorting the interview 
material: 
"My work on Brazilian women did not begin as a literary project, nor is it 
intended to end as one. But on some levels, the literariness of the narratives 
struck me soon enough. The problems I faced with the transcripts 
resembled in certain respects those I have encountered translating fiction-
problems of how to retain the tone, style, and flavor of the original. 
However, I also did some things we would rarely do in translating a text 
already marked as "literary": cutting, reorganizing, and shaping the 
material I had gathered. I did not realize at the time that this was because I 
assumed that the final written product would be a prose narrative whose 
primary function was to convey information" (p.148, authors' emphasis). 
I did not translate all the focus group materials. I worked on the transcripts written in 
Portuguese and only translated the passages that I decided to include in my research 
report. Where I could not find any satisfactory English translation for a given word or 
phrase I have kept the original speech and tried to explain in a footnote what that 
would mean. In the translated material it was difficult to keep the original structure of 
the sentences and their punctuation. I felt that this distorted the participants' original 
discourses a bit further. In practical terms, I consider it impossible to do translations of 
group interactions without changing the original discourses. In theoretical terms, I find 
in Stanley and Wise's work (1993) not a proper justification for this 'distorting effect' 
but assumptions that may suggest one. They write: 
"All research involves the production of the textual representations of a 
research reality, using whatever conventional stylistic and rhetorical 
devices are considered appropriate by the various theoretical and other 
allegiances a researcher locate themselves by. Within writing, researchers 
have the last - or rather the penultimate (for readers have the last) - say 
about what 'the research' meant, found, concluded. Writing dispossesses 
the researched. Although the researched may exert a good deal of influence 
on the interaction that composes research, when it comes to writing 
researchers can - and indeed in a sense ultimately must - take responsibility 
for the research carried out, because it comes to bear their names as textual 
products of the academic labour process. The written product of any 
research process is a construction, and not a representation, of the reality it 
is about" (p.218, author's emphasis). 
Following those assumptions, the theoretical justification can be that, in order to 
produce a theory and communicate it to others, scientists cannot avoid the 'processing' 
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of the material gathered in a way that can be analysed, reported and read. This implies 
that to do research always involves some sort of translation work. 
After transcribing the data the next step was to start the data interpretation. This 
process was informed by feminist post-structuralist theories on subjectivity. In the 
following section I present the feminist post-structuralist arguments used in the process 
of making sense of the data. 
The Influence of Post-Structuralist Feminism 
Post-structuralist feminist perspectives on subjectivity helped me to solve some of the 
analytical problems created by my interest of producing a theory on girls' ways of 
seeing risk without overlooking the girls' individualities. While it was not my intention 
to affirm the absolute 'sameness' of the 'girls' I interviewed, it would be impossible to 
make any kind of analysis of the girls' ideas about risk without considering their 
similarities. I dealt with this problem by adopting the alternative suggested by Alison 
Jones (1993), which consisted in using as well as rejecting the term 'girls' in a strategic 
way by asking "where and how is it helpful to treat girls as a single category? and 
where and how is it important to focus on differences among girls?"(Yates 1990, p.40, 
conf. Jones, p.158). 
In the data analysis I looked for what the 'girls' had in common, either in terms of 
personal experiences concerning risk or with respect to their beliefs, ideas, knowledge, 
etc. about issues around risk. On the other hand, the analysis of the contradictions and 
differences in their approach to risk was also considered as very relevant for it 
confirmed the argument that individuals do not necessarily see risk in the same way 
and that personal approaches to risk can vary from one situation to another. 
Post-structuralist feminists have pointed to the theorizing of 'girls/woman' as 
problematic (Alcoff 1997; Jones 1993; Walkerdine 1998). To take 'woman' as a concept 
may mean neglecting the differences among women's experiences. On the other hand, 
to overemphasize differences and reject the idea that women have something in 
common among each other may disarm feminists in their attempts to theorize and fight 
against women's oppression. Alcoff (1997) describes this dilemma as "the identity 
crisis of feminist theory" (p.330). She asserts: 
" ... as a concept it ['woman'] is radically problematic [ ... ] because it is 
crowded with overdeterminations of male supremacy, invoking in every 
formulation the limit, contrasting Other, or mediated self-reflection of a 
culture built on the control of females" (Alcoff 1997, p.330). 
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Alcoff points out that male-oriented conceptions of 'woman' have defined it as an 
essential conglomeration of attributes that differ from 'man' for, as opposed to the 
"male free willed subject" (p.331), 'woman' is governed by 'nature'. Alcoff 
summarizes men's construction of 'woman': 
"[M]an has said that woman can be defined, delineated, captured-
understood, explained and diagnosed - to a level of determination never 
accorded to man himself, who is conceived as a rational animal with free 
will. Where man's behavior is undetermined, free to construct its own 
future along the course of its rational choice, woman's nature has 
overdetermined her behavior, the limits of her intellectual endeavors, and 
the inevitabilities of her emotional journey through life" (Alcoff 1997, 
p.331). 
Alcoff suggests that the responses of feminists to the dilemma created by the theorizing 
of 'woman' have emerged from two feminist lines of thought: cultural feminism and 
feminist post-structuralism. Like Alcoff, I find those responses problematic. Firstly, 
while claiming to be legitimate voices on behalf of women, cultural feminists have 
tried to challenge men's definitions of 'woman' by arguing that they have developed a 
wrong conception of women because it has been based on man's interests and on a 
perspective that takes into consideration men's culture. Cultural feminists have then 
assumed that the alternative is to 'correct' men's description of 'woman' (Alcoff 
1997). In this respect, as Alcoff points out, "cultural feminists have not challenged the 
defining of woman but only the definition given by men" (Alcoff 1997, p.331). While 
the generalizing tone of Alcoff s critique of cultural feminists is a matter of concern for 
me, I agree with its main point. 
Alcoff argues that the second major response to the feminist dilemma of the theorizing 
of woman's identity is to negate the existence of 'woman', for the 'feminine' is seen as 
totally plural, diverse, multiple. To me this is highly problematic as it raises the 
obvious question of how to develop a theory on girls/women, or more precisely on 
their points of view, if, as subjects, they do not exist. The idea that 'girls/women' is a 
fiction could destroy any personal goal of understanding the ways the girls who I talked 
to see the risks of sex. The dissolving of the female subject (Alcoff 1997) seemed to 
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make it impossible to think of the materiality of girls' disadvantaging situation with 
regard to sexual risks (which were so powerfully expressed in their talk) or to think of 
girls as 'real' persons who talked about 'concrete' lives, 'concrete' bodies, 'concrete' 
fears and who did seem to be alive independently of my imagination. 
For feminist post-structuralists, to reject essentialism in the name of what Alcoff calls 
"nominalism" (p.338) - "the denial of sexual difference" (p.344) or "the idea that the 
category of 'woman' is a fiction, and that feminist efforts must be directed toward 
dismantling this fiction" (p.338) - means to discard the discourse of 'woman' which is 
seen as guided by a male-oriented concept of 'woman'. In man's discourse 'woman' is 
the other, the subjugated pole of binary oppositions like self/other, culture/nature; 
rational/emotional, etc. (Alcoff 1997; Tong 1992). 
The political project of feminist post-structuralists is to fight against these binary 
oppositional thoughts in the hope that this will liberate women from the kind of 
discourse that may have existed before 'woman' was 'invented' (Tong 1992). For the 
French feminist Julia Kristeva, the political struggle of feminist post-structuralists has 
a "negative function", rejecting "everything finite, definite, structured, loaded with 
meaning, in the existing state of society" (Kristeva cited by Alcoff 1997, p.338). 
While I could dedicate several pages of this chapter to the discussion of feminist 
cultural and post-structuralist theories and to the critiques, I do not have space to do it 
here. My aim here is just to present the main points raised by Alcoff in her attempt to 
show why she does not agree with the contemporary approach of feminists to the 
problematizing of woman's identity and ends up by proposing an (promising) 
alternative. 
How could I think of different 'girls' without limiting 'girl' to its semantic 
determinations? How could I work with 'girls' as plural without neglecting the 
commonalities of their histories? Alcoff (1997) offers an alternative to the 
essentia1izing and de constructing extremes of contemporary feminism III its 
theorization of woman's subjectivity. She proposes a conception of subjectivity as 
"positionality within a context" (p.350), which implies 
" ... that the concept of woman is a relational term identifiable only within a 
(constantly moving) context" [and] " ... that the position that women find 
themselves in can be actively utilized [ ... ] as a location for the construction 
of meaning [ ... ] rather than simply the place where a meaning can be 
discovered (the meaning of femaleness)" (p.349). 
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The positional definition of woman does not accept the idea of innate characteristics; 
'woman' is not independent from its external circumstances but a construct that is 
made in relation to it. The metaphor of a chessboard illustrates Alcoff's definition of 
the subject as "positionality": "the external situation determines the person's relative 
position, just as the position of a pawn on a chessboard is considered safe or 
dangerous, powerful or weak, according to its relation to the other chess pieces" 
(A1coff 1997. p. 349). 
A1coff's concept of 'positionality' was very influential in my interpretation of the data. 
With it I could understand how and why the same girl could produce discourses that 
were internally coherent but incoherent in reference to previous personal positions, and 
also, to see the ways by which those conflicting discourses were, at the same time, 
shaping and shaped by different and contradicting 'selves'. Perhaps more importantly, 
by understanding the girls as subjects of their own discourses, I realized how important 
risk discourses are for the formation oftheir subjectivities. And, also, how complicated 
it can be to combine a personal discourse of risk with other similarly relevant 
discourses at the same point of view. 
Along with Alcoff's concept of 'positionality' I used another feminist post-structuralist 
argument to make sense of the data. That is, the argument about the association 
between discourses, agency and subjectivity. Agency has been a point of debate among 
feminist post-structuralists who have been contesting the idea of an unitary 'self. 
Alison Jones (1997a), for example, argues that the concept of agency mistakenly 
assumes a pre-discursive 'self, which she claims is only possible within a humanist 
discourse. As opposed to the subject of humanist discourses the subjects of post-
structuralist thought, Jones maintains, are not to be understood as actively making 
rational choices and taking positions within discourses. It is in fact a subject whose 
choices are limited by the discourses that produce her or him as a subject. In sum, for 
Jones, from a post-structuralist perspective, the agency of the 'self is no more than 
illusion. 
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Jones' claims have been emphatically questioned by other feminist post-structuralists 
like Bronwyn Davies (1991), who argues that it is precisely the fact that post-
structuralism conceptualises the subject as discursively made, that opens up the 
possibility of the existence of an agentic 'self. For Davies, the awareness that our 
'selves' are constructed through discursive positionings can give us the ability to find 
new alternatives of being in the new discourses that we might come across. So the very 
idea that we are the result of discourses that co-exist around us shall not erase our 
authority or agency (Davies 1991). 
Davies' analysis of the definition of agency is facilitated by her critique of the 
conceptualisation of the subject in humanist theories. She makes the point that "within 
the humanist discourses that predominate in the social sciences, agency is synonymous 
with being a person" and " .. .is used interchangeably with such concepts as freedom, 
autonomy, rationality and moral authority" (Davies 1991, p.42). In a humanist sense, 
Davies argues, a person " ... has an obligation to take themselves up as knowable, 
recognizable identity, who "speaks for themselves" and who accepts responsibility for 
their actions" (1991, p.42, author's emphasis). The importance of this, she stresses, is 
that "it is this discursive placing of responsibility that makes us, in a legalist sense, 
agents by default" (Davies 1991, p.42). 
The assumption that agents are persons who can rationally control themselves implies 
an understanding of those who are emotional or non-rational as non-agents. Within this 
type of discourse the agentic person is assumed to make rational choices as long as the 
choices made are approved by those who have the power to prescribe what is and is not 
rational. This is an idea elaborated by Benson who is cited by Davies: "the necessary 
agreement and approval that makes the act in question definable as a rational one must 
be given by those who have access to the same value system and the same forms of 
reasoning and who would concur with the free choice that has been made" (Benson, 
1990, cited by Davies 1991, p.44, author' s emphasis). 
Davies' ideas about the possibility of an agentic 'self are helpful in the analysis of the 
contradictory positionings available to and taken up by the girls in the discursive 
intersection between gender and risk. The first point I want to make is that of the 
affirmation of agency in the scientific discourses produced around the notion of risk. 
As it is repeatedly emphasized in this thesis, contemporary discourses of risk are 
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underpinned by the assumption that individuals are free to choose between safe and 
risky options. In having authority over their actions, individuals are expected to be able 
to make the right decisions with regard to their safety and well-being. Risk-avoidance 
('risk' in scientific terms) is the only alternative for the 'free-chooser' if shelhe is to be 
accepted among those who are morally and politically correct. 
If we take Davies' description of humanist discourses, we may argue that this type of 
discourse is humanist, in that it describes a subject that rationally chooses what to do, 
and thus, who to be. Agency seems to be seen by risk experts as the ability to act 
intentionally. In the case of women there is a serious problem here. Scientific 
discourses of risk take for granted everyone's ability to do what they intend to do. The 
problem is related to the conception of agency. By affirming the importance of 
language in the production and re-production of the dualism male/female, from which 
it is difficult to escape when we think and act, Davies traces a parallel between the 
definition of agency in humanist discourses and that proposed by post-structuralism: 
"To think of agency while the male/female dualism is intact is to think, 
inevitably, in terms of male, other-than-female heroic individual who 
stands out from the crowd, whose life is the stuff of history. To conceive 
agency once the male/female dualism is abandoned is to think of speaking 
subjects aware of the different ways in which they are made subject, who 
take up the act of authorship, of speaking and writing in ways that are 
disruptive of current discourses, that invert, invent and break old bonds, 
that create new subject positions that do not take their meaning from the 
genitalia (and what they come to signify) of the incumbent." (Davies 1991, 
p.50, author's emphasis) 
Humanist discourses, Davies suggests, do not take women as agents (Davies 1991). In 
thinking of risk experts' discourses, I would agree with Davies, but only partially. I 
would say that in their own terms technico-scientific discourses on risk actually take 
women (as nearly everybody else) as agents (see pages 47-55). That is, risk discourses 
are apparently congruent with the definition of agency taken by their authors, 'agency' 
meaning 'power to choose'. We may disagree about what agency means but cannot 
help recognizing that we may find internal coherence in others' discourses. In the 
context of HIV/AIDS, for example, the idea that women (like men) are free to make 
autonomous and rational decisions with regard to sexual risks is quite common?6 Of 
26 See pages 65-85 for a discussion of how the problem ofHIV/AIDS sexual risk has been defmed by the 
technico-scientific discourses of health promotion. 
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course, by considering my knowledge background (academic, empirical and personal) I 
cannot accept the assumption that women have the power to do what they want in 
sexual encounters. So, to me, in their own terms, the scientific discourses of risk that 
are applied to sex, particularly those targeting women, are based on an 'imaginary' 
female agency. Safe sex campaigns focused on female assertion often neglect the 
power imbalance that usually permeates female/male relationships. As it has already 
been argued, what is presumed to be woman's power within heterosexual relationships 
is not more than an "apparent or potential power" (Browne and Minichiello 1994, 
p.248). But if I have reservations with the 'agentic woman' of such discourses, the 
same happens with Davies' propositions concerning female agency. 
Women, at least the ones who I talked to, were very far away from post-structuralists' 
discourses and their proposals of innovative ways of subjectivity production. Actually, 
if we are to compare the influence of humanist and post-structuralist thought in the 
ways the girls positioned their 'selves' during the focus group sessions we can perhaps 
say that the former is more influential (probably because it is more easily available) 
than the latter. Post-structuralists' discourses are still largely limited to the academy, 
and even academics (like myself) are still struggling to understand and make the best 
use of it (both at a professional and personal level). In sum, what I am trying to say is 
that both views of 'agentic woman', the one of the scientific discourses of risk that are 
applied to sex and the one described by Davies, are still products of our imagination, 
perhaps dreams. 
As a political project towards women's emancipation I can share with Davies a 
discourse in which women are to be discursively positioned as agents in sexual 
encounters. Nevertheless, there is still a lot to be done until the girls who I talked to 
can reach the point of speaking themselves into existence as agents in their sexual 
relationships with boys/men. For now what I can perhaps do as a starting point of such 
a project is to uncover with my analysis the dangerous contradictions produced in the 
intersection between discourses of gender and risk; the first positioning girls/women as 
subordinated to boys/men and the second affirming female agency without breaking 
out the hierarchy of gender that makes sex a terrain of male dominion. 
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Before going on any further, I still want to remark that it is not the case that the girls 
who I talked to ever tried to disrupt or invert current discourses of risk and gender with 
their talk, which proves that they can create new subject positions for themselves 
within such discourses. The problem is, however, that their agency was spoken into 
existence without the consistency necessary to break up old and powerful discourses of 
gender. As Davies herself recognizes, agency is " ... a discursive position that can be 
occupied within one discourse simultaneously with its non occupation in another" 
(1991, p.52). The discursive taking up of an agentic positioning with respect to sexual 
risks management was usually dismantled by a discourse of subordination attached to 
the female condition of the subject. 
In sum, informed by a feminist post-structuralist perspective, the process of data 
analysis that will be described below was not an attempt to find the truth about the 
girls' ways of seeing the risks of sex and HIV/AIDS risk, but to explore the diverse 
perspectives through which their risk discourses were produced and communicated 
during the focus group sessions. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
In spite of the diversity of books on qualitative data analysis, specific instruction on 
how to analyse focus group material is still underdeveloped (Frankland and Bloor 
1999). By being essentially qualitative focus group data analysis follows basically the 
same procedures of the analysis of data collected via other qualitative methods (Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1998). There is more than one way of 
carrying out qualitative analysis. Textbooks on qualitative methodology are full of 
examples of how to do that. Also, there have been few publications reporting focus 
group research that give an idea about the way the researcher (s) proceeded the analysis 
(although in general this is not the main objective ofthe author)?7 
The 'modus operandi' of my fieldwork favored one of the most traditional principles of 
'grounded theory', which is that of the systematic analysis of data throughout the 
research process (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 'Grounded theory' means theory grounded 
on data, that is, the researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in 
27 See for example Frankland and Bloor 1999, Green and Hart 1999. 
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mind, but lets the theory emerge from the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The notion 
of a wholly grounded theory has been much criticized, for the idea that researchers can 
start their researches without any theoretical reference is problematic (Stanley and 
Wise 1993). However my work is grounded on data in the sense that that it is data-led. 
While the data analysis accompanied the whole process of data collection, there was a 
moment in which the analysis was refined and more explicit theoretical findings began 
to emerge. This moment of the analysis had two basic stages: (a) data coding and (b) 
data interpretation. 
At the time of the coding I was already very familiarized with the data. Nevertheless, 
the complexity and richness of the focus group material made the data analysis 
surprisingly difficult. As Kitzinger (1994a) appropriately suggests in "Focus groups: 
method or madness?" to analyse the amount of data generated by the 24 focus group 
sessions I had conducted seemed to me something like 'madness'. The author, herself a 
focus group researcher, affirms that focus group data " .. .is not the kind of data that are 
easy to quantify or even to classify" (Kitzinger 1994a, p.159). She talks about 
contradictory data, interrupted statements, and incoherent points of view to give a 
picture of focus groups material as sometimes messy. It was precisely that type of data 
that I had to make sense of. 
Morgan (1997) affirms that one important question to be considered in the coding of 
focus groups data is which unit of analysis to use. For the author, "neither the 
individual nor the group constitutes a separable "unit of analysis"; instead, our analytic 
efforts must seek a balance that acknowledges the interplay between these two "levels 
of analysis" (p.60. authors' emphasis). I assume that I managed to maintain the balance 
suggested by Morgan by coding all mentions of a given topic as either originating from 
individual or group-produced discourses. As Morgan himself suggests, coding all 
mentions of a given theme will also reveal if it is a specific individual or a given group 
that is making the point. 
Following the traditions of qualitative research I started the analysis with the "open 
coding" procedure (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p.102). "Open coding" is a procedure in 
which "data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, and compared for 
similarities and differences" (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p.102). However, when I cut 
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selected extracts of the transcripts from my computer's screen and pasted them into a 
different document/file, the data seemed to lose part of their meanings. I got the 
impression that outside the context where they were produced they did not make the 
same sense. This should not be a surprise since the research was designed to explore 
risk meanings as well as links between meanings and contexts. I was counting on 
group interactions to provide information about 'how' risk meanings were produced. 
The only way I found to cope with this problem of maintaining the links between 
quotes and context was to attach to each quote removed from the main text memos 
describing briefly its contexts. 
The coded quotes were grouped into categories and sub-categories. When I thought I 
had a fair idea about which categories of data were gathered in the focus group sessions 
I started another stage of the analysis in which connections between categories were 
established, resulting in the interpretative framework upon which my thesis was 
developed. In which ways could the data be read in order to provide answers to my 
research questions? Starting from that I concentrated the analysis on the framework 
used by the research participants themselves to make sense of the HIV / AIDS sexual 
risk. I found out that it was mainly around 'self-governance', 'choice', 'knowledge' 
and 'being careful' that their risk discourses were produced. These categories were 
then taken as central to the development of my theory. Amongst an array of 
possibilities for the theorizing of the data I finally chose one that seemed to better 
summarize the story I wanted to tell. My thesis is an attempt to tell this story. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have tried to make clear to the reader how I collected, organized and 
interpreted the empirical data and why I did it in a particular way. In the next chapter I 
start to tell the reader about my reading of the data gathered. The chapter will be 
focused on the girls' accounts of everyday risks and on the picture of Brazil as a 'risk 
society' produced in those accounts. 
CHAPTER 4 
'RISK SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP' AND THE GIRLS' 
INITIATION INTO RISK MATTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
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In the last two chapters I have made clear my theoretical positions with regard to ways 
of seeing risk. I have stressed that my thesis is an attempt to expand our understandings 
of risk in general, and HIV/AIDS sexual risk in particular. I have also pointed out that 
to do this, I believe we require to do more than analyse other persons' knowledge of 
risk, sexual risks and HIV I AIDS risk in the light of our own. I have suggested that 
what we need to do to expand our conceptions of risk is to listen to other people's ways 
of seeing 'risk' - what they mean by that, what risks they fear most and least, which 
values are attached to those risks, how they assess those risks and tend to deal with 
them, etc. This information may provide a picture of other persons' own 'reading grid' 
of risk matters. With this at hand we can, perhaps, start understanding other person's 
approaches to risk (or what we ourselves understand by that), with which we may 
avoid common assumptions to be taken as 'truths' about why, despite all the risk 
information available, others keep exposing themselves to what we take as well known 
risks, such as the risks of sex, in particular HIV I AIDS risk. 
The starting point of my research is that, despite the involvement of scientists in risk 
definitions, 'risk' encapsulates not only scientific, but also social and cultural 
meanings. I argue in this thesis that 'risk' does not exist as an objective reality. It is 
essentially an epistemological phenomenon, for it is constructed through knowledge. 
This immediately leads to the question of what counts as knowledge in 
conceptualizations of risk. With that in mind, my first preoccupation with the analysis 
of the girls' accounts of risk aimed at exploring the perspectives through which they 
make sense of risk in their everyday lives. Not surprisingly, their views of everyday life 
were embedded in their accounts of everyday risks. I took that as a chance to highlight 
the issues about context raised in those accounts, which in my view constitute the girls' 
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knowledge about the 'risk society' they live in. This is important because it reveals the 
background of contextual knowledge in which the girls' approach to risk in general, 
and HIV/AIDS sexual risk in particular, are embedded. The analysis undertaken here 
constitutes my first step towards the exploration of the girls' ways of seeing the 
HIV I AIDS sexual risk. I assume that 'ways of seeing' a particular risk are primarily 
informed by 'ways of seeing' risk in general. 
In this chapter I sketch out the context within which the girls make their choices in 
relation to sexual risks. I argue that the girls are very aware of the material context in 
which they make their choices with regard to how to behave, what to do and value or 
who to be in everyday life. The girls have an incredible knowledge about the menu of 
options available in such a context and of the possible threats that specific choices may 
represent to personal safety. They are also aware that they cannot escape making 
choices, for this is what everybody else does for the organization of personal life and 
the fulfillment of personal goals. 
To know the structure of the social context generates consciousness of a reality in 
which there is no risk-free choice. This imposes the need for constant monitoring and 
assessment of the risks attached to personal decisions. The data analysis shown in the 
present chapter suggests that in such circumstances the girls are forced to choose not 
between 'risk' and 'safety', but between different kinds and levels of risk, all 
embedded in what I call 'risk portfolio'. The girls know that life carries multiple risks, 
which are not detachable from each other and so cannot be taken as isolated, but 
interrelated problems. Throughout this thesis I will call this association of risks a 'risk 
portfolio'. The risks included in the risk portfolio depend on the background of 
knowledge and values that set the boundaries of the risk context considered. For 
instance, as we will see in the next chapter, 'risky sex' includes many possible and 
interrelated dangers seen as part of sexual encounters, ranging from emotional to moral 
to physical harms (see Fig. 2, page 194). 
I will start my analysis of the contextual knowledge that informs accounts of everyday 
risks by looking at the girls' lists of 'top ten' risks. After that I will analyse the 
discussions generated by the need to find a consensus about what to include in this list 
and how to position the risks within it. This analysis will provide data about the 
epistemological nature of risk, for it will expose some of the elements of the 
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knowledge background that underpinned the girls' conceptions of 'everyday risks'. I 
will argue that the girls' knowledge of the structure of Brazilian 'risk society' strongly 
influences their definitions of and approach to 'everyday risk'. The section will be 
divided into four sub-sections: education, social inequalities, gender relations and neo-
liberalism. These are the aspects of the structure of Brazilian 'risk society' that are 
commonly addressed in the girls' accounts of everyday risks. In the final section I will 
point out some of the meanings of risk that appeared in those accounts. 
THE 'TOP TEN' RISKS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
It has already been argued and empirically documented that 'risk' can be 
conceptualized in various ways (Green 1997b; Memon 1991; Moore and Rosenthal 
1991; Rhodes 1997) and that lay understandings of risk can be distinct from those of 
experts (Grinyer 1995; Kaufert and O'Neil 1993). Following these sociological 
arguments, my thesis assumes that it is problematic to develop theories of risk 
behaviours, like HIV I AIDS sexual risk-taking, drawing strictly on scientific 
understandings of 'risk' (see section on page 47). As Heyman (l998a) remarks, the 
term risk is, in spite of its scientific origins, no longer an exclusive 'property' of 
science since it is nowadays widely used by the public. Once incorporated into culture 
at a large, the concept of risk becomes subjected to transformations and, apart from its 
continued and specific use in scientific discourses, it is now a cultural resource in the 
modem negotiations of day-to-day life (Heyman 1998a). 
The pervasiveness of risk in the life routine of contemporary Western societies means 
that we are always seeking and getting information about the risks of living (Giddens 
1996). The same knowledge background that informs our sense of everyday life also 
informs our ways of seeing the risks we face in everyday life. Our 'ways of seeing' and 
attitudes towards risk vary according to, for example, what has happened to us in 
everyday life and what we expect, feel, know and care about in our lives. We would 
not be able to understand scientific information about the risks of genetically modified 
crops if we had not have acquired previous knowledge about the importance of food 
for health, about genetics, about plantations, experiments, etc., just to cite the most 
general knowledge that we have to mobilize in order to make sense of risk. 
Consequently, I decided to start my analytical approach to the issue of 'how the girls 
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see the HIV / AIDS risk in heterosexual relationships' by exploring their general 
understandings of 'risk'. I was assuming that the girls' understandings of specific risks, 
like the HIV / AIDS risk, were initially informed by previous knowledge of risk matters. 
In one of the first focus group sessions I asked the girls to list ten risks they run in their 
lives, taking into consideration the possibility of these risks becoming reality. I 
assumed that the perception of the chance of a risk becoming reality gives importance 
to it. The more the chance of a risk becoming reality, the more concern it generates and 
the more its importance. The first one would then be the one that was most likely to 
occur. Neither group could find a consensus with regard to the 'top ten' risks. Their 
lists contained only nine risks. In the end, the list resulted from a negotiation of 
arguments between the girls and was accepted by the majority. The hierarchy of 
everyday risks established by the first group was: 
(1) to be assaulted or robbed, 
(2) to have an accident, 
(3) to die, 
(4) to lose someone we like 
(5) to catch a disease (including AIDS), 
(6) to be disillusioned, 
(7) to lose our boyfriend, 
(8) to get pregnant, 
(9) school failure. 
The second group listed similar risks but positioned them differently: 
(1) to die, 
(2) to be happy, 
(3) to be betrayed and disappointed, 
(4) to hurt somebody, 
(5) to catch a disease (including AIDS), 
(6) to be assaulted or robbed, 
(7) to get pregnant, 
(8) drugs, 
(9) loneliness. 
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The analysis of the two lists shown above leads to two immediate insights. First, just 
by looking at the risks listed, we may visualise the context in which the girls 
experience everyday risks. Second, we may deduce that the production of a list of 'top 
ten' everyday risks implies the judgment of the values attributed to each risk, values 
that I believe are learned from everyday experiences. By saying that, I want to argue 
that to share a common knowledge about the context in which they live is a condition 
for the girls to be able to produce a joint list of everyday risks like the ones shown 
above. 
It is worth noting that the risks strictly related to sex appeared only once in the lists of 
the 'top ten' everyday risks. Although the presence of pregnancy among these 'top ten' 
risks denotes its importance in the girls' lives, its location at the end of the list suggests 
that it is secondary to other risks. In the collective 'ways of seeing' their reality, the 
girls consider pregnancy as a risk they are less exposed to. Another point to note is the 
location of AIDS, which appears among other diseases, in the fifth place in the 
hierarchy of everyday risks. This indicates that AIDS is just one more possible risk but 
one that does not have much relevance considering all the other risks that constitute the 
girls' day-to-day risk portfolio. The relevance of sexual risk is then relative. As we will 
see in this thesis, 'risk' is not assessed in isolation from all the other possible dangers 
that are seen as probable threats of the same risk situation or context. For that, I 
conclude that conceptions of risk are relationaL That is, in the definitions of a certain 
risk it is included the meanings and values of the other risks that are equally perceived 
as present in the same context. In my view 'risk' is a relational concept because to live 
in a 'risk society' makes it impossible to be exposed to a single risk, but not only for 
that. Also, as we will see throughout this thesis, it seems that 'a single risk' is 'per se' 
a combination of a number of possible dangers. 28 'Everyday risks' and 'sexual risks' 
are both systems of associated dangers, which I call 'risk portfolio'. Considering the 
contextual nature of risk, I take the latter as an element of the former. These issues will 
be further discussed in the next chapter where I analyse the girls' accounts of 'risk' as 
applied to sex. 
As a Brazilian I recognize that many of the risks listed above are indeed fears that are 
nowadays shared by most Brazilians. In the next section I sketch out the context of 
28 See examples of this on Fig. 2, page 195. 
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everyday life that appears inherent in the girls' discussions about everyday risks. I will 
also show some examples of how difficult it was to reach a consensus about what to 
include in the list of 'top ten' risks and how they should be ranked. As we will see, the 
difficulties basically originated from the existence of different backgrounds of 
knowledge and values upon which personal positions were adopted. 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTEXT AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
NATURE OF RISK 
The task of preparing a consensual and hierarchical list of everyday risks made the 
epistemological nature of risk explicit, for it was necessary to defend personal 
positions in favor of the importance of certain risks and to the detriment of others. The 
background of knowledge and values against which the risks of everyday life were 
assessed was then exposed. As Douglas (1990) argues, to make sense of 'risk' implies 
the need to evaluate the probability of the realization of an event and the magnitude of 
its outcome. The way people see 'risk' depends on the value they give this outcome in 
comparison with other things they value in life. Although we may consider personal 
ways of seeing risk as partially resulting from individual thoughts, we cannot forget 
that the process of thinking is dependent on the social and cultural context within 
which it is embedded. If this is true, then, the girls' ways of seeing risk are attached to 
their ways of seeing the context in which 'risk' is to make sense. 
Diverse evaluative criteria were used to take decisions with regard to the presence or 
position of certain risks in the list. We can see that the personal values that 
underpinned personal judgments were always presented in a certain contextual frame, 
even if sometimes this was not explicit. For example, there were disagreements about 
the probability of the realization of certain risks, such as the risk of being robbed and 
contracting a disease. For sure, this probability calculus could not be carried out 
without taking into consideration the knowledge of the routine of everyday life. 
"Marta - I think that robbery could be before the risk of diseases ... 
Katia - No ... 
Fatima - You can be robbed at any time ... 
Maria - Yeah ... 
Suzana - But it's easier to get a disease ... 
Katia - Yeah, to me it's also easier to get a disease .. for example, I've got 
sick many times but I've never been robbed. 
Marta - Yeah ... everyone is subjected to the risk of catching a disease ... no 
one is safe. " 
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Some girls made their judgments on the basis of the knowledge of past experiences, 
like Katia who considered the risk of diseases as more important than the risk of being 
robbed because the former had already become reality in her life more than once and 
the latter had never happened. Without giving much importance to having experienced 
a robbery or not, Fatima, however, took into account the knowledge about the 
frequency of her exposure to the risk of being robbed as a reason for considering it 
more important than getting a disease. The evaluation of the frequency of risk exposure 
- "you can be robbed at any time" - was certainly also based upon Fatima's knowledge 
of the context where she lived. 
There were also disagreements about the possibility of personal exposure to the risk of 
pregnancy. This time, however, past experiences and the frequency of personal 
exposure were not the explicit motives of disagreement. 
"(. . .) Claudia - Let's put 'to get pregnant' because everybody mentioned 
that ... 
Dora - Well, I don't know ... does everybody agree that all of you run the 
risk of pregnancy? 
Vera - I don't. 
Tania - I agree ... I'm a woman ... 
Ines - Yeah ... me too ... 
Vera - I don't take this risk ... 
Ines - Ah ... an unwanted pregnancy can be ... 
Dora - It's only Vera that thinks she doesn't run the risk of pregnancy? 
Julia - Me too .... " 
In the discussion shown above, two criteria seem to underpin the acceptance or not of 
'pregnancy' as a communal everyday risk. The first one had to do with the judgment of 
the future consequences - 'I won't get pregnant' - of present actions - because "I don't 
take this risk". In that case, the risk of pregnancy was judged as irrelevant because it 
simply did not exist. The other criteria originated from a wider background. To get 
pregnant could actually be a possibility as 'pregnancy' was, in theory something 
attached to women's nature. 
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The assessment of the risk of school failure was carried out on the basis of a 
combination of an analysis of past and present actions and their related consequences. 
"Julia - ] wouldn't put the risk of school failure, because I've never failed 
and] think I'll never have bad results at school ... ] think] take it too 
seriously ... 
Claudia - Of course we run this risk ... 
Tania - Claudia is saying that because she has already failed twice ... 
Julia - Yeah .. . 
Claudia - Ok ... but this can also happen to you ... it's a risk ... 
Julia - Not for me .... JJ 
To Julia, the risk of school failure should not be included in her everyday risk 
portfolio, as she did not see herself as someone subjected to having bad results at 
school. So, this was a risk that did not exist in her life. To Claudia, however, it was 
easier to admit the risk as she had already had past experiences with failure at school. 
The girls' ways of seeing everyday risks were produced against different backgrounds. 
The use of distinct backgrounds resulted in distinct interpretations of everyday risks 
and added complexity to the process of making sense of the risk in question. It may 
well be that in day-to-day life the girls use different backgrounds to interpret different 
risks, similar backgrounds to interpret different risks or, yet, different backgrounds to 
interpret similar risks. Each background may contain specific knowledge about the 
elements of the structure of everyday life that are, in certain ways, related to the 'risk' 
in question. 29 
My argument about the influence of values in the girls' discussions on how to organize 
the list of the 'top ten' risks does not only refer to the sort of judgment that was 
obviously involved in decisions on how to locate the risks in a specific order. I 
consider that value judgments also underpinned the definition of risk itself. In the 
conversation shown below we can see how the use of value judgment worked in both 
ways, either to define what risk is or to establish its relative position in the 'hierarchy 
of everyday risks' . 
"Maria - ] think that in my case it's first the risk of happiness before that of 
being disappointed. 
29 For a discussion of the dependency of the notion of risk on knowledge see pages 37-64. 
Suzana - No ... ! run the risk of being disappointed more that that of being 
happy ... 
Katia - ! don't know ... maybe it's the two at the same time, because at the 
same time that we run the risk of being disappointed, we also run the risk 
ofbeing happy ... 
Suzana - Ah ... we are much more likely to become disappointed ... we may 
not pass the 'vestibular' [a kind of exam every student, who is in the same 
year as the girls, has to pass in order to get a place in university j, so we 
may not get the job we want and we may not have the money to buy the 
things we want ... 
Marta - No ... We have many good things in life. ! have my family, ! have 
friends, ! have a house ... Everybody has that, including you 
Suzana ... Although you might not have everything in life, you have to put 
value in things you have and not in things you don't have ... 
Maria - Yeah, ! agree. " 
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Suzana's interpretation of the risk of "to be disappointed" illustrates the judgmental 
character of 'risk' and the importance of the knowledge of the context in the 
determination of the relative value of each of the risks of everyday life. To Suzana, the 
risk of being disappointed could be realized if she did not pass the 'vestibular', an 
exam that she would be doing soon. This would result in her not getting a job and not 
having money to buy what she wanted. To Brazilian adolescents, competing for a place 
in the university is perhaps the biggest challenge of all. There are not vacancies for 
everybody in good universities and in universities where one does not pay fees, so the 
level of competition is high. 
The 'vestibular' represents the possibility of realizing personal and familiar life 
projects, as graduation is regarded as key to a promising professional future. The exam 
is so important in Brazilian family life that it is not unusual to see parents 
accompanying their sons or daughters to the sites where it takes place. The parents 
want to give their children support. They want to participate as much as they can in 
such an important moment oftheir children's lives. The 'vestibular' means competition 
and, as such, generates anxiety and puts a lot of pressure on adolescents. The exam is 
also a kind of rite of passage through which the youngsters are supposed to prove their 
maturity and readiness to becoming adults. After passing the exam they are going to 
enter a new life, in which education is no longer imposed, but personally chosen by the 
student, according to herlhis interests. 
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Apart from personal values, there are also social values attached to the 'vestibular'. 
Those who succeed are regarded as 'winners' and their names are listed in the 
newspapers. To Suzana, to take such an exam was of a high risk. She was aware that 
her chances of being successful were low because she had been studying in a state 
school in which the 'quality' of education did not meet with the high standard required 
to compete with students from independent schools for a place at university. 
It is therefore easy to understand why, to Suzana, who was about to take the 
'vestibular', being successful was so important. One can also see why she valued the 
exam so much and selected it as the key element of the risk of disappointment or the 
element around which its meanings were defined. Considering that the risk of 
disappointment depended on her performance in the 'vestibular', the probability of its 
realization was regarded as very high. 
Differences in the values attributed to various aspects of everyday life resulted in 
distinct definitions of everyday risks. For instance, although all the other members of 
Suzana's group were also preparing themselves for the big event of the 'vestibular', 
none of them defined the risk of being disappointed in terms of the probability of their 
failure in it. Teresa, for example, defined the risk of disappointment as attached to the 
possibility of romantic disillusion, a risk that perhaps Suzana could not consider, since, 
at that time, she did not have a boyfriend: 
'Teresa - For me, the risk of disappointment has to do with having a 
disillusion with my boyfriend ... For example, if he betrays me ... you know, 
you would be disappointed in this case, wouldn't you? " 
To Marta and Fatima, the risk of disappointment was also to do with possible problems 
with romantic relationships and disillusionment: 
"Marta - When I think about that [the risk of disappointment}, I think 
about the possibility of finding out that my boyfriend is not faithful or that I 
shouldn't have trusted him ... Yeah ... definitely .. .1 would become very 
disappointed 
Fatima - In my case it's the same thing ... if my boyfriend betrays 
me ... ah ... what a disappointment!" 
The difficulty in reaching a consensus apparently confirms the idea that 'risk' is not an 
objective construct as it is perceived against a background that is selected through a 
value-laden decision (Douglas 1990; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Gibson 1986; 
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Heyman 1998b; Rhodes 1997). It also suggests that everyday risk assessments are 
carried out 'in context'. As I commented earlier (see page 134), the girls assessed the 
importance of a given risk, taking into consideration the relevance of other risks they 
'knew' were also possible dangers of everyday life. All those dangers were included in 
a sort of portfolio of everyday risks that were taken into account when the need arose to 
assess a certain risk. It appears, then, that the girls' approach to risk was indeed, as 
sociological theories suggest, based upon a background of contextual knowledge and 
values (see pages 38-53). 
Drawing on the girls' discussions about the risks of everyday life, I now want to 
concentrate my analysis on the context that these discussions delineate. The data 
shown above suggests that the girls had a fair knowledge of the material reality of 
Brazil, where they learned what to value and what there is to be risked in life. While 
discussions about everyday risks did not focus on one specific element of the structure 
of the Brazilian society, some themes were more commonly addressed. Education, 
social inequalities, gender relations and neo-liberalism were the most common themes. 
I will start by discussing the girls' knowledge of the situation of education in the 
structure of Brazilian society. 
Education 
Suzana's definition of the risk of disappointment as meaning 'failure in the vestibular', 
gives an idea of her knowledge not only of the Brazilian educational system as a whole 
but also of her and her peers' position within it. The public educational sector is 
commonly not prepared to provide the level of education that students need in order to 
be successful in the 'vestibular', unless competition to gain access to a chosen course 
and/or university is low. Usually, low competition arises when the exam concerns 
independent universities, which are very expensive. Even in that case, chances of 
success are more restricted to courses in which the competition is low. Public 
universities have the highest status in the Brazilian educational system and among 
Brazilian people. So, it is to public universities that Brazilian families want to see their 
children. 
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The 'unequal' preparation of students from public and independent schools for the 
'vestibular' results from accumulated gaps in the quality of primary and secondary 
education. Similarly to other public institutions, public schools in Brazil have been 
affected by a lack of state funding. The schools are generally poorly equipped in terms 
of teaching resources and do not have the capacity to follow the technological advances 
in teaching materials. Libraries are inadequately stocked and teachers have very low 
incomes. The public educational sector has additional problems, like the chronic 
problem of illiteracy which has been inherited from the past and, without an efficient 
solution, has passed on from generation to generation. Although a slow decrease in 
illiteracy rates has been recorded since the beginning of the 20th century, an increase in 
absolute numbers of adult and young illiterates, from 18.7 million in 1980 to 19.2 
million in 1991, can be observed (Brasil 1991). 
Only 56% of the Brazilian children reach Year 5 of Primary School (which comprises 
eight years), while, according to UNICEF (1995), the percentage should be 85% for the 
Brazilian level of per capita gross national product. The children who do not reach 
Year 5 are usually those from poor families. The need to work and grade retention are 
the main reasons for academic failure and school dropouts. 
Academic failure is mentioned in one of the lists of 'top ten' everyday risks. It was the 
focus of the discussion shown above between Julia, Claudia and Tania about whether 
the risk of school failure could be considered a personal risk or not. To Claudia, 
"school failure" was a an obvious risk for her and her peers - "of course we run the 
risk" - , for they were all sharing the same educational environment in which not only 
she had already failed twice, but others had too. The disagreement of Julia about the 
inclusion of the risk of "school failure" as an element of a joint list of everyday risks 
was underpinned by a comparison between what she considered conditions for school 
failure and her perception of her own school performance - "I wouldn't put the risk of 
school failure, because I've never failed and I think I'll never have bad results at 
school ... 1 think I take it too seriously". 
On another occasion, Vera complained about the insistence of Ines on talking about 
education as "a promise of a goodfuture": 
"Vera - Please don't say that ... you know that's not true. You cannot 
compare our school with independent schools. How many of us will really 
be able to get a degree in the course we want and get a very good job and 
a very good salary? ... For example, even if 1 wanted 1 wouldn't be able to 
do Medicine, for this is not for us ... 
Ines - Why not? 
Vera - Because, you know ... A friend of mine said that most of the people 
who pass the 'vestibular' for Medicine are sons or daughters of doctors. 
Ines - But that's notfair ... 
Vera - Of course not .... " 
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Other examples of the girls' knowledge of the situation of education in Brazil emerged 
in their discussions about other types of everyday risks, which suggests that their 
knowledge of the context where they experience everyday risks is not fragmented. For 
instance, the problems with the educational level of the Brazilian population were 
considered as related to those concerning health. Marta's reply to Suzana's comment 
that many poor adult women still become pregnant despite having free access to 
medical advice and contraceptives was: "What do you want? Most of them do not even 
know how to write or read. How can they understand what a pill is and how to use 
it? ". 
Similarly, in a discussion about mothers who do not take their babies to health centers 
for vaccination, educational problems were once again pointed out as the causes of ill 
health. 
"Claudia - For you it can be easier to see the problems of these mothers as 
just a matter of irresponsibility but 1 don't ... 
Tania - Yeah ... it's not ... this is because they sometimes don't understand 
the benefits of vaccines ... because, you know, it's perhaps the case that they 
did not have the opportunity of getting education, to learn how to 
read ... imagine they don't even know how to read a word ... 
Vera - 1 don't know .. .I think that sometimes it's because they don't 
mind ... then their children get a serious disease and they cry ... 
Julia - But it's not because they don't care ... 1 think that's because they are 
ignorant. And you cannot compare yourself, who is being educated, with 
them because they didn't have this opportunity." 
The situation of education in Brazil was also discussed in a conversation about the 
causes ofthe high robbery rate in everyday life. 
"Teresa - Everybody knows that to be robbed is a risk. But I disagree that 
robbers are always to be blamed. You cannot expect them to do otherwise 
if they do not have conditions of living decently ... you know ... they don't 
have money so ... 
Marta - (. . .) Yeah .. .1 don't know ... maybe they did not get the chance of 
being anything but robbers because they did not get a good education, I 
mean, a good school or teachers who were interested in their future ... 
Teresa - But I also think we cannot blame the teachers ... do you know that 
primary school teachers .from public schools earn less than the minimum 
wage? " 
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As we can see, the girls' knowledge of the situation of education in Brazil was 
intertwined with their knowledge of the economic problems of the country and the 
social inequalities that it has generated. The next section focuses on the girls' specific 
knowledge of social inequalities-related issues like poverty and violence. 
Social Inequalities 
Social inequality in Brazil is seen as a trace of the colonization of the country by the 
Portuguese (Holanda 1973). While the year 2000 marks the sooth anniversary of 
Brazil's discovery, the country is still experiencing huge socio-economic disparities. 
The richest people become richer by the day and the poorest become poorer at the same 
rate. As shown in the World Development Report 199912000 (World Bank 2000, 
p.230), Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world. Nevertheless, the country has the 
2nd worst income distribution (the first is Sierra Leone; ibid., pp. 238-9). 
During the last half of the twentieth century, the country experienced the problem of 
high inflation rates. Inflation was seen as the major economic problem in the 80s and 
90s, with an accredited heavy impact on the poorest groups of society and an increase 
in social inequalities. In 1994, the Brazilian government implemented a successful 
anti-inflationary policy, which was expected to reduce the social inequality gap. 
However, the policy, as delineated, required interest rates to be raised. This resulted in 
an increase in the Brazilian government debt, leading international agencies, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, to put pressure on the government towards a 
budgetary equilibrium. This has brought about large expenditure cuts on public 
institutions such as hospitals, schools and universities, public safety, transport systems, 
amongst others. The anti-inflationary measures have subsequently had a great impact 
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upon the quality of life of Brazilian population as a whole. But it has been the poorest 
people, who rely heavily on public services to survive, who have suffered most. 
Considering once again the lists of 'top ten' everyday risks, we have learnt that the risk 
of "to be assaulted or robbed", of "to have an accident", of "to die" and "to lose 
someone we like" can all be related to the social inequalities of the Brazilian society. 
For instance the risk of "to be assaulted or robbed" and "to have an accident" is part 
of the climate of violence that Brazilian population has increasingly experienced over 
the last twenty years. The likelihood of being robbed is high everywhere, although 
people who live in working class villas of big cities, like the girls, are more in danger 
because there are areas with potentially high concentration of drug dealers and/or 
where the police are less present. To have a car accident is also a constant danger for 
everyone in Brazil. Car accidents are, along with homicides, the second major cause of 
deaths in Brazil (Grupo Abril 1998). Brazilian highways are poorly maintained and the 
motorists themselves tend to drive abusively. The location of death among the first 
three risks in the 'hierarchy of everyday risks' established by both groups is 
understandable, as it is a danger that accompanies the risk of being robbed and of road 
accidents. It is not rare to see robbers and assaults being carried out at gunpoint and 
each day there are new cases of victims who are injured or even killed. Homicides and 
car accidents constitute 60% of the causes of death amongst young people: 25% caused 
by homicides and 15.3% by car accidents (Grupo Abril 1998). 
"Claudia - Do you remember that guy who was assaulted in daylight near 
the bakery? The robber ... ! think there were two men ... each had a 
gun ... I'm scared to death ... !fear my own shadow ... 
Julia -! was not living here at that time. Did he die? 
Claudia - ! think so ... that's why I'm always attentive when! am walking 
down the street, even ifit's during the day ... 
Julia - I'm scared as well but .. .! always think 'what ifpeople didn't need to 
rob anymore' or 'what if everyone in Brazil could have enough money to 
feed their children' ... 
Claudia - Yeah, but in that case it was because they wanted money to buy 
drugs ... " 
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Although during the whole data collection process the girls always referred to risk 
control as primarily a personal matter30, the awareness of the social causes of some 
risks led the girls to think also of socially and politically oriented alternatives to 
personal actions. We can see that they are very critical with respect to the social 
problems of Brazil. While they probably would not be able to talk about it in statistical 
terms, their perceptions of the material reality of Brazil seem to be congruent with the 
picture of Brazil addressed by the World Development Report referred to at the 
beginning of this section. 
Next, I take a look at the third element of the context of everyday life that was more 
commonly referred to in the girls' conversations about everyday risks. The section 
shows the girls' knowledge about the way gender relations are organized in the context 
of Brazilian society. 
Gender Relations 
'Disillusion', 'betrayal', 'disappointment' and the 'loss of the boyfriend' appear among 
the 'top ten' risks of everyday life as indicators of the girls' knowledge of the structure 
of gender relations in the Brazilian society. For example, as shown on page 139, in the 
discussion about what the risk of disappointment meant to her, Teresa suggested that 
she trusted her boyfriend but that there was a possibility of her being eventually 
betrayed - "for me, the risk of disappointment has to do with having a disillusion with 
my boyfriend [. . .} if he betrays me .. .[. . .], you would be disappointed in this case, 
wouldn't you?". 
In the same discussion, Marta also related the risk of being disappointed in everyday 
life with romantic disillusion. Like Teresa, Marta also positioned herself as a possible 
victim of betrayal- "When I think about that [the risk of disappointment}, I think about 
the possibility of finding out that my boyfriend is not faithful ... ". The subsequent 
disappointment should be the result of a mistaken faith in her boyfriend's loyalty -
" ... or that I shouldn't have trusted him (. . .) ". 
30 See brief discussion on 'everyday risks management' on Chapter 4 and a more elaborate analysis of 
'sexual risks management' in Chapter 5. 
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In a patriarchal society like Brazil it is indeed not rare to see a man betraying his 
girlfriend, partner or wife. Also, considering the cultural meanings of 'woman' 
produced in this patriarchal structure, it is highly possible to see a woman disappointed 
or disillusioned due to a man's betrayal, as a woman is expected to be loyal to man, 
trust his words and to passively accept his acts. It is not the case that every woman and 
man in Brazil behave in this way but, certainly, this ideology is very influential in the 
organization of gender relations in the Brazilian society. To be aware of the "way 
things are" in terms of the structure of gender relations and what to expect from men 
within this structure leads to the idea that the only way of controlling the risk of 
disillusion is to monitor and control personal expectations. 
"Dora - What could be done to prevent the risk of a romantic disillusion? 
Tania - Don't be too much deluded .. .[. . .} 
Claudia - In the way things are nowadays, first don't delude yourself, in 
order not to be disillusioned later [the girls laugh]. " 
As in other patriarchal societies, gender relations in Brazil are organized in accordance 
with the ideological structures of the patriarchal tradition, in which the question of 
power is fundamentally important. It is on the basis of power differences that the 
system of hierarchical relations that frames the relations between Brazilian women and 
men comes to be constructed and socially legitimized. Within this gender hierarchy, 
men occupy a position of authority and domination, while women are distinguished 
from men through their position of submission and subjugation (Parker 1991). 
This gender hierarchy obviously impacts upon the sexual morality that regulates men 
and women's sexual behaviour. In a context of dual morality, Brazilian men experience 
an almost complete sexual freedom, while women's sexual life is expected to be 
limited to stable relationships and marriage. The patriarchal nature of gender relations 
in Brazil also provides specific coordinates for men's and women's sexual behaviour 
itself - man is to be the 'active' subject of the sexual act, whereas woman is to be its 
'passive' object (Parker 1991). It is also along those lines that the cultural meanings of 
masculinity and femininity are produced. The quotation below shows how those 
meanings can be applied to the definition of the risk of disillusion as an everyday risk. 
"Fatima - Look ... I have a story of disillusion to tell and I think that in the 
world we live almost every woman has a similar story to tell. This happens 
every day. That's why I said that women are always at risk of being 
disappointed My boyfriend once kissed another girl and it was his own 
niece that told me that ... then he said that it was the girl's fault and that he 
didn't want to upset me with that story ... Ok, although 1 was very 
disappointed 1 believed in him ... that time 1 forgave him ... but if he did that 
again then 1 wouldn't forgive him ... and he ... 1 don't know if he would 
forgive me ... 1 think that man think that forgiveness is a feminine thing ... 1 
don't know maybe it's men's personality or this thing of being 'macho ' ... 1 
think that he wouldn't forgive me n. 
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As the data analysed in the next chapter will show, the girls' knowledge of the 
patriarchal structure of the Brazilian society can be unconsciously and consciously 
used to make sense of and respond to the risks of heterosexual sex. We will see that 
amongst the risks of sex are included the dangers associated to the gender hierarchy 
that organize heterosexual relationships. Those dangers are all constitutive elements of 
the 'sexual risk portfolio' (see page 195). 
Apart from the knowledge about the situation of Brazil in terms of education, social 
inequalities, violence, poverty and gender relations, the girls also demonstrated they 
had a very good knowledge about the political ideology that is behind the Brazilian 
government nowadays. Although the next chapter will give special attention to this 
issue, I could not finish the present chapter, whose purpose was to sketch the structure 
of everyday life that is embedded in accounts of everyday risks, without mentioning the 
girls' knowledge of neo-liberalism. 
N eo-liberalism 
The girls did not talk openly about the neo-liberal government that rules Brazil 
nowadays. Nor, did they mention the expression 'neo-liberalism' as such. It is their 
emphasis on the individual management of everyday risks that I take as indicating an 
implicit knowledge of the predominance of neo-liberal ideas in the organization of 
everyday life in Brazil. As I argue throughout this thesis (see pages 15-16, 167, 184, 
190,216), 'the care of the self has a fundamental value in a neo-liberal regime, which 
is structured to promote individuals' freedom and independence from the state 
government.3 ! Next I will show very briefly how the knowledge of neo-liberal 
31 See pages 78-79 for examples of the influence of the notion of 'the care of the self in Brazilian public 
policies. 
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ideologies appeared in the girls' discussions about strategies for the management of 
everyday risks. 
The emphasis on self-responsibility for risk management was evident, for example, in 
the case of the protection strategies suggested against the risk of being robbed. 
"Dora - What has to be done for to avoid the risk of being robbed? 
Tania - To walk with attention on the streets. 
Vera - No ... Not with attention because there are many people that walk 
like that on the streets and are robbed ... so don't walk on the streets 
anymore ... then it's impossible ... 
Ines - Ah ... don't walk on the streets always alone ... 
Tania - Yeah ... don 't walk on the streets with your mind on another 
planet ... 
Vera - To walk with a group like ... do not walk alone during the night ... 
Claudia - To carry a gun .... " 
The importance of self-care was also mentioned in the prevention of the risk of road 
accidents. 
"Ines - [You've got} ... to be careful. " 
"Tania - We need to pay attention to what we are doing ... " 
"Marta - A car accident usually happens because the driver is not careful 
enough or because the person who is crossing the road mistakenly thinks 
that it is safe to cross the road ... we need to be careful with those things. " 
The same emphasis on the individual ability to look after the 'self was also shown in 
the case of the prevention of the risk of disillusion. 
"Suzana - We cannot trust a man ... it is a mistake to trust man ... we cannot 
assure that he will be faithful ... make sure that you don't trust him, this is 
the only way of avoiding the risk of being disillusioned. " 
"Teresa - I trust my boyfriend ... but I think I shouldn't ... if you trust him 
and he betrays you the disillusion is very painful, I know that .. .! think that 
if he betrays me I will not forgive myself for trusting him .... " 
When I tried to extend the discussion about risk prevention beyond self-care, at first 
the girls kept their position. 
"Dora - Does the prevention of everyday risks only depend on us? 
Tania - We have to ask the guy 'please don't rob me' ... 
Claudia - It depends on both of them [the robbed and the robber j, doesn't 
it? 
Julia - But we can only think by ourselves ... we can't think for the 
others .... " 
"Dora - We always think that the responsibility is ours. 
Marta - Yeah ... 
Dora - if we think a bit more we'll see that actually it's not only our 
responsibility ... 
Maria - Yeah but we can take care of ourselves, can't we? " 
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As I insisted on other strategies of risk prevention, the girls started to think about the 
social roots of their day-to-day risks. 
"Dora - We've been saying that risk prevention depends on us ... do not 
walk alone on the streets, to close the front door, the risk always depending 
on us. Is there any other factor that influences the risk? 
Suzana - The government ... " 
"Maria - I think that diseases depend also on the social condition. " 
They also started to consider socially and politically-oriented alternatives to the 
proposed individual solutions. 
"Marta - The robbery, I think that ... first the education and the social 
condition ... [. . .} Here in Brazil [. . .} the social condition is horrible, there 
is much money in the hands of few people ... many people rob for getting 
food ... but [. . .} in a first world country, where the money is better 
distributed, there are robberies but less than in the third world .... " 
"Claudia - if the robbers had been treated as human beings before 
becoming robbers ... I think this is not the case ... but if they had had a good 
life, then I think they would not rob ... Ok, we have to take care of ourselves 
but we wouldn't need to be afraid of robbers if they didn't exist. I'm sure 
there are robbers that would give up if they could get a decent job .... " 
Although the girls demonstrated a good level of knowledge about the social problems 
faced by Brazil and about the influence of those problems on the risks faced by the 
Brazilian people, they nevertheless insisted on defining the management of everyday 
risks in terms of 'self-care'. It seems that the social and political consciousness lost its 
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importance, as the sense of individual power over the circumstances of private life and 
of self-governance looked more appealing. Apparently, although the state was believed 
to be responsible for the lack of 'better education' and 'a better distribution of money', 
this had only to do with the prevention of public risks like 'diseases' and 'robberies'. 
When it came to the personal risk of contracting a disease and being robbed, then, the 
'self was seen as holding the responsibility of risk prevention. 
By being socially constructed, conceptualizations of risk are impregnated with the 
social ideologies that organize everyday life. As many have argued, in contemporary 
western societies the 'self has been subjected to new forms of governance (Castel 
1991; Giddens 1996; Nettleton 1997; Ogden 1995; Petersen and Lupton 1996; Rose 
1989). These new forms of governance, " ... the means by which we fashion our 
thoughts and conduct" (Nettleton 1997, p.320), have emphasized individuals' 
accountability, encouraging people to take care of themselves. The modem 'self is to 
be accountable for making informed decisions and acting upon rational choices 
concerning its own welfare (in which is included the management of personal risks). 
This discourse is particularly articulated through neo-liberal philosophies (Petersen and 
Lupton 1996), which are at the core of a number of social institutions, like those in the 
area of public health for example (see pages 21, and 63-65). 
In a neo-liberal society, the state is no longer responsible for the welfare of the citizens. 
The citizens are free consumers of the available options, either with regard to housing, 
education or health (Nettleton 1997). They have not only the right to choose their own 
destiny but also, and, perhaps, more importantly, the duty to do so (Greco 1993). As 
Petersen and Lupton (1996) stress, 
"discourses of personal responsibility and good citizenship have great 
appeal to the late modem subject, who has been acculturated to accept and 
privilege the notion of autonomous individuality [ ... ] through such 
institutions as the family, the mass media, and the education and the legal 
systems" (pp.17 5-7 6). 
Considering the girls' good knowledge of the structure of the Brazilian society, it is not 
a surprise that they see the management of day-to-day risks as a matter of individual 
responsibility. Their understandings of risk management seem to coincide exactly with 
what society expects from them as young prototypes of good citizens. To 'choose' to 
be a good citizen means to 'choose' a particular lifestyle. It means to 'opt' for a 
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particular narrative of the 'self that will define not only "how to act" in risk situations, 
but more importantly, "who to be" (Giddens 1996, p.81). 
Before concluding this chapter I would like to make some considerations with regard 
to what the girls meant by 'risk' when talking about everyday risks. This will be an 
initial exploration of risk meanings. I will come back to risk meanings in the next 
chapter where I carry out a detailed and specific analysis of the girls' 
conceptualizations of risky and safe sex. 
RISK MEANINGS 
The first point I want to make is that although 'risk' was more commonly referred to in 
a negative sense, it could also mean a 'good risk'. This is what we can conclude if we 
consider the inclusion of "to be happy" in the list of the 'top ten' risks of everyday life. 
To run the risk of being happy may be a contradiction in terms if one follows the 
sociological argument that, in modernity, 'risk' has been used only in a negative sense 
(Douglas 1990; Gabe 1995). It is, indeed, striking to think about 'risk' as something 
that may have a positive outcome as it is commonly understood as 'danger'. We could 
maybe conclude that the girls were wrong in considering the possibility of a 'good risk' 
or that their understandings of what 'risk' is were mistaken. However, I do not want to 
argue that the girls were right or wrong, for I believe there are no 'rights' and 'wrongs' 
in interpretations of 'risk'. What I want to highlight is that even accepting that negative 
definitions of 'risk' are dominant we cannot neglect the possibility of existing 
definitions that take a different or opposite starting point. Also, it is likely that the same 
person takes contradictory starting points - risk as something bad and as something 
good -, depending on the type of risk that is being considered. This was demonstrated 
when the girls included the risk of "to be happy" and the risk of "to die" in the same 
list of everyday risks. 
If, on the one hand the view of 'risk' as something good can be striking, on the other, 
this can be understood as congruent with the idea of the entrepreneurial subject, a 
discourse underpinned by the neo-liberal ideology (Friedman and Friedman 1980; 
Hayek 1944). In this particular discourse, to take risks is regarded as positive and a 
typical choice of entrepreneurial citizens. From this perspective, those who are 
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prepared to take risks are believed to have the right to the benefits coming from that, 
like a better quality of life, which includes higher income, better health, better 
education, etc. This is a strong argument, one that is difficult to contest even for 
contemporary theorists of equality. Those theorists have considered that privileges 
resulting from inherited inequalities may be wrong but that privileges that come from 
risky choices might be justified (Philips 1999). 
Drawing on the analysis of the meanings the girls attached to 'risk', I want to make a 
second point. While it was not easy to establish a collective ranking of risks (which 
suggests variations in the way the girls understand 'risk'), the possibility of a collective 
labeling of day-to-day risks demonstrated that the girls shared a general level of 
common-sense about what 'risk' meant. If it was possible (actually, it is not) to 
encapsulate all the meanings the girls attached to 'risk' in just one word, this word 
would be 'danger'. The Concise Oxford Dictionary presents 'danger' as meaning 
"exposure to harm" and "a thing that causes or is likely to cause harm" (Allen 1990, 
p.292). "Exposure to harm", for example, seems to be a meaning implicitly alluded to 
in Marta's statement "everyone is subjected to the risk of catching a disease ... no one is 
safe". It also appears to be what Fatima meant when she said "you can be robbed at 
any time" . 
In my view the girls' 'ways of seeing' everyday risks were based on conceptions of risk 
as something that is similar to, but not the same as, 'danger'. The most important 
difference between 'danger' and 'risk' seems to be related to the incorporation of 
'uncertainty' into the meanings of the latter. I take that as a sign that the girls' 
understandings of risk are influenced by the features of modernity (Beck 1992; 
Giddens 1996)?2 As Carter (1995) remarks, 'risk' is a concept that is more ambiguous 
than 'danger'. 'Danger' means an undoubted "state of peril", while "risk alerts us to 
uncertainties about whether the future is safe or dangerous" and " .. .it simultaneously 
points to the possibilities of security and insecurity" (p.135). As Yates and Stone 
(1994) points out, in its current use 'risk' incorporates the affirmation of the 
uncertainties of prospective actions. Indeed, we can note in the girls' accounts of 
everyday risks that 'risk' has ambiguous meanings. Drawing on the data gathered, I 
want to argue that to them 'risk' is not a definitive state of affairs in at least two senses: 
32 See section on 'risk and modernity', page 38. 
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first, implicit in its meanings there is the idea that by means of external interference it 
can be annulled, reduced or increased33 and second, 'risk' is conceptualized according 
to levels of riskiness - low, medium and high risk. 
'Danger' is only part of risk meanings. Everyday risks include everyday dangers but 
not only that. What is missing in the definition of 'danger' is the attribute of 
'uncertainty'. In this sense, the notion of an 'uncertain danger' can, perhaps more 
appropriately, encapsulate what the girls meant by 'risk'. The dangers are potentially 
there but if they are going to represent future personal risks or not is yet unknown. To 
define a certain danger of everyday life as a 'risk' there is the need to undertake a sort 
of probability estimation about the matter. The quotations below illustrate the view of 
risk as an 'uncertain danger' or as a danger that mayor may not be experienced in the 
future. 
"Vera - Tania, talking seriously, do you run the risk of getting pregnant? 
Tania- Now, now 1 don't ... Maybe one day .... " 
"Katia - When you are in love, you cannot guarantee that you will be 
loved in the same way. Actually, you run the risk of not being loved in the 
same way ... This is a possibility. " 
The continuation of the conversation initiated by Katia (and shown above) 
demonstrates how reflections about an 'uncertain future' are linked to the meanings of 
the risk in question. 
"Dora - So, what kind of risks do you, girls, run when you fall in love? 
Katia has already mentioned the risk of not being loved ... 
Katia - And also, the boy may not think of us ... think much of himself and in 
hisfame. 
Maria - Ah ... also the risk of disappointment isn't it? ... you fall in love and 
think that he is like you and then you realize that this person doesn't take it 
seriously .. . 
Suzana - ... Of disillusion ... we are full of hopes and .. . 
Teresa - That it was just a 'moment thing' and [. . .] .. . 
Dora - The risk of disappointment then ... 
Maria - Yeah ... this 1 think that is one of the worst ... 
Suzana -1 think that it is the worst .... " 
33 By 'external' I mean any deliberate or non-deliberate action that changes the course of the risk event. 
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I want to make one last point here. It is my impression that whatever the risk in 
question, the meanings attached to it are relative. To me, this is only partially due to 
the ambiguities of 'risk' and the uncertainties that its definition incorporates. In my 
analysis of the girls' accounts of everyday risks I noticed that to talk about a certain 
risk implied considering an array of other possible dangers, known to be present in the 
same context of the former. Those dangers were generally directly related to the risk in 
question, like those considered in the discussion about the risk of 'to fall in love' 
shown above. The inclusion of related possible harms in the interpretation of the risk 
of 'to fall in love' makes its definition complex, for it can result from a varied 
combination of elements and meanings. Another example shown earlier is Suzana's 
definition of the risk of disappointment in terms of 'passing or not passing the 
vestibular', which is itself taken as a risk. Also, if we take the list of 'top ten' risks we 
can, perhaps, suggest that there was a sort of association between them. That is the case 
ofthe list that includes "to be assaulted or robbed", "to have an accident", "to die ", 
"to lose someone we like ", all in a way related to the likelihood of being subjected to 
violence in the event of an assault or robbery. Obviously, those risks can yet 
encapsulate other meanings when considered in other contexts and associated with 
other risks. 
Although I thought it was worthwhile pointing out some issues concernIng the 
attachment of meanings to risk, I take the same position as some risk theorists about 
the riskiness of defining risk (Arnett 1996; Fischoff 1985). I did not intend then to 
provide a full account of the girls' definitions of risk. I consider this impossible. Even 
if it was possible to combine all the elements they use to make sense of 'risk' in only 
one definition, this would reach beyond of the scope of this study. Given its 
complexity, this would constitute, perhaps, a thesis on its own. In addition, the 
information analysed in the present chapter merely represents a fragment of the data 
gathered. It intended to offer a first overview of girls' general understanding of risk. 
The data analysis carried out in the next chapter should provide new insights, as it will 
consider 'risk' in the specific context of heterosexual sex. My interest in showing and 
analysing information that could exemplify what the girls meant by 'risk' when talking 
of the dangers of everyday life was to give the reader a preliminary idea of what goes 
into definitions of risk. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this chapter that the analysis of the girls' accounts of 'everyday risk' 
illustrates the epistemological nature of 'risk'. The analysis uncovers some of the 
elements that constitute the knowledge background the girls use to make sense of 
'risk'. The data shown in the chapter indicate the dependence of 'risk' on contextual 
knowledge and on the values that are attached to it. It has also shown that this 
constellation produces unstable, complex, varied, contingent, and sometimes 
contradictory definitions of 'risk' . 
We have learnt in this chapter that the girls had a very good knowledge of the 
structural conditions of Brazilian 'risk society'. They knew about the precarious 
conditions of education, about the social inequalities that permeate everyday life, about 
the way gender relations are constituted and about the political ideology that is behind 
the current Brazilian government. The girls use this knowledge to make sense of the 
risks of everyday life, which indicates that as sociological theories of risk suggest, 
'risk' is socially constructed. That is, the girls' understandings of 'risk' seem to be, 
indeed, produced through social, cultural and political processes (Petersen and Lupton 
1996). 
The data analysed here has suggested that to know everyday life as a 'risk context' 
means to be aware of the many risks attached to everyday life, and that there is no risk-
free choice. We have learnt that to talk of a particular everyday risk implied 
considering many possible dangers that were seen as related to the risk in question. I 
have argued then that in their everyday life the girls assessed risks not as isolated, but 
as interrelated dangers. I called this association of dangers a 'risk portfolio'. 
This chapter focused on the girls' knowledge of the structure of Brazilian 'risk 
society'. The next chapter will go further in the analysis of the relationship between 
'knowledge' and 'risk'. It will look at the specific types of knowledge (learned also 
from life experiences) that underpin the girls' ways of seeing the risks of sex. Special 
attention will be given to the influence of the knowledge about the importance of 'the 
care of the self on the girls' understandings of 'risky sex'. The chapter will show that 
the relevance of the knowledge about this particular aspect of the context of the 
Brazilian 'risk society' is not limited to its use in conceptions of 'risky sex'. It also, and 
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more fundamentally, informs the girls' ideas about identities within it and their own 
projects for the 'self. 
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CHAPTERS 
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE GIRLS' WAYS OF SEEING 
RISKY AND SAFE SEX 
"1 think that when a woman is too pressured into it [to have sex 
before she is sure that he is the right guy, which is defined as 
risky] she ends up by thinking like that ... ah ... l don't know if 1 
want ... but she doesn't do it forcibly. She thinks, and then one 
day she decides ah I'm going to do it ... but she does it with 
consciousness of what she's doing ... but it's not forced .. I . .} 
she's going to do it because she is being pressured into it and 
decides to do it ... [. . .} " (Tania). 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter I have started my analysis of the epistemological nature of risk. By 
looking at the girls' accounts of everyday risks I have uncovered some of the layers of 
knowledge that exist behind the girls' conceptions of risk. My general aim there was to 
explore the knowledge that goes into conceptions of risk, when 'risk' is considered in 
its broader sense. In the present chapter I narrow the focus of my analysis by looking at 
the knowledge that goes into conceptions of risk, when 'risk' is specifically applied to 
heterosexual sex. I explore here the girls' conceptions of risky and safe sex, 
investigating the process in which those conceptions are produced. The analysis 
focused on 'risk' in general, and 'sexual risk', in particular, will both contribute to the 
development of my understanding of how adolescent women see the personal risk of 
contracting HIV / AIDS in heterosexual relationships. 
We have learned so far that to live in a 'risk society' is an opportunity to know what 
and where are the risks of daily life are, and how to deal with them. Drawing on my 
reading of the girls' accounts of everyday risks I have argued in the last chapter that 
risk meanings are constituted by a shared knowledge about the social context where 
they live. As we have seen, to live in a 'risk society' means to experience 'risk' as a 
combination of probable dangers that are interconnected. I have concluded there that 
'risk' is not a monolithic entity, but part of a system of interconnected dangers that are 
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assembled in a sort of 'risk portfolio'. This turns risk assessment into a complex 
operation, for it involves the consideration not of one single hazardous outcome of the 
risk assessed, but many. The data analysed here will show that HIV/AIDS risk is only 
one of the possible dangers included in the girls' sexual risk portfolios. It will also 
show that the value of HIV / AIDS risk is relative to the value of all the other possible 
dangers considered in sexual risk assessments. 
In the present chapter I develop the argument that although the girls' ways of seeing the 
risks of sex are underpinned by a number of different social knowledges, one type of 
knowledge in particular is very influential on their approach to risky/safe sex. That is 
the knowledge about the importance of 'self-care', which in discourses of risk means 
'self-governance'. In my analysis I will make the point that this knowledge is mainly 
learned from health promotion's discourses on risk and that this implicates health 
promoters in the way the girls see and respond to the risk of heterosexual HIV 
infection. As we will see, the girls' emphasis on self-governance has two immediate 
consequences. First, it generates a continuous identity work. Second, and related to 
that, it creates the illusory identity of 'self-governed girl', one who is to be able to 
control the risks of sex by making autonomous choices. 
'Self-governance' is one of the principles of the ethical systems of high modernity 
(Rose 1989). It is, as Nikolas Rose (1989) argues, a mechanism of production of 
subjectivities. Those mechanisms are forms of government that act upon individuals' 
choices and behaviour in an indirect manner. They are mechanisms that permit an 
alliance between personal and institutional (or social) objectives by creating the 
illusion that individuals are free to choose who to be and how to live their lives.34 
The data gathered shows that risky and safe sex are thought and talked about by means 
of self-inspection, self-problematization and self-monitoring. As we will see, 
discussions around the meanings of risky/safe sex always involve the self (even when 
sexual activity is not a personal practice yet). The quotation presented at the beginning 
of the chapter, where Tania explains her theory about adolescent women's sexual risk-
taking, illustrates the intrinsic relation between 'risk' and 'subjectivity'. By 
34 For a discussion on the importance of the idea of 'self-governance' in the context of health promotion 
see page 21. 
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'subjectivity' I mean the sense we make of ourselves according to our position within a 
certain context (Alcoff 1997). The quotation is an example of the association between 
the meanings of risky and safe sex and the notion of risk and safety as personal 
choices, thus of self-governance. 
The first part of this chapter focuses on what the girls mean by risk when they think 
and talk of sex. As in my analysis of their understandings of everyday risks, I intend to 
get a broad overview of sexual risk meanings before embarking on a deep exploration 
of sexual risk meanings. The next section continues to look at the ways by which the 
girls make sense of sexual risks. It analyses sexual risk meanings but, more 
fundamentally, it looks at the processes in which those meanings are produced. The 
section is focused on the personalization of risky/safe sex. In the section I develop my 
argument about the links between this process, self-governance and the girls' ways of 
seeing risky/safe sex. 
MAKING A PERSONAL SENSE OF RISKY I SAFE SEX 
The General Meanings of 'Risk' 
I start the analysis of what the girls mean by risky and safe sex through the more 
general meanings attached to 'risk' and 'safety' in the context of sex. The comparison 
between the ways the girls define risk/safety in the context of their everyday lives (see 
Chapter 4, page 130) and their ways of seeing risky and safe sex demonstrates that in 
the girls' discourses of risk 'risk' follows general patterns of meaning. Either when 
contingent to the specific settings of sexual encounters or when it is applied to the 
more general context of daily life 'risk' seems to be understood as something similar 
but not equal to 'danger'. Similarly to 'everyday risk', 'sexual risk' is not exactly the 
same as 'sexual danger'. By saying that my intention is not to point out a definitive 
deconstruction of the meanings the girls attach to 'sexual risk'. The idea is to highlight 
once again the complexities and ambiguities of the notion of 'risk' . 
In the quotations shown below we can note that like in conceptualizations of 'everyday 
risk', the transformation of 'danger' into 'risk' is value-laden. Probability estimations 
are used to ascribe value to the hazards in question. 
"Tania - I don't think AIDS is a danger for me. As far as I know I don't 
run this risk. Ok, in theory it can be a danger ... you know ... but if you don't 
use drugs and are a virgin the risk is minimum ... ". 
"Claudia - There are some girls, friends of mine, who don't care ... they 
know that sex can be dangerous but they don't care .. .[. . .} Then there is 
always that possibility, and they know that, but I think they pretend there is 
no risk of getting pregnant or catching a disease like AIDS, but the risk is 
really high". 
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Another similarity between everyday risks and sexual risks is that in both the notion of 
risk cannot be dissociated from that of safety. The ambiguity of the notion of risk turns 
'safety' into an intrinsic element of risk meanings. As Carter suggests, risk" ... alert [ s] 
us to uncertainties about whether the future is safe or dangerous" and " .. .it 
simultaneously points to the possibilities of security and insecurity"(Carter 1995, 
p.135). To be 'safe' or to be 'unsafe' in sexual encounters is contingent to a given time 
and space; the same situation can be defined as 'safe' in certain circumstances and 
'risky' in others. What matters is not the fact 'per se' - "a friend of mine has had sex 
with her boyfriend without protection" - but the judgment of the circumstances in 
which this fact happened - "but I don't think that she has run any risk of catching 
AIDS because they have been together for two years now and she trusts him". 
While 'safe sex' is referred to as the opposite of 'risky sex', these are not references to 
absolute state of affairs. According to the data gathered, in the terrain of sex 'risk' and 
'safety' are always relative- « ... we cannot say 'to have sex with this guy is safe' or 'it is 
risky' and that's it ... you never know, it depends ... ". The contingency of 'risk' and 
'safety' results in risky and safe sex being treated as provisional categories. In similar 
situations sex can be 'risky' and 'safe', depending on certain conditions. The 
conversation shown below illustrates how the relativism of definitions of risky/safe sex 
appears in the girls' conversations. 
"Vera - Ah ... I don't know ... safe sex is to protect yourself and to do it 
where there is no risk of somebody catching you ... 
Claudia - It depends, isn't it? If it's a friend that's not so bad but if it's 
your mother ... 
Vera - But if your mother had a young mind, like my mother, then this 
shouldn't be a problem ... that's why it depends .... 
Claudia - Yeah ... right ... I always hope that one day my mum will 
understand these things better. If .. I'm saying if .. if she changed then it 
wouldn't be a problem ... 
Julia - Ah ... to me [safe sex] is to let my mother know ... Jf I tell her it will be 
safe, if I don't, then, it will become risky ... 
Tania - Ah ... it depends ... in my case it's the opposite, if I tell my mum, 
then, it will become very risky indeed". 
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Considering that risky and safe sex are not detachable, my analysis will take both as 
encapsulating complementary meanings; the information about one may illuminate the 
analysis of the other. The conversation below is an example that to define 'risky sex' 
implies to make use of the meanings of 'safe sex' and vice-versa: 
"Claudia - For you to be safe you first have to be sure that you know the 
risks. When you know the risks you run, then you are able to .. .[. . .} then 
you can protect yourself. .. and when you don't protect yourself it's because 
you've decided to take the risks. 
Julia - Yeah ... but safe sex does not mean to know all the risks ... sometimes 
a girl doesn't know all the risks she's run in the past and even so she 
doesn't catch any disease ... 
Ines - [. . .} And you can also know all the risks, feel safe but still risk your 
life ... ". 
This finding about the contingency of risk and safety in sexual encounters is replicated 
in other studies that similarly investigated the way people assess personal sexual risks. 
For example, in a qualitative study carried out with gay men the authors found out that 
the majority do not make a once-and-for-all assessment of their personal risk of 
becoming infected with the HIV virus in sexual relationships with a given sexual 
partner (Davies and SIGMA 1992). The conclusion was that the HIV / AIDS risk 
assessment consisted in a dynamic process, "varying from minute to minute before and 
after, and [ ... ] from second to second within the sexual encounter" (p.139). 
The observation that definitions of risky sex extrapolate the meanings of dangerous 
sex, are not detachable from conceptualizations of safe sex, and are always relative, are 
the more immediate and general findings of my analysis of the girls' ways of seeing 
risky/safe sex. Furthermore, a closer exploration of the girls' discourses about 
risky/safe sex leads to the conclusion that to make sense of risky/safe sex implies its 
personalization. 'Personalization' here has a double sense: it means to identify 
risk/safety as belonging to a particular person who can be the 'other' and/or 'me'. As 
we will see, it is via this process of personalization that risk meanings become 
specifically related to sex. For that reason I will give special attention to the analytical 
exploration of how this process operates and to what extent it is important in the 
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production of meanings and 'ways of seeing' risky/safe sex. I will start by arguing that 
the personalization of risky/safe sex is the basis of sexual risk assessment. 
Personalizing Risky I Safe Sex and Assessing Sexual Risks 
To evaluate the risks of sexual encounters involves the prior establishment of the 
boundaries between 'risk' and 'safety', that is, what is 'risky' and 'safe'. It is by 
personalizing 'risk' and 'safety' that the girls distinguish risky from safe sex. By sexual 
'risk assessment' I mean not only the evaluation of the potential risk of a sexual 
encounter - 'is it risky or safe?' - and if risky, - 'which risks does it comprise?'; but 
also, the value judgment that will establish the importance of each of the risks 
considered - 'how significant are the possible outcomes of each of those risks?'. The 
personalization of risky/safe sex may not be a surprise since discourses on sex, with the 
reinforcement of the individualistic tenor of those of risk, involve the identification of 
the individuals who happen to be the characters of the risky/safe sex scene. 
A review of research in which lay people's ideas of risk are considered shows that the 
tendency to personalize risk and safety when thinking of sex is not a peculiarity of 
Brazilian adolescents. For instance, with the aim of investigating the construction of 
common-sense knowledge about the sexual transmission of HIV among heterosexual 
young adults, a study developed in Canada concluded that for the interviewees AIDS 
was " ... caused by individuals rather than by a virus" (Maticka-Tyndale 1992, p.248). 
While in my research the girls also talked about sexual risks as located in individuals 
or in 'risk objects' (who are to be the threat to those they sleep with), the 
personalization of risky/safe sex was not, however, confined to the HIV / AIDS risk. It 
was also related to other risks included in the sexual risk portfolio like the sex-related 
moral risks, among others (see page 195). This suggests that the definition of 'risky 
sex' as 'sexual intercourse without wearing a condom' employed by health promotion 
is too narrow for its underlying conception of sexual risk restricts risk meanings to 
biomedical assumptions.35 
35 For a discussion of the meanings of 'safe sex' in which it is included those of 'risky sex', see pages 75-
77. 
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Evaluating the potential risk of a given sexual encounter, which happens on the 
grounds of personal experiences, knowledge and values, offers the possibility to adjust 
the available meanings of risky/safe sex to personal interests. Once put into a more 
familiar context, the meanings of 'risk' and 'safety' can be 're-invented'. This is 
illustrated in the conversation shown above (page 159), where a collective process of 
risk assessment constructs a definition of risky/safe sex that is very different from its 
'classical' conception of 'condom non-use/use'. Risky/safe sex is defined there In 
terms of the danger of "somebody catching you ... ", particularly the girls' mothers. 
For the girls whom I talked to, the assessment ofthe risks of sex involves the setting of 
the boundaries between 'risk' and 'safety' through the identification of 'risk subjects' 
(the potential victims) and 'risk objects' (the potential threats), to which I will refer 
with more detail later on. Inspired by Carter (1995), I use the word 'boundary' 
" ... because it calls to mind both the idea of change occurring as it is crossed and that 
such boundaries are socially constructed" (p.141). Although Carter talks about the 
boundaries that define the space of safety within scientific risk assessment, the point he 
makes about the function of the 'other' in the definition of spaces of danger and safety 
can also be applicable to the girls' discourses of risk. According to my analysis, the 
'other' plays an important role in the girls' assessment of sexual risks. It can be either 
the 'risk subject' or the 'risk object' of a sexual encounter. As a 'risk subject', the 
'other' may represent, as Carter suggests, the person who occupies the space of danger, 
as opposed to the 'self who may be located in the space of safety. 
"Marta - There are many girls who don't take care of themselves ... don't 
use a condom .. .{. . .} There are some girls who don't accept using condoms, 
they say that they don't feel pleasure, that it's not good, I don't know ... 
Maria - Ah ... that's bullshit ... I would never make love without a condom". 
"Maria - I think that [the girl J doesn't think so much [about AIDS as about 
pregnancy J also because she thinks that she knows the guy ... 
Teresa - Yeah ... that 's it ... 
Maria - Ah ... he doesn't have this and that, neither do L so ... this won't 
happen to me .... 
[. . .} Dora - Do you think like that as well or you are talking about the 
others? 
Maria - I think that that thing has to come out ... that thing about knowing 
that you have to take care of yourself [. . .] 
Suzana - Ah ... you have to look at things in their two sides, you know ... you 
can't look at it like ... like looking at appearances, only because he is a tidy 
guy [. .. j, from a good family ... [. .. j ". 
"Vera - Tania, talking seriously, do you run this risk (of getting pregnant)? 
Tania - Right now no ... 
[. . .]Claudia - You run, ,you run because you are a woman ... 
Tania - Ok, but I know how to hold myself on ... ". 
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The notion of risk is, as Carter argues, useful in the establishment of the boundaries of 
the danger/safety dichotomy because it encapsulates the idea of knowable and 
predictable dangers. In the conversations above, the existence of a sort of knowledge 
background about the dangers of sex is apparent. To have sex without using a condom, 
give importance to the guy's appearance, to not take care of oneself, AIDS, and 
pregnancy seemed to be all dangers that were known as such previously. It is these 
known dangers that the girls seek to assess when evaluating the potential riskiness or 
safety of a sexual encounter. 
The identification of what is dangerous leads to that of what is safe. Given that the 
imperative of risk avoidance has a moral impact upon the 'self (see pages 62-65), the 
possibility of keeping its identity away from the recognized dangers may lead to the 
protection of the moral integrity of the 'self. The space of danger can then be left to be 
occupied by the deviants (see page 85). "As long as we are 'good', [ ... J then danger is 
elsewhere, not part of the 'self" (Carter 1995, p.143, author's emphasis). What we will 
see in the analysis presented in this chapter is that, as Carter stresses, the boundaries 
between 'risk' and 'safety', the 'self and the 'other' are fluid. In my view, the risk that 
this implies is the fact that these are boundaries that can be easily crossed, at least at an 
individual level. However, as Carter argues, the social control over the movement 
between the boundaries of danger and safety is not in the girls' hands but with the 
experts; their emphasis is on boundaries, not on connections. To Carter (1995), 
"crossing these boundaries actualises a shift from safety to danger, from 'self to 
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'other'. Yet the connections between these spaces remain socially obscured by their 
being placed in the control of the expert risk assessor" (p.145). 
Carter's contentions lead me to wonder about the various 'selves' and simultaneous 
and contradictory spaces occupied by the girls during the focus group sessions. It is 
indeed the case that the official boundaries between 'risk' and 'non-risk' are 
established by risk experts' discourses and also that these are powerful discourses, but 
they are not the only discourses available. Although as members of the category 
'adolescents' 'girls' are usually seen by risk experts as 'risk subjects', that is, those 
who 'probably' occupy the space of danger (see pages 10-11), their multiple identities 
give them the possibility of breaking out the scientifically defined boundaries between 
risky and safe sex. I am not saying that the girls are able to dissolve the dichotomy 
risk/safety, which is already well established, but that they can, at least to a certain 
extent, dislocate the transgressing point of its boundaries. I suggest that this relocation 
and the redefinition of risk and safety that it entails have the effect of softening the 
rigidity of the scientifically established risk boundaries36 and that this challenges the 
power of experts' knowledge. In a way, I think, we are witnessing the effects of this as 
risk experts have put all the efforts on 'correcting' adolescents' 'misconceptions' about 
where safety finishes and risk begins. 
The process of sexual risk assessment and the definitions of risky/safe sex appear to be 
symbiotically related. On the one hand, risk assessment is an operation that serves as a 
contextual frame for the attachment of meanings to risky/safe sex. On the other, the 
meanings of risky/safe sex orient the estimations of sexual risks. The following 
conversation shows the importance of risk assessment in the determination of 
risky/safe sex meanings and vice versa. It took place in one of the integrating activities 
that usually preceded the focused group discussions. In this particular case the 
integrating activity was a 'problem solving fishbowl' which I called "If! were you ... ". 
Each girl was asked to write down on a card a problem, question or doubt concerning 
the pleasures and dangers of loving relationships. They were to pretend they were 
asking for advice. After that, the cards were distributed amongst themselves and then 
answered by one 'adviser', who was to write down on the same card her advice. The 
36 See section about the 'technico-scientific' approach to 'risk' on page 47. 
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cards were returned to the person who was seeking advice and who, then, would read 
the question and the answer to the group. 
"Fatima - (Her question) 'Even in a stable relationship and knowing that 
he loves me, shall I use a condom in order to not run risks?' 
Fatima - (The adviser's answer) 'One does not know completely a person 
and one can't be sure ... even if you love him, you don't know if he is going 
to be faithful ... and the condom is always necessary .... 
Dora - And what do you think about that advice? 
Fatima - I thought it was right ... 
Dora - Why? Does anybody think it's not right? 
Katia - Ah! One can get pregnant and even if one knows the person one 
will never know everything he does ... 
Suzana - One doesn't know what he did and with whom he had a 
relationship ... 
Katia - He can have a disease ... and you can get pregnant as well ... 
Dora - Ok, but for pregnancy one can use pills, for example, not 
necessarily a condom ... 
Suzana - Yeah, but the pill is not so safe as the condom is ... 
Katia - I think like you ... the condom is much more safe ... ". 
One could, perhaps, be tempted to conclude that in the conversation shown above the 
girls define 'risky sex' as 'not using a condom', a definition that would satisfy most 
sex educators. However, a more careful analysis leads to the conclusion that 'risky 
sex', and also 'safe sex', mean more than that. 'Risky sex' is defined as 'not knowing 
the 'other' completely', including 'not knowing everything he does and did, and also 
with whom he had a relationship', 'not being sure that the 'other' is faithful and if he is 
healthy' and 'not using a condom'. By 'safe sex' the girls, apparently, mean the 
opposite. It seems to be defined, for example, in terms of 'knowing the 'other' 
completely', 'being sure about everything he does and did' (although this was 
considered as unlikely), and also 'using a condom'. Personal understandings of what is 
risky/safe sex are crucial for the establishment of what is to be assessed when it comes 
to sexual risks. 
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In this section I have addressed some of the issues concerning the importance of the 
personalization of risky/safe sex for the production of risk meanings as applied to sex. I 
have argued that it is mainly through the personalization of risky/safe sex that risk 
assessments are carried out and that risk assessments and risk meanings are 
intrinsically related. 
The analytical deconstruction of the process in which risky/safe sex is personalized 
reveals the knowledge backgrounds that underpin the girls' conceptions of sexual risk 
and, also, how the girls interpret this knowledge in order to make sense of risky/safe 
sex. According to my analysis, the personalization of risky/safe sex is organized 
through a discursive construction of 'risk subjects' - those exposed to risks, and of 'risk 
objects' - those who may be the source of risks. In my view, the production of 'risk 
subjects' is the outcome of individual investments in the "care of the self' (Foucault 
1984, p.47). The production of 'risk objects' results, on the other hand, from the 
interest in the 'knowledge of the other'. 
I take 'self-care' and 'knowledge of the other' as the two poles around which the girls' 
discourses concerning sexual risks are articulated. I want to argue that the simultaneous 
interest in 'the care of the self and 'the knowledge of the other' is related to the girls' 
desire to be recognized as self-governed women and persons who not only know the 
alternative options and the risks involved but also know how to deal rationally, 
responsibly and autonomously with them. 
The diagram shown below is an attempt to represent what I identify as the different 
levels of the process through which risky/safe sex is personalized. Although it may 
appear that this process is so simple and rigid that it can be represented in a diagram, 
this is actually not the case. The transmission of the idea that the process of 
personalizing risky/safe sex always happens in the same way for all the girls is a 
negative effect of my attempt to capture its complexities in a picture that does not show 
the dynamic of this process. In 'real' life the personalization of risky/safe sex is much 
more flexible than my diagram represents (see Fig.1). 
THE PERSONALIZATION OF RISKY/SAFE SEX 
/ 
THE IOENTIFICATION OF 
'RISK SUBJECTS' 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
'RISK OBJECTS' 
AN INVESTMENT IN 
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AN INVESTMENT IN 
'THE CARE OF THE SELF' ---.. 'THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER' 
THE INVENTION OF A 
SELF·GOVERNED 'SELF' 
/ 
Fig.1 - Process of Personalization of Risky/Safe Sex 
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I now want to move my analysis on to one of the stages of the personalization of 
risky/safe sex - the discursive production of 'risk subjects' -, which are of two types -
the 'self and the 'other' - and on its links to 'the care of the self and self-governance. 
The analysis will reveal some of the constitutive elements of the knowledge 
backgrounds used by the girls in the process of making sense of risky/safe sex. 
Personalizing Risky/Safe Sex (Part A): The Production of 'Sexual Risk Subjects' 
and 'Careful Selves' 
The first point I want to stress is that knowledge about the contextual positions of the 
'self within heterosexual relationships constitutes a fundamental element of the 
knowledge background used in definitions of risky/safe sex. In the girls' discussions 
about sexual risks 'risk subjects' are identified through a sort of 'discursive 
positioning' that narrates 'where' the subject is in relation to the external 
circumstances that constitute the risk to be assessed. 'Where' means here not only the 
material circumstances of the risk situation - the elements used to describe the scene -, 
but more importantly, the girls' interpretation of these material circumstances. Diverse 
perspectives inform this interpretation. Different interpretations of the circumstances 
that delineate the risk scene result in/from different types of discourses to which the 
girls are subj ected. 
The position ofthe 'risk subject' is a referential point for the development of personal 
discourses of risk/safety in the context of sex. In a discussion about who runs the risk 
of being infected by the HIV virus in a sexual encounter Suzana takes a discourse in 
which the 'self is positioned as safe. For Suzana, to be at AIDS risk, however, does 
not seem to be out of the question, as in the same discourse the 'self is positioned as a 
'risk subject' through the act of kissing. One can also note that in her discourse the 
'others' and the 'self occupy same equal positions, as she uses'!, and 'we' as 
intertwined subjects. The discourse that describes the perspective from which Suzana 
considers the risk of kissing intrinsically describes the context where the 'risk subject' 
is positioned. 
"Suzana - ... Me too [I don't think about the risk of catching AIDS in a 
sexual relation but about the AIDS risk in general}. .. like sometimes when 
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we are in a party ... and we flirt with someone ... we know that we won't 
catch it through a kiss ... but we are scared like ... he is a stranger, we don't 
know where he came from ... that scares us .. .[. . .}". 
Suzana's talk identifies her 'self as a subject who, like others, goes to parties, flirts, 
kisses, is well infonned about the HIV / AIDS risk and yet does not feel completely safe 
in spite of 'knowing' that HIV/AIDS is not transmitted through kissing. She makes it 
clear that the infonnation she (like others) has got is not enough to make her (and 
others) feel safe because she still sees strangers as potential 'risk objects'. The 'self is 
not positioned on the grounds of Suzana's (scientific) knowledge of the safety of 
kissing but on her belief that to have an intimate contact with a stranger (in this case 
through kissing) might be risky despite what scientists say. Suzana's discourse 
emphasizes the importance of knowing the boy she kisses. Knowledge about the 
'other' would reduce uncertainties, hence risks. By knowing "where he came from" 
Suzana would be able to make infonned decisions and evaluate if he could or could not 
be a 'risk object' through the act of kissing. She would rely on her own judgments. 
Within the context described by Suzana her 'self is not exposed to the risk of 
contracting HIV / AIDS through sex. If HIV / AIDS is to be a threat, it is not by means of 
sex. Suzana introduces her 'self to us (the other girls and me) as an HIV/AIDS 'risk 
subject' but not in the way I was proposing (which was by thinking of sexual risks). 
She resists being positioned as a subject of the risks of sex. To talk about risk, 
however, implies personalization; the 'self is involved in one way or another with it. 
The alternative for Suzana is to describe her 'self as worried about the possibility of 
being subjected to the HIV/AIDS risk through kissing, which is the only risky practice 
she admits to. 
Suzana's resistance to take up a position as a 'risk subject' in the discourse of 
risky/safe sex is a reflexive exercise. Such a position seems to be coherent with the 
type of girl/woman she wants to be or the one she would like to present as herself in 
the research context. When talking about her plans with regard to sex she makes it 
clear that she is still a virgin and that if one day she decides to have sex, it will be with 
protection - "1 haven't done it yet and 1 don't know if I'll do it before marriage but if it 
happens it'll be with a condom and that's for sure". On the other hand, at that 
moment, she was not pressured to revise this personal proj ect as she was currently 
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'single' - "Right now I don't have a boyfriend, I am not at risk of doing what I don't 
want to". So, the only possibility of positioning her 'self and being positioned as a 
risk subject in discourses of HIV/AIDS risk is to think and talk about the risks of 
kissing a stranger. 
The emphasis on the need to know "where he came from" in order to feel safe in a 
relationship reflects the subject Suzana wants to be: one who is able to assess and 
manage the dangers of her personal life, in particular those related to the intimate 
moments of her relationships with men. Suzana's discourse about the risk of kissing 
seems to be underlined by a personal project of 'self-governance'. As we will see, this 
is not only Suzana's personal project. Amongst the girls 'self-governance' constitutes a 
common ideal. This emphasis on 'self-care' appeared also in the girls' discussions 
about everyday risk management (see pages 147-150). This suggests that different risks 
can be seen through similar lenses. Another way of looking at this finding is to say that 
'to kiss a stranger' is actually an everyday risk and that, so, the meanings of the former 
are embedded in the meanings of the latter. 
In a group discussion about the risk of HIV / AIDS in sexual encounters Maria also talks 
of her 'self. This time, however, sex is not rejected as the context where the 'self 
might be SUbjected to risk. 
"Dora - [. . .] Let's describe a risky sexual relation. 
Maria - I met a guy today and had already had sex with him without using 
a condom, without precaution ... that's totally risky ... ". 
While the self-positioning as a 'risk subject' is originated in a hypothetical situation, 
the identification of the 'self as the subject ofthe described risky sex situation has the 
effect of personalizing the meanings of risky/safe sex. Like Suzana, Maria relates 'risk' 
to the lack of information about the 'other'. 'Risky sex' is primarily defined as a sexual 
encounter in which the 'risk object' is a stranger 'other', and secondly by sex with this 
stranger without a condom. Like Suzana, Maria also seems to invest in a self-governed 
'self. The 'risk' and 'safety' of sexual encounters are not totally defined in terms of 
the use or non-use of a condom. The movement of the 'self between risky and safe 
positions is more a matter of the mobilizing of internal resources of self-defense and 
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less of the employment of external means of protection. It IS a question of the 
individual 'talent' for taking care of the 'self. 
Contradictorily enough, while the meanings of 'safety' are attached to those of 
'carefulness', that is, a 'safe self is also a 'careful self, the discursive association 
between the two relies on a prior positioning of the 'self as a 'risk subject'. That is to 
say, the acknowledgment ofthe risks is a condition for the construction of the 'careful 
self. If the 'self is not at risk there is no need to look after it. This is additional 
evidence that, as I have argued previously, the girls' conceptions of risk are not 
dissociated from those of safety (see pages 160-161). 
As I pointed out earlier and the examples given above illustrate, 'self-governance' is an 
implicit reference for the girls' discussions about the risks of sex. But the investment in 
a self-governed 'self can also be discursively explicit. In the following cases it is 
accompanied by the display of a self-attribution of carefulness. 
"Claudia - It depends ... in my case I wouldn't do it if I didn't want to ... we 
are the owner of our mind and we have to keep in mind that we need to 
take care of ourselves because if we don't people can rightly say that we 
are careless and irresponsible ... I'm not like that, I take care of myself .. I 
don't know, this is the way I am, I never forget that I have to be careful ... . " 
"Laura - [. . .} Are you crazy? I know perfectly well that sex is a risky 
thing .. .! have to keep my eyes wide open, I mean, we have to be very 
careful ... I am conscious about the risks and I know how to take care of 
myself .. those who are careful are those who have less chances of getting 
pregnant or catching AIDS .... " 
"Maria - We've got to protect ourselves. It doesn't matter if it's a boy or a 
girl. I think that it's not only the boy that has to carry a condom ... only 
because he is the man and the girL.ah! she is ashamed of .. or because in 
this case she has prejudice against it ... ". 
While Claudia's, Laura's and Maria's discourses of self-care are all good examples of 
the investment in an autonomous and careful self, it is Maria's talk that I wish to 
deconstruct next because it leads to a number of insights that have to do with the 
argument that I want to develop here. The argument concerns the conflicting subject 
positions made available to the girls in the intersection between gender and risk 
discourses. 
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In Maria's discourse of 'self-care', the 'self speaks in the name of the entire 
adolescent population. To be able to protect the 'self against the risks of sex is both an 
individual and collective agenda. To Maria, gender shall not count when it comes to 
the subject's responsibility to take care of the self. Boys and girls have all got to be 
careful and assume equal responsibility for safety in sexual encounters. A discourse of 
'gender equality' underpins Maria's discourse of 'self-care'. However, her 
consciousness ofthe different girls' and boys' locations in the gendered discourses that 
organize sexual agendas (expressed in the statement about the reasons why girls do not 
carry a condom) creates an unconscious paradox. The fact that "she is ashamed of" 
and "has prejudice against" carrying a condom defines the paradox. Girls and boys are 
actually not the same gender subjects. The masculine 'other' has a different attitude 
towards the mastering of his personal protection in sexual encounters. He is not 
ashamed of carrying a condom and does not have prejudice against it, "only because he 
is the man". If, in order to be able to take care of the 'self (represented by the carrying 
of a condom), the girl/woman needs to be equal to a man, then this discourse of self-
responsibility for sexual protection does not seem to hold a position for subjects who 
happen to be feminine. 
The paradox expressed in Maria's discourse of risk prevention and self-care originates 
from the gendered nature of her talk. It reveals the notion of a dualistic gender order, a 
discourse that has traditionally constructed 'woman' not simply as different but, 
essentially, as inferior. While Maria's declaration in favor of women's rights expresses 
her desire to assure gender equality and girls' autonomy with respect to sexual 
protection, the attachment of her subjectivity to the category 'we as girls' creates a 
contradictory position for the 'self. The imagined 'self or the subject that Maria wants 
to be - the careful and self-governed feminine 'self - becomes blurred by the 
alternative positions available to girls in the terrain of sex. 
Advocating gender equality without discursively breaking out of the boundaries of the 
dualism feminine/masculine undermines the coherence of Maria's narrative of her 
autonomous and careful 'sexual self. The discourse about boys' and girls' equal rights 
and duties concerning sexual self-protection sustains this dualism. Thus it does not 
question the power of boys/men, which is the essence of the construction of gender and 
woman's subordination to man (Davies 1989, Holland et al. 1998). 
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As feminist poststructuralists argue, "power remains fundamentally contradictory to 
the idea and the idealisation of the idea of being female" (Davies 1989, p. 71, author's 
emphasis). In practice, the positioning of the 'self as an autonomous and empowered 
subject in matters of sexual protection will possibly expose Maria (and also Claudia 
and Laura) to risks. The 'risk subject' resulted from that would either risk her gender 
identity or her autonomy. As others have already argued, in the dominant system of 
gender, to be female is incompatible with performances of autonomy, in particular 
when it comes to sex, which is constituted as a legitimate male domain (Holland et al. 
1998). 
The discursive positionings taken up by the girls are results of personal choices (unless 
they originated from physical pressure or even violence, which did not seem to be the 
case) but they do not seem to be free choices. In the case of decisions related to 
personal sexual safety, the choices made are constrained by gender ideologies and 
models of femininity. Maria, for example, made explicit her belief that shame and 
prejudice against carrying a condom were part of being female. It seems that in her 
own evaluation this could result in girls' exposure to the risks of sex, as they could end 
up by not carrying a condom. 
To recognize their 'selves' as women or to construct their subjectivities upon 
conventional femininity may indeed be very risky if we consider the lack of legitimate 
power associated with being female (Davies 1989), particularly in the context of sexual 
relations. And this is not a risky position only for the Brazilian girls whom I talked to. 
In their analysis of English young women's accounts of sexual behaviour Holland et al. 
(1998) also concluded that it is precisely the mark of femininity that makes girls' 
sexual identities unsafe. That is, it is by behaving like 'feminine girls' that they become 
subjected to sexual risks. 
Condom use can be seen as antithetical to femininity. As Holland et al. (1998) argue, 
"to be conventionally feminine is to appear sexually unknowing, to aspire to a 
relationship, to let sex 'happen', to trust to love, and to make men happy" (p.6, 
authors' emphasis). To insist on condom use for personal safety may then threaten 
women's feminine identity. It may mean "a lack of sexual innocence and so a lack of 
conventional, reputable femininity" (ibid., p.33). 
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The deconstruction of the girls' discourses about the risks of sexual encounters 
suggests that it is not easy for them to be the (safe) sexual subjects they want to. While 
discourses of woman's freedom and right to choose are nowadays widespread, the 
conditions for putting those discourses into practice are hard to achieve. Because the 
girls recognize their 'sexed selves' (Probyn 1993) as the feminine pole of the binary 
opposition feminine/masculine, their choices concerning sexual behaviour become 
constrained by the conventions of gender (Holland et al. 1998). There are a number of 
examples of how gender establishes the girls' menu of sexual behaviour options. In 
spite of having limited space to present all the data gathered here, I think it is 
worthwhile picking up some of these examples as a means of illustrating and 
highlighting the explicit gender basis of the girls' production and presentation of their 
'sexed selves' during the focus group sessions. It is worth noting that the discourses in 
which this gender basis is expressed end up by positioning girls/women similarly. 
Usually they are represented as subordinate to boys/men. That is the case, for example, 
of female sexual initiative. According to the girls, because women are supposed to 
have less sexual knowledge than men, those who demonstrate having a good 
knowledge about sex can get into trouble. 
"Marta - If a woman knows [the knowledge necessary for having a good 
sexual performance 1 she is discriminated against ... she is 
condemned ... because of what people are going to think about her ... ah, she 
has already had ... 
[. . .] Fatima - ... Many kilometers ... ". 
Sexual initiative is not a real option for girls. Under dominant gender regImes 
'initiative' and 'action' are masculine roles. Girls' sexual initiative may be seen as 
sexual knowledge expertise, a sign of previous and multiple sexual experiences, which 
does not fit into the conventional model of feminine passivity/masculine activity3? and 
also contradicts the ideal of feminine monogamy and innocence (Holland et al. 1998). 
As reflexive subjects of gender discourses, the girls cannot help to recognize that the 
subversion of the norm of feminine repression of desires may bring with it some risks. 
"Vera - The woman, even if she wants, she can't ask the man to have sex 
with her ... 
Claudia - She can but she is not going to do that ... 
37 For a discussion about the influence of this ideology in the organization of gender relations in Brazil 
see section on page 145. 
Ines - She is going to be afraid ofbeing rejected ... 
[. . .} Claudia - It's more simple for men to want it [sex] ... ". 
"Katia - There are some boys who like it when their girlfriends have the 
initiative but I think that there are some who don't ... 
Teresa - [. . .} I think that in that case the boy becomes suspicious about the 
girl... he starts haVing bad thoughts about her .... 
Dora - What does the boy think if the girl has the [sexual] initiative? 
Marta - [. . .} He thinks that she has already had sex with other guys ... ". 
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Sexually assertive girls may be seen as 'easy' and this is a risk to reputation. 'Easy 
girls' are not however exclusive to men's vocabulary. Teresa's talk is an example that 
even girls may judge other women's sexual initiative as morally wrong. This suggests 
that ideas of 'appropriate' feminine sexual behaviour are constructed through what 
Holland et al. (1998) have called "the-male-in-the-head" (p.171). This expression was 
coined by the authors to signal the privilege of masculine interests within 
heterosexuality. To Teresa, when a boy comes across someone who is 'easy', he is 
expected to take advantage of her. Such a reaction to the girl's 'easiness' may be taken 
as a deserved response to her lack of self-respect. 
"Teresa - I think that the boys are not all that bad ... I think that they value 
those women who have self-respect, those who are not easy ... but those ... of 
course that they are not stupid ... they can't help taking advantage of those 
who demonstrate to being so easy ... it 's going to be one more, isn't it? But 
when somebody who is like ... hard to get, I think that they don't think about 
her like they think about those who are easy ... ". 
The use of 'the-male-in-the-head' to make sense of girls' heterosexual behaviour 
legitimizes male domination in heterosexual relationships. Teresa's position 
concerning the meaning of women's self-respect can be regarded as an example of her 
knowledge about gender models. It is probably the case that she will use (or was 
already using) those models to produce herself as a feminine subject. In producing 
herself as feminine, Teresa is likely to contribute to the reproduction of male 
dominance (Holland et al. 1998). 
To be a 'hard to get' girl, in the sense of hiding desires and waiting for boys' 
demonstration and fulfillment of theirs, constrains the girls' 'ways of being' in sexual 
encounters. The menu of options is packed with ideals of altruistic behaviours and self-
sacrifice, which are supposed to have the rewarding outcome of respectability. What is 
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noticeable from the data gathered is that the proposed selflessness in which this project 
of the 'self is embedded is not an objective that is to be fulfilled when the girls start 
being sexually active. Before that the girls have other opportunities to learn that to be 
feminine in heterosexual relationships (meaning all sorts of interactions between males 
and females, men/boys and women/girls, including sex) implies experiencing the active 
'nature' of men and to conform to feminine passivity. For example, according to the 
girls, women are not supposed to take the first step towards starting a romantic 
relationship. 
"Suzana - If you are interested in somebody of course you're going to wait 
for him or ask afriend to talk to him ... 
Teresa - But you'll never go by yourself .. 
Suzana - You'll never go like ... ah, I want to flirt with you ... ". 
They are also not expected to orient intimate encounters with men, who are actually 'in 
command' of what shall or shall not happen in the relationship. Boyfriends usually 
initiate kissing and hugging for example. It is possibly the case then that when the girls 
have their first sexual experience, they have already got used to their passive role in the 
context of romance as opposed to boys' initiative and control over it. 
"[. . .}Dora - ... Who takes the initiative of, for example, kissing and 
hugging, when they are not in public? 
Maria - Normally it is the boyfriend ... 
Katia - Yeah ... 
Suzana - Most of the times it's him ... ". 
"Dora - Those intimate events that happen in relationships, apart from sex, 
for example kissing and hugging, who initiates that? The boy or the girl? 
Claudia - The man ... 
Vera - The guy ... 
Tania - The boy, most of the times, isn't it "? 
It seems that it is not only experience that plays a role in girls' acceptance of boys' 
sexual initiative. Knowledge about and belief in the "male sexual drive discourse" 
(Holloway 1984, p.23) also appears to be influential. 
"Claudia - The girl is not going to ask him to have sex with her, is she? [. . .} 
Tania - And men are generally 'warmer' than women ... 
Dora - More what? Warm? 
Ines - It's him that always asks more ... 
Dora - What do you mean by 'warm '? 
Tania - More 'fire ' ... ". 
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Understandings of men's nature complement and are complemented by those of 
women's nature. Those complementary understandings constitute a circuit of 
reproduction of gender differences (Holland et aL 1998). Because the girls see boys as 
naturally 'warmer' than themselves, it is also 'natural' to interpret their sexual 
initiative and power over sexual encounters as normaL In the end somebody has got to 
be in charge ofthe sexual relationship and if it is not the girl because she is ashamed of 
it, then it must be the boy. These representations of 'women' and 'men' may not 
change over the years. As the quote below suggests, they can even be reinforced by the 
repetition of dis-empowering sexual experiences in adulthood. 
"Ines - The man always takes the initiative before the woman ... 
Vera - It has been like that for years, hasn't it? Now, to change that ... 
Claudia - Yeah it is difficult ... 
r . .} Tania - It's already a tradition ... ". 
The girls seem to generalize girls' passivity and boys' control over sexual encounters. 
Yet they try to assure room for diversity by affirming that there may be women 
(perhaps including themselves) that think and act distinctly from the majority. 
"Claudia - It's [the tradition of male sexual initiative} because the man 
always wants to shag first ... the woman can wait ... the woman waits some 
time ... 
Ines - It depends on the woman, doesn't it? 
Claudia - Yeah ... it depends ... ". 
If the girls were including themselves as the exceptions to the supposed norm of female 
acceptance of male control over sex, this could imply that they had not resigned 
themselves to the imbalance of power perceived as permeating sexual encounters. It 
could also mean that they hoped to resist the traditional norms. But, as the data 
collection progressed I got the impression that what they meant by "it depends on the 
woman" was perhaps more a way of expressing the possibility of an isolated case of 
deviancy from the norm than a personal motivation to challenge it. 
"Dora - Do you think that it's correct to see a woman who takes the 
initiative as vulgar and consider a man's initiative fine? 
Claudia - [. . .} No ... 
Vera - I don't think it's correct ... both should be able to ask ... why not? .. if 
both/eel the desire of.I . .} 
Claudia - Yeah ... this is bullshit [. . .} ... 
Vera - [. . .} ifboth o/them want to, both should be allowed to ask ... 
Claudia - Yeah ... but it's vulgar, isn't it"? 
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The data suggest that it is easier to criticize social norms as an outsider viewer than 
compromising the 'self in changing the traditional positions of girls/women in sexual 
encounters. The contradictory interpretation of female sexual initiative as correct and, 
in the end, naming it "vulgar", made me wonder about the appropriateness of the 
affirmation that our society is now governed by new values which overcome traditional 
morality. The use of feminist speech in defense of women's sexual rights, like that 
expressed in the conversation above, does not seem to open new real alternatives to the 
girls as they continue to make choices concerning sexual behaviour in conformity with 
tradition. New alternative positions are theoretically offered to modem women, but in 
practice to go against tradition is still something that demands audacity. 
"Dora - Would you take the sexual initiative? 
Vera - I wouldn't have the courage ... 
Claudia - Yeah, I wouldn't ... 
Ines - Neither I ... 
Claudia - I wouldn't have courage but I don't have anything against it ... 
Vera - Me too ... ". 
"Dora - What would you think about a girl who asks a boy to have sex with 
her? 
Maria - I wouldn't say anything ... I think that it's normal ... 
Suzana - Normal? 
Teresa - Not normal but ... 
Suzana - This is not normal ... 
Marta - I don't think so .. . 
Suzana - [. . .} Ah no ... this is vulgarity ... I think this is horrible ... do you 
think I would be able to ask somebody to have sex with me? What's that? 
In which world are we"? 
Being a 'girl' in a sexual encounter means to take up a 'non-boy' position, which apart 
from accepting lack of power implies having different concerns. 
"Claudia - Boys are worried [about diseases] but ... at that time [during the 
sexual encounter] they don't care ... the girl is more careful... the girl is 
worried about getting pregnant and catching a disease '" then it's her that 
uses [precautions}. .. ". 
"Teresa - Boys are worried about the same things that girls are but their 
major concern is with their performance ... girls don't worry so much about 
performance like boys do ... they have other things to be worried about". 
"Marta - I think that [boys are worried about] many things, about 
extending their fame, their experience. They are worried about pregnancy 
like girls ... well, not so much I think ... but also about what the girls are 
going to think about their sexual performance". 
"Claudia - Boys don't think about pregnancy and diseases like girls do ... I 
think that what they most fear is the possibility of not getting it up ... ". 
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In considering boys as capable of embarking on sexual encounters to improve their 
sexual experience or to prove their sexual potential, the girls become obviously 
concerned about the possibility of being sexually (ab)'used' and disposable. 
"Fatima - Sometimes the girl's concern is that she will be rejected by the 
boy after [the sexual relationship }. . .[. . .] 
Dora - But why? I don't understand this fear ... why after sex there may be 
that rejection? 
Katia - Ah ... it may well be that he wants her only for having sex ... she has 
this fear ... [. . .] 
Suzana - It's because the girl is more worried about if he really likes 
her ... if he is doing that because he likes her [or if it's] because of his 
development, you know [. . .] 
Marta - And also if he is going to reject her after [them having sex}. .. if he 
wants her only because of sex and then will look for another girl ... It 
happens [. . .] ... the guy is with the girl for a long time and after having sex 
with her all that love ends ... ". 
The awareness of the problem of women's autonomy m sexual encounters gams 
relevance when the issue in question is the riskiness of sex. It is a type of knowledge 
that may undermine the fundamental characteristic of the 'self that the girls want to 
be. This characteristic is one that implies self-mastery in matters of personal protection 
against sexual risks. 
"Dora - Are girls worried about catching diseases when having sex? 
[. . .] Ines - It depends ... they are worried, but sometimes [. . .] he is pushing 
her and ... then the girls do it without taking precautions ... ". 
"Dora - Are you sure that you 'U be able to protect yourself against the 
risks of sex? 
Fatima - 0 course I am .. .! mean, I intend to do so ... while I could say no ... I 
mean, I intend to resist and I hope he will understand and will be able to 
wait until I'm prepared. 
Maria - As far as I know many girls say the same and got pregnant 
because he didn't want to use the condom and they didn't want to upset 
him ... ". 
"Vera - [. .. J we can't say I won't have sex with you but you also can't have 
sex with anybody else ... it's not like that ... ". 
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It does not seem to be difficult to repeat the main messages of current discourses of 
risk, like those concerning the mastery of the 'self. What is clearly difficult is to 
accommodate new discourses, like that of risk, with traditional ones, like those of 
gender and sexuality. In the quotations shown above, the conflicting messages of risk 
and gender discourses are evident. Power is at the core of their incompatibilities. The 
girls identify the power imbalance of heterosexual relations as an obstacle to the 
practice of self-governance. Male power may spoil the realization of the reflexive 
project of their 'sexed self (Probyn 1993) towards autonomy and ability of self-
protection against the risks of sex. But there are other messages available, which are 
not always congruent with previous experiences and/or knowledge. 
Are girls/women really able to take control of her sexual life, as risk prevention 
campaigns seem to suggest, when for example, they say, "living without AIDS depends 
only on you,,?38 Or are they powerless subjects who give up their desires, for example 
of protecting themselves against the risks of sex, only because 'he' is the man and "is 
pushing her" or because they "didn't want to upset him"? For the girls who have 
already experienced sex the answers may be derived from personal experiences. Those 
experiences mayor may not confirm previous information about women's agency in 
sexual encounters. For those who are still waiting for the 'right man' and the 'right 
38 This was the slogan of a recent campaign of the Ministry of Health, which was launched by the 
beginning of 1999 and whose aim was "to stimulate the individual responsibility for the combat of the 
disease and inform the population about the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases."- Correio do 
Povo-5/2/99 
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moment' the answers may come from others' sexual experiences and from the general 
information they come across. There is no single answer to those questions, or a simple 
logic to be followed. Experiences may be conflicting as well as the interpretations they 
entail. As the girls kept repeating to me, in a glimpse of the multiple realities they have 
dealt with and the consequent multiple positionings they have taken up, "it depends". 
To make decisions is naively seen by the girls as a way of being in control of their own 
lives. This is not, however, a representation of autonomy that is only part of the girls' 
world. As pointed out earlier, for health promoters, too, the promotion of choice is 
taken as a way of promoting agency (see section on page 19). As emphasized by the 
sociological literature on 'health' and 'risk' (see Chapter 2) individuals are encouraged 
to believe that by knowing the risks and making their own judgments and choices 
about them, they are conducting their private lives according to their will. In the girls' 
and health promotion's imagination, the capacity of the 'self to control its own life 
also means the ability to control the risks. But, as we all know now, our social 
environment is permanently risky. It is thus a fantasy to believe in risk-free decisions. 
In spite of the problems with the imaginary woman's agency in the scientific 
discourses of risk, it is not hard to understand why the subject's positions that are 
available within it are of great appeal to the girls. Autonomy, independence, freedom 
are nowadays all social and personal imperatives. The insistence of health promotion 
mass campaigns on everyone's power to choose and implement 'safe sex' has turned 
women's sexual autonomy into a taken-for-granted condition. This has created the 
illusion that this is a common feature of women's sexual life (Browne and Minichiello 
1994). While at an individual level this condition can be contested, at a collective level 
this is more difficult, for it may mean singularity andlor deviation from the category of 
'women', which has already been 'identified' by others as agentic in sexual encounters. 
The following conversation captures the conflicts between the positions of 
girls/women within others' risk discourses and those that arise from lived experience. 
"Teresa - If it 's difficult to talk (with a boyfriend) about it (the use of a 
condom), imagine how difficult it is to use it, it's even worse. 
Maria - But nowadays it's so common ... everyone talks about it ... to use a 
condom is now normal, that 'bogy man' doesn't exist anymore. 
Teresa - The thing is ... it's too common to use a condom nowadays ... ft 
seems that everything comes all together ... it 's difficult to say why do we 
still feel that it is a problem ... and we know that if we don't use it we put 
ourselves at risk ... ". 
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When contradictions between others' risk discourses and personal experiences emerge, 
the solution can be to take up a position in which the 'risk subject' becomes the self-
confessed origin of the problem. The knowledge that 'safe sex' has been advertised as 
an easy choice leads the girls to position their 'selves' as subjects who are, perhaps, 
different from the majority because strangely enough, unlike the others, they do not 
find condom use that easy. The assessment of the deviance of the 'self from the norm 
strengthens the norm itself. It also compromises the girls with the correcting of this 
deviance within the 'self (Crawford 1994). The gap between the supposed experiences 
of others and personal experiences produces anxieties. The girls express their 
difficulties in understanding why they have different experiences with condom use. 
"It's difficult to talk about it", "it's difficult to use it", but "everyone talks about it" 
and "it's too common to use a condom "; so, "why do we still feel that it is a problem" 
in spite of knowing "that ifwe don't use it we put ourselves at risk"? The continuation 
of the conversation suggests that the girls' problem is not so much that they do not 
know why others' theories do not match with their experiential knowledge. The 
problem seems to be that the former constitutes the reference against which personal 
judgments about the 'correctness' of the latter are made. 
"Teresa - Yeah, everything seems to come together, it's like a package ... 
Maria - Yeah, [. . .} 
Fatima - You buy the product (sex) and it comes with a condom ... 
Teresa - Yeah, but it's not easy to use everything that comes in this 
package [laughs}. Maybe for most of them (the girls) it is, but not for 
everybody ... there are some who are different from those who want to use 
condoms and actually use it ... that's why some of us take risks, it's because 
sometimes we are not as good at these things or are different ... ". 
The commonest message that is nowadays addressed to adolescents is that sex is (or 
should be) inextricably attached to risk/safety. This makes sex look like a "a 
package", a set of combined meanings and rules concerning sex and safety that cannot 
be divided up. The term 'package' is well known in Brazil as a metaphor that 
represents a common political strategy of the Brazilian government. This involves the 
setting up of a combination of 'new' rules or laws, especially economic ones, that are, 
overnight, imposed on the population and are to be implemented all together. Teresa's 
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discourse suggests that girls like her, who are in danger of not committing or cannot 
commit their 'selves' to "a package" which links 'sex' to 'safety', may have a 'bad 
essence', one that is different from the mainstream. In such a discourse the 'self is 
identified as a 'risk subject', as opposed to the 'safe subjects' who are assumed to be 
"so good at these things" as the majority. The evaluation made by Teresa seems to be 
underpinned by a moral commitment to the care of the self, which she takes as held by 
everyone, including herself. The view that the girls who do not find it easy to "use 
everything that comes in this package" - sex and safety - "are not as good" implies a 
value judgment. One might suppose that for Teresa, who seems to believe that she, 
along with others, may not be a good caretaker of herself, the next step is to invest in 
the improvement or perfecting of the 'self (Foucault 1984). The ideal 'self she will 
seek to be will have many faces each produced in a combination of discourses that are 
made available to her in each context where she has to make her 'self present. I am 
talking about multiple discourses, contexts and 'selves'. In spite of that, I maintain that 
among such a variety of compositions there were some discourses, contexts and 
'selves', like the self-governed and careful self, that were made more visible to me 
during the course of the focus group sessions. 
The positionings taken up during the whole process of data collection and the 'selves' 
produced during the course of the research were not fixed. The creation of a diversity 
of discourses and subjectivities did not mean, however, that the 'selves' made during 
the focus group sessions were simply invented by the girls themselves, nor that 
alternative identities were already there just waiting to being taken up. If we assume 
that the girls' 'selves' were not embodied in anyone moment or place but could appear 
at certain intersections (Rose 1998), we can perhaps say that the focus group sessions 
provided a discursive environment in which certain subject's positions (and not others) 
were made available to them. That is, there were certain discourses intrinsically and 
explicitly related to the research, like discourses on risk, AIDS and sexuality, which 
were already constitutive of the discursive background of the group discussions. The 
girls themselves, individually and collectively, also brought other discourses into the 
discussions. So the discursive elements - the words and the practices that were meant 
to be the translation of reality - that the girls used to speak themselves into existence in 
our meetings were already there. By making a number of combinations and 
reinterpretations of those elements the girls were able to (re )produce multiple 
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discourses (sometimes contradictory, sometimes congruent) in which multiple readings 
of their 'selves' were made possible (Davies 1991). 
The data analysis shows that one of the main routes of the construction of multiple 
readings of the 'self is self-inspection. Through self-inspection personalized 
discourses of risky/safe sex are created and discursive positionings made available to 
the 'self. The exercise of self-inspection guides the "reflexive project of the self' 
(Giddens 1996, p.). It connects elements of the outside world - the social order - with 
those of the inside - subjectivity -, providing answers for existential questions such as 
'who am I?' and 'who do I want to be?'. The outside world (at least with regard to 
Brazil) is governed by a neo-liberal regime, in which optional 'ways of being' are 
created and presented to individuals as goods to be consumed (see page 147). In such a 
world, as Rose (1989) stresses, "individuals are to become [ ... ] entrepreneurs of 
themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make among the forms of 
life available to them" (p.230). 'Ways of being' and their correspondent forms of 
conduct, then, are not imposed by any coercive force. As Rose (1989) points out, 
"forms of conduct are governed through a personal labor to assemble a way of life 
within the sphere of consumption and to incorporate a set of values from among the 
alternative moral codes disseminated in the world of signs and images" (pp. 230-231). 
The 'risk subjects' - risky/safe selves - produced through taking up positions within 
discourses on sexual risks are made in reference to the 'sexual selves' the girls want to 
become. Who they want to be in the risky/safe situations of sexual encounters 
embodies the individual characteristics chosen as personal ideals among an array of 
options. Self-inspection is a mechanism of discovery of personal desires. It is the 
starting point of an individual elaboration ofthe 'self. To be spoken into existence as a 
'risk subject' within discourses on sexual risks implies identifying the 'self either as a 
risky or safe 'sexual subject'. It makes possible the attachment of self-referential 
meanings to 'risk' and 'safety', which are some of the most important commodities of 
contemporary life. As Rose (1989) argues, "consumption requires each individual to 
choose from among a variety of products in response to a repertoire of wants that may 
be shaped and legitimated by advertising and promotion but must be experienced and 
justified as personal desires" (p.231). 
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The 'sexual self that the girls want to be is influenced by the knowledge they have 
about what it means to be 'feminine' in sexual encounters. To come to know what it is 
to be feminine implies learning a number of lessons. Nowadays, at least in the context 
of sexuality, one the most common lessons to be learned by 'feminine' girls is that, 
from the point of view of the practice of heterosexual sex, this is a risky identity. 
Ironically, it seems that it is the discourses of those who are supposed to promote 
adolescents' sexual risk protection that produce the discursive positioning through 
which the girls transform their 'sexual selves' into 'risk subjects'. Health and education 
professionals have a fundamental role in the production and communication of such 
discourses. 
Marta's story tells us about the health professionals' power in constructing the image 
of girls as 'risk subjects' in sexual encounters. It also illustrates the closeness of the 
girls' investment in self-governance concerning sexual protection and the project of 
health professionals. 
"Marta - One of those days 1 went to the health center ... it 's because 1 have 
anemia ... and my boyfriend went with me ... then the nurse ... there are two 
pregnant adolescents that always go there ... then, when 1 was leaving the 
nurse saw me and she called me - Marta - she said - Marta, come back 
here ... she took a bag full of condoms and gave it to me in the middle of the 
room ... everyone looked at me, my boyfriend looked at me .. .I looked at her 
and she said - even if you are not doing it yet take it with you and protect 
yourself because you can see what might happen to you, can't you? if you 
want the pill come here. And 1 took the bag full of condoms to my place ... 1 
was so embarrassed .. .[laughs}". 
To be publicly recognized as a 'risk subject' is embarrassing. Risk-taking is morally 
wrong. It goes against the ideal of self-preservation and the duty to be well (Greco 
1993). In addition to that, to be considered as a 'risk subject' on sexual matters may 
spoil the girls' public reputation with respect to feminine attributes. Firstly, it may 
contradict the ideal of 'well-behaved girls' (those who are responsible, careful and 
behave according to the norms) as opposed to 'badly-behaved boys' and secondly, it 
means that somebody suspects that they might be sexually active. 
Ines has another story to tell. This time the embarrassment comes from her teacher's 
assumption about girls' carelessness and the resulting identification of her 'self as a 
potential 'risk subject' in sexual encounters. 
"Ines- A teacher of ours has always said that we've got to be careful and 
I've always agreed with her. But that time it was too much ... Do you know 
what she did? She said to me: 'Ines, I know that sometimes it's difficult for 
the girls to keep their minds when they are with they boyfriends .. .1 mean, 
to say no, without a condom no deal ... Girls are not always careful with 
these things ... If I were you I would make sure that I always have a condom 
in my handbag' ... at that moment my wish was to disappear because she 
said that in front of my classmates ... how can she know if I am or am not 
doing it already? Only because she saw me with my boyfriend in the 
supermarket the day before"? 
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The surveillance function of discourses on risk (Castel 1991; Crawford 1994; Douglas 
1990; Giddens 1996; Lupton 1993) seems to be a marked presence in the girls' daily 
life, particularly in relation to the boundaries between health and sickness encapsulated 
by the notion of risky/safe sex. Girls are considered as 'risk subjects' before their 
exposure to sexual risks occur and/or are confirmed. In fact, in this case there seems to 
be no need for personalized evidence. As Castel (1991) suggests, publicly recognized 
'risk subjects' are constructed on the grounds of general conjectures derived from the 
health professions' milieu. The public representation of girls as 'sexual risk subjects' 
follows the contemporary tendency of health professionals to label and group 
individuals into categories of human beings who are supposed to share a specific 
'essence', in this case a 'risky essence' (Castel 1991; Yen 1995).39 
Crawford (1994) comments on the effect of the health promotion's creation of this 
modem notion of 'self' as the subject of risk: 
"in contemporary health promotion discourse, the healthy self is portrayed 
as a composite of risk - behaviours, 'life events', and a host of other stress 
factors. The new health consciousness is, on a practical level, a response in 
part to this risk awareness. The healthy individual has, in a sense, been 
converted into a person who is potentially sick, even well on the way to 
becoming sick" (p.1357, author's emphasis). 
To health risk experts, the category of girls have already proved to be constituted by 
'risk subjects' (as they are getting pregnant, contracting sexually transmitted diseases 
and AIDS)4o. Once communicated to the population, this type of discourse, which is 
based on experts' knowledge, becomes one of a public domain; it sets boundaries for 
its subjects. To be publicly identified as a 'risk subject' of sexual encounters it seems 
39 For a discussion on this matter see page 57. 
40 See pages 12-13 for a discussion about the presence of adolescent women in discourses on AIDS risk. 
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to be enough to display certain characteristics (scientifically known as risk factors). To 
look like a girl seems to be one of them. This suggests that the girls are the targets of 
what Castel calls modem systems of administration, where individuals have been 
transformed into subjects of prediction and prevention (Castel 1991). 
As it has been argued, these mechanisms of government inculcate upon the 'self' the 
responsibility for its own surveillance (Greco 1993; Nettleton 1997; Ogden 1995; 
Petersen and Lupton 1996; Petersen 1996; Rose 1989). As Nettleton (1997) argues, in 
this self-surveillance exercise new identities are formed', 'selves' that are recognized 
as 'risky selves' (see page 64). This is not to say, however, that the official discourses 
pronounced by health care and education workers (like the nurse and the teacher who 
appear in Marta's and Ines's talk) have the power to determine girls' subjectivities. In 
my view, the 'creators' of 'selves' are the girls themselves but the creation processes in 
which the 'selves' are produced are informed by a number of dominant discourses that 
present the alternative positions for these 'selves'. In Probyn's words, "the self is [ ... J 
never transcendent of its discursive reality ... ", that is, it is "[ ... J formed in the material 
limits of its discursive context" (Probyn 1993, p.167). From a poststructuralist 
perspective, the importance of this discursive context is not so much that they offer 
positioning alternatives but that they show which ones are desirable or possible to take 
(Jones 1993). A conclusion to be drawn from this is that, when the girls speak of their 
'selves' as 'sexual risk subj ects' , " ... they are taking as their own the discourses through 
which they are shaped" (Davies and Banks 1992, p.3). 
Before finishing this section I would like to present some examples of the girls' 
identification of others as 'risk subjects'. As I mentioned before, the discursive 
production of 'risk subjects' is not constrained to an exercise of self-inspection; the 
'other' is also scrutinized. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the links between 
subjectivities and risky/safe sex meanings, that is, it is the 'self' as a 'risk subject' that 
is my main interest here. Nevertheless, I consider it worthwhile to have a brief look at 
the girls' identification of others as 'risk subjects'. 
In the girls' talk, the 'other', identified as a 'risk subject', represents someone who is 
very close to the 'self', usually a female friend or relative. The importance of the 
scrutiny of female 'others" risky/safe positions in sexual encounters is that it can also 
be a means to assess personal risks. The 'other' in question shares with the 'self' the 
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same gender identity and is a known figure. What can be thought of the 'other' can be 
also applicable to the 'self. Because the 'other' is known, it is possible to evaluate 
what she has in common with the 'self. As a result, the similarities and differences 
between the risk positions of the 'self and 'other' can be established. In any case, the 
evaluation of the position of the 'self with regard to the assessed risk is 
simultaneously undertaken with that of the 'other', either via a sort of identification to, 
or differentiation from, this 'other'. 
An important finding related to the girls' identification of others as 'risk subjects' is 
that they are usually recognized as women, like the 'self. In the data analysis I found 
very few examples of men being positioned as the subjects of sexual risks. The 
quotations shown below exemplify how other girls/women whom I talked to position 
other girls as 'risk subjects'. 
"Maria - I think that the girl doesn't think so much [about AIDS than of 
pregnancy] also because she thinks that she knows the guy ... ". 
"Suzana - 99% are like that ... they [girls] have sex [without precautions] 
because they like them [boys] .. . 
Teresa - Not because they [girls]like .. .{but] because they got emotional 
and don't care about anything else ... ". 
"Maria - We've got to protect ourselves. It doesn't matter if it's a boy or a 
girl". 
In the next group of quotations the examples are about the way male 'risk subjects' 
appeared in the girls' talk about risky/safe sex. 
"Vera - [. . .] The [. . .] only thing he can catch is a disease ... he is not going 
to get pregnant ... ". 
"Claudia- The boys are worried [about diseases] but ... at that time [during 
the sexual relationship] they don't care ... [. . .]". 
"Dora - Do boys face the same dangers as girls [in sexual encounters]? 
Fatima- Yes, depending on the girl ... ". 
Why would it be that 'sexual risk subjects' were usually identified as women? I would 
suggest that this had to do with the subjective character of girls' definitions of 
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risky/safe sex, that is, the 'self was unavoidably involved with the risk in question. So, 
in the 'we' and 'they' the'!' included was explicitly identified as feminine. I would 
suggest that the girls' desire to be in charge of the risk situations of sexual encounters 
ended up by restricting the position of 'subjects' in their discourses of risk to female 
characters. Could this be considered a discursive strategy to underscore the point about 
female agency and self-governance in sexual encounters? Maybe it was. 
To look at the surface of the girls' talk reveals some of the discourses that shape them 
as 'sexual risk subjects'. This allows us to discover some of the lenses through which 
they make a personal sense of risk and safety when it comes to sex. Obviously, the 
discovery ofthe discourses that are behind the subject positionings that make the 'self 
a 'sexual risk subject' cannot be completed as the 'risk subject', a form of subjectivity, 
is itself an ongoing construction. Nevertheless, the data analysis undertaken shows that 
there are some discourses whose importance in the positioning of the 'self as a 'sexual 
risk subject' is more evident than others. Self-governance and gender, of which I have 
talked so far, are two of them. In the next section I will explore a bit further the girls' 
investment in self-governance. This time my focus will be the discursive production of 
'risk objects' or the source of sexual risks, which results from the girls' interest in the 
'knowledge of the other'. In the way I read the data, the 'knowledge of the other' and 
'the care of the self constitute the two main story-lines upon which the girls 
discursively 'invent' themselves as 'self-governed' girls. 
Personalizing Risky/Safe Sex (Part B): The Production of 'Risk Objects' and 
'Knowers of the Other' 
"Dora - What could possibly help you to come to the conclusion that a 
sexual relationship is risky or not? 
Teresa - I think that the partner ... 
Dora - In what sense? 
Teresa - Ah .. . like ... if he is truthful, if you know the environment he lives, 
the persons with whom he is associated, the methods he is used to use 
{ . .} ... 
Maria - If one thinks ... every relationship is risky .. .[. . .} if you don't take 
care of yourself every relationship is going to be risky ... 
Marta - Ah ... I think that it is risky because in general when the girl start a 
relationship she doesn't know him ... there are cases in which you know 
but sometimes the girl knows him in one day and starts a 
relationship ... you don't know from where he came from, how he acts, 
thinks, how he protects himself. .. so she has to know him first ... 
Maria - Or with whom he had been ... 
Dora - Ok ... but even if you know him can you guess about it? 
Marta - No ... it's like I've already said, 'quem ve cara nao ve AIDS "'.41 
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In my analysis, the production of 'risk objects' is the outcome of a process in which the 
'significant male other' (the probable male partner of the proposed heterosexual sex 
scene) is in the limelight. He is the target of a sort of biographical investigation that is 
to be carried out by the girl with the aim of assessing his risk potentials. This 
investigation is focused on the 'knowledge of the other', which will establish if a given 
sexual encounter is risky or safe. I take the production of the 'risk object' - the 'other' 
who is under scrutiny -, and of the 'knower of this 'other" - the one who is to proceed 
with the investigation, as the girls' response to the need for taking personal action in 
the management of sexual risks. To me this is a direct result of the emphasis on self-
41 In English this would be "don't judge AIDS by its cover". It is a slogan of a Brazilian AIDS 
prevention campaign that comes from a Brazilian popular proverb and has a similar meaning to the 
English proverb' don't judge a book by its cover' . 
192 
control and self-governance that has dominated the individualistic discourses of health 
promoters in the field of sexual risk prevention (see section on page 65). 
As some have argued, while biomedicine can, in general terms, provide 
(epidemiological) information for the assessment of the risk of HIV infection in sexual 
relationships, it can offer little help with regard to the evaluation of the risks attached 
to specific sexual partners (Scott and Freeman 1995). For people embarking on sexual 
encounters it is then a necessity to get expertise on sexual risk assessment. And the 
main strategy to develop this expertise is to build up a sort of "informational basis of 
risk assessment" upon which the 'self acquires knowledge about the 'sexual 
biography' of a sexual partner (Scott and Freeman 1995, p.162). 
According to the data gathered, the production of 'risk objects' is not gender-exclusive 
as is that of 'risk subjects'. 'Risk objects' may either represent female or male 
characters. However, 'risk objects' never include the female 'self. The source of risk 
is always the 'other'. For instance, the sexual risks to which boys are exposed may 
depend on their female partners: 
"Dora - Do boys face the same dangers as girls [in sexual encounters]? 
Fatima - Yes, depending on the girl...". 
In another example, the risks brought by sexual encounters to girls' reputations appear 
attached to those who value virginity. The conversation suggests that in this case, 
"everyone", no matter the gender, is a potential threat. 
"Suzana - 1 think that women run more risks [in romantic relationships] 
than men .. .[. . .] in every thing ... even in relation to sex. In the end there is 
always [. . .] a kind of prejudice .. .[. . .] ah, she's already had sex ... it 's 
always like that ... 
Katia - Yeah ... so young .. .[. . .] 
Fatima - Because even with the evolution of this thing of [girl's] virginity 
and sex in romantic relationships, there's always been a little of 
[prejudice] ... 
Suzana - Everyone values it [virginityj. . .[. . .] Everyone prizes it ... ". 
The tendency to see the 'other' as the source of risk has been pointed out as a common 
feature of lay and professional thinking in the context of AIDS epidemics (Crawford 
1994; Frankenberg 1992). Although the girls' conceptions of sexual risks are not 
limited to diseases, but also include pregnancy and emotional and moral harm, AIDS is 
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one of the most frequently mentioned threats in their talk of risky/safe sex. It is the 
contemporary proliferation of discourses on HIV/AIDS, I think, that is mainly 
responsible for making the notion of 'risk' such a marked factor in the girls' daily life, 
particularly when it comes to sexual issues. 
It may well be that the girls' ways of seeing HIV / AIDS risk influence the ways they see 
sexual risks in general. If that is the case, we can perhaps apply here what Crawford 
(1994) says about the "identity work - protecting or reformulating self boundaries, 
reinforcing images and reimagining the other" (p.1348) - resulted from our need to 
assure our healthy state against infectious diseases like AIDS. Crawford's argument is 
that the modem and valued notion of health and the healthy being, who embodies what 
it means to be a good person, has generated an intense elaboration of the 'self 
(Crawford 1994). In contemporary societies, he argues, health has become a social and 
personal ideal that was incorporated into the 'self as a language of identity. In such 
contexts the body is assumed to be originally healthy. Those who are the recognized 
'unhealthy' bodies are believed to be the deviants from the norm of healthy beings. 
Disease is then seen as deviancy from the norm; diseased beings lose their original 
healthy state through deviancy within the 'self. Diseased bodies are also diseased 
identities. Health is a reward, disease is a penalty. 
As Crawford (1994) remarks, in the health promotion discourses, the 'healthy self is a 
composite of risks that have to be controlled within the 'self. Loss of control will 
result in 'unhealthy' behaviour and deviancy from the norm. Boundaries between the 
'healthy self and 'unhealthy others' are then created to protect the healthy identity of 
the 'self. "The other just becomes the person who, unlike self, does not properly 
manage risks once they (the risk and the person) are identified" (Crawford 1994, 
p.1357). In the context of AIDS the immorality of the disease is reinforced. The sick 
person is suffering the consequences of hislher risky behaviour. Unlike me, he/she did 
not behave well. 
I would like to suggest that the categorical labeling of AIDS as a disease of deviant 
persons is quite influential in the girls' tendency to personalize the risks and safety of 
sexual encounters, even when AIDS is not the risk considered. I suspect that it is so 
influential because the discourses on AIDS and the notion of risk that they encapsulate 
have been massively targeting adolescents, above all in the terrain of sexual 
194 
transmission. It is my impression that although 'risk' appears in all sorts of discourses, 
it is via discourses that are focused on the risks of the sexual transmission of 
HIV / AIDS that the girls become more familiarized with the notion of risk. If this is 
true, there may be two reasons for that. First, sexual experiences are highly important 
for the girls, sex is constantly on their agenda. So everything that has to do with sex 
becomes equally relevant. Second, discourses on AIDS risk contain a conception of 
prevention that points out the route for the production of the 'self as a competent 
manager of personal life, which is congruent with the ideal of self-governance 
emphasized by neo-liberal regimes like those of contemporary Brazil. 
I come back now to the point about who is identified in the girls' talk as the source of 
risk. While the identity of 'risk objects' can vary, ranging from girls to society as a 
whole, it is boyfriends (or boys/men with whom girls/women are romantically 
involved) who are most commonly identified as the source of sexual risks. So, in this 
case, the 'risk object' has his gender specified; he is definitely a man. 
"Dora - Do girls run the risk of being seen as easy (when they sleep with 
their boyfriends)? 
All of them answer at the same time - Yeah. 
Claudia -It depends ... if the boyfriend is a 'dog '42, yes ... 
Ines - Yeah ... there are some who comment on it with everybody". 
"Dora - Do girls run the risk of being seen as easy (when they sleep with 
their boyfriends)? 
Marta - Yes, sometimes, but it depends on the boyfriend ... 
Teresa -lfhe really loves her he is not gonna do that ... ". 
I have chosen to illustrate the girls' tendency to represent 'risk objects' as boyfriends, 
two examples that are not related to what are conventionally regarded as sexual risks, 
like sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy (which are more commonly 
emphasized as risks to girls' health). My intention here is to highlight that the risk 
portfolio attached to sex is broader than many would think43 (see Fig. 2). 
42 To be a 'dog' means to be a despicable person or someone who cannot be trusted. 
43 See my interpretation of this notion of 'risk portfolio' on pages 131 and 157-158. 
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Figure 2 - The Girls' Perceptions of Sexual Risks According to the Harms They Can Cause 
TYPES OF RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH EXAMPLES OF THE HARMS THAT 
HETEROSEXUAL THESE RISKS CAN CAUSE 
SEX 
~ to be deluded, to be betrayed, to lose her boyfriend after 
Emotional 
- the first sexual relationship 
Sexual Risks ~ to be forced to quit school in case of pregnancy, to be 
abandoned by her boyfriend in case of pregnancy, to 
~ assume responsibility for the baby alone, to disclose her Moral sexual activity, to be a one night stand only, to get 
Sexual Risks 
- "--1 to be seen as easy, to not know how to make love 
~ to not give pleasure to the sexual partner, to not have 
PhysicallHealth- ~ personal pleasure Related 
Sexual Risks to get pregnant, to contract AIDS and other diseases 
In the conversations quoted above, the risk considered is the girl's loss of reputation, 
which would be the result of her boyfriend's betrayal. A research finding illustrated by 
those two examples is that not every boyfriend is recognizable as a 'risk object'. In the 
cases above only those who are a "dog" or do not really love their girlfriends are 
potential threats. To be a 'risk object' means to have a particular identity. 'Who' is the 
'significant male other' is then a key question that will have to be repeated again and 
again each time the risks of sex are to be assessed, for everything "depends", that is, 
everything is contingent. 
According to the girls, the identity of the man with whom a woman sleeps is directly 
related to the dangers that this woman will possibly face in her sexual encounters with 
him. The boundaries between risky and safe sex are, then, to be defined in relation to 
what the woman knows about the 'significant male other'. 
"Claudia - [Safe sex] is to protect yourself and to know with whom you are, 
isn't it? To know ifhe doesn't have any dangerous disease ... ". 
"Ines - [Safe sex] is to know that after having sex with him he won't kick 
your arse ... ". 
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The importance given to "to know with whom you are" for the categorization of sexual 
relationships into risky and safe and obviously for the identification of 'risk objects' 
implies that to get to know the 'other' is crucial for the assessment of sexual risks. The 
quotations shown above suggest that the process of knowing the 'other' is focused on 
the identification of specific attributes of this 'other', to which some value is ascribed. 
In practical terms, "to know with whom you are" relies on searching and finding out 
'signs' ofthe attributes that in the end will make the difference between the 'risk-man' 
and the 'safe' one. This procedure is a complex one, for 'signs' are symbolic 
constructs. 
To discover 'who is he?' in the assessment of the riskiness/safety of a sexual encounter 
means to go through a reflexive journey that will first find personal signifiers for 
risk/safety and then utilize the resulting image of risk/safety to check its identification 
with, or distinction from, the 'other'. For example, in the quotations above the 
assessment of the riskiness/safety of having sex with the 'other' is based on the 'signs' 
that he does not "have any dangerous disease" and that he will not "kick your arse". 
In another conversation, "the way the person reacts" and "the way he treats you" are 
suggested as 'signs' of the 'significant male other's' faithfulness and sincerity. Each of 
those 'signs' seems to be read as symbols of safety. 
The 'other"s state of health, is another attribute that seems to be important to assess. 
Claudia's and Suzana's comments illustrate how the 'signs' concerning personal 
appearance can help to assess whether the 'significant male other' is a 'risk object' or 
not. 
"Claudia - Ah ... he can't be slim like .. .[. . .} he can't be very slim ... if he is 
with something like coughing, the way he is ... I don't know [. . .} ". 
"Suzana - If he is pale or too slim then I think this is a sign that he is not 
fine ... or that he is not healthy ... he may be hiding something, you know ... ". 
"To know with whom you are" is based on subjective evaluations. The dependence on 
subjective criteria reveals the fragile accuracy of the girls' sexual risk assessment 
(which the girls seem to be aware of). The sincerity of the 'significant male other', for 
example, is an attribute that is completely up to the judgment of the 'self. 'Sincerity' 
is a relational concept. It is not something that can be measured or concretely 
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visualized. To be sincere is also an attribute that is time- and space-contingent. 
Somebody can be sincere now and here and be false tomorrow and anywhere else. 
Given that it is a moral attribute, 'sincerity' can imply various meanings, depending on 
the values ascribed to it. The next quotation shows the level of subjectivity inherent in 
the assessment of sincerity and the primary reliance of sexual risk assessment on the 
ability of the 'self to evaluate the risks. It also indicates that the evaluation of the risks 
depends partially on the 'assessed other', or better, on his willingness to show his 'true 
self. 
"Dora - How are you going to know that [he is sincere}? 
Ines - .. .[Ij) he tells me everything he knows [. . .} 
Julia - No ... there are persons who know how to tell a perfect lie. 
Ines - Ah ... being with him for a long time ... he is going to tell me the 
truth ... ". 
The data analysis suggests that the importance given by the girls to 'the knowledge of 
the other' is associated with the need to trust this 'other' before having sex with him. 
To know the 'other' is a 'sine qua non' condition for building up trust. 
"Fatima - If you know your boyfriend well you, at least in theory ... you do 
not think that you run the risk of being abandoned after your first sexual 
relationship ... ". 
"Maria - [. . .} A girl usually tries to know very well a boy before sleeping 
with him ... I think that girls do not feel safe if they do not trust their 
boyfriends ... ". 
"Claudia - If a boyfriend is faithful and the girl trusts him, then AIDS and 
'other' diseases do not cross her mind when she has sex with him ... ". 
"Julia - I think that most of the girls plan to wait until they know a boy 
very well before they can even think about sex ... at least the girls I know, 
and I agree with them [. . .} because if you don't know the person, you 
know, how can you trust him to the point of sleeping with him? It would be 
risky, wouldn't it"? 
Trust receives the highest value in the value hierarchy upon which the possible risks of 
a given sexual encounter are evaluated. For the girls, trust 'shall be' the synonym for 
safety. A faithful 'significant male other' 'cannot be' a source of risk. I will show later 
on that these assumptions are not used as absolute truths in the girls' discourses of 
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sexual risks. Trust appears to be an ever-revisable item in the girls' evaluations of the 
risks of sex. The employment of the criterion of 'trust' in the assessment of the risks of 
sexual encounters has the effect of individualizing 'safety'. That is, 'safety' becomes a 
sort of belonging, a mark in the identity of the faithful and truthful 'significant male 
other'. As a consequence it is also a mark in the identity of the 'self with whom this 
'other' will sleep. 
The safety line created around the 'self and its truthful male 'other' generates a sense 
of self-immunity, although this is not a strong sense of safety. It is the unknown male 
'other', the options not taken, that 'shall be' the 'risk object'; not the girl's choice: the 
well-known and truthful boyfriend. 
"Katia - ! never had a boyfriend but ! know from my friends' experiences 
that they trust their boyfriends ... at least this is what they say ... ! don't know 
but! think that after being with him for quite some time you start to know 
him and to recognize his qualities and problems ... you can say that he is 
like this or like that ... and if the girl decides to have sex with him ! think 
that it's because she trusts that he is different. 
Marta - Yeah, and if she thinks that he is different from others [. . .} it's 
because she trusts him ... 
Teresa - Of course, you would not choose someone that was not different 
from others ... first you feel that he is different and then you need to know if 
he really will not do the same things that others do to their girlfriends ... 
Marta - .. .It's rare to find a girl who has sex with someone she doesn't 
know well to the point of trusting him ... those who do that ... the girls who 
shag with strangers usually pay a price .. . 
Katia - Yeah ... they put themselves at risk ... ". 
While the development of trust constructs a protective barrier against the risks that are 
to be found outside the relationship between the 'self and the 'significant male other', 
the assessment of truthfulness, like of other attributes, is heavily dependent upon 
subjective judgments. The possibility of not being told 'everything' may undermine the 
assessment of sexual risks, for it partially relies on what the 'significant male other' 
tells to the 'self. However, there are mechanisms for making such evaluations look 
more objective and accurate. The focus then shifts from the 'significant male other' 
and his attributes to the relationship itself. The variable of time is then considered. 
The more time the girl spend with her 'significant male other' before having sex with 
him, the more chance there is of him telling her "everything he knows". In a lasting 
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relationship the girl might have time to know the 'other' and establish with him the 
intimacy and the sort of commitment that is considered as indispensable for making a 
sexual encounter safe. The problem is that it is not men's 'nature' to wait. 
"Claudia - I think that it's more difficult for boys [to have a long lasting 
relationship without sex than it is for girls] because they like more to have 
a relationship with sex ... they feel better I think ... The woman may also feel 
like that but she knows better how to hold on ... ". 
"Claudia - The man is more hasty isn't it? The man wants that the woman 
give, you know? ... ". 
"Vera - The role of the man is to put pressure on the woman for her 
having sex with him". 
When to lose virginity is, then, not always a decision taken on the basis of the projects 
of the 'self: 
"Tania - The girl cannot plan the day she is going to lose her 
virginity .. .[. . .} 
Claudia - It's a thing of the moment ... 
Tania - Like ... 1 think that- in that specific moment I am going to decide to 
have my first sexual relationship ... then the boyfriend is one of those who 
used to put pressure on you ... and in the end you give up before the time 
you had predicted ... ". 
It seems to be common-sense among the girls that "to know with whom you are" is 
important for the building up of trust and in the personal establishment of the 
boundaries between risky and safe sex. They also seem to think that the attributes that 
matter in the 'process of knowing' are variable. Personal values influence individual 
judgments about which knowledge to treat as relevant. For example, not everybody 
agrees about the importance of appearance: 
"Julia - For me appearance doesn't matter [. . .} I have to know him for 
quite some time .. .1 have to know about his whole life to know well how he 
is .. .[. . .} to know if he is a good person". 
In the case above, to be "a good person" matters more than 'good appearance'. This 
suggests that personal values are very important in the girls' identification of 'risk 
objects' and also that their definitions of what is risky and what is safe sex are 
necessarily subjective. To estimate if somebody is "a good person" depends on an 
evaluation that is informed by the moral code assumed by the individual who makes 
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the judgment. In Julia's case, the signs she could look for in her evaluation of the 
goodness of the 'other' could be those concerning honesty or moral correctness. 
"Dora - What is to be a good person? 
Julia - Ah ... not being a robber ... ". 
And also signs of good health, which would confirm the moral character of the' other' : 
"Julia - Also, you ought to know if he doesn't have any disease that I can 
catch ... I'm going to protect myself you know, but I don't know ... ". 
The reliance on personal judgments about the faithfulness and truthfulness of the 
'significant male other' in the assessment of sexual risks does not seem to mean that 
the girls are naive, which could perhaps be easily assumed by risk experts. The 
conversation shown below suggests that they are well aware that this is a risky way of 
assessing the dangers of sexual encounters. 
"Marta - I know that sometimes we can be terribly wrong ... we think that 
because we are in a stable relationship with our boyfriends they are going 
to be faithful and we can really trust them ... 
Fatima - It's always like that, the girl thinks that time implies love but ... 
Marta - Yeah ... to trust your ownfeelings can go terribly wrong ... we can be 
risking many things without knowing it ... 
Suzana - I think that's the case of a married woman. They think that their 
husbands are faithful but they are not ... ". 
Also, it does not seem to be the case that to rely on trust for the assessment of sexual 
risks is the result of a lack of knowledge or misunderstanding about the risks involved. 
"Maria - [. . .} It's not rare to see husbands sleeping with other women 
while their wives stay there waiting for them and trusting that they are just 
playing football with friends. That's why married women are catching 
AIDS ... you know, they don't protect themselves because they think that 
their husbands are faithful ... 
Fatima - Yeah ... and this can also happen to us ... ". 
"Ines - We know that men are not always faithful. We know that there are 
boyfriends who betray their girlfriends. You can catch AIDS ... 
Tania - Yeah, not only AIDS ... you know, he can say that you are the only 
woman in his life, but ... he can be sleeping with other girls and you think 
that he loves you but in reality he is laughing at you in your back ... 
Julia - I agree ... it's not only AIDS ... ifwe think of pregnancy for example, 
he says 'don't worry, if something goes wrong I will assume everything' 
and I know many girls who trust their boyfriends' words and ... 
Ines - [. . .} but I think this is not so important ... the worst of all is when a 
boy sleeps with a girl and tells her lots of beautiful words and repeats them 
to another woman and you trust that he is sleeping only with you and you 
can be risking your life ... ". 
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If it were neither because of naivety, nor of ignorance, then why would the girls 
consciously employ such an unsafe way of distinguishing risky from safe sex? I 
suggest that, in the same way of the emphasis on the 'care of the self, the importance 
given to the 'knowledge of the other' for the attachment of meanings to risky/safe sex 
is influenced by what the girls know about the society they live in. The girls' interest in 
taking 'safety' into their own hands may well be a response to the climate of 
individualism and emphasis on self-governance that permeates life in the 'risk society' 
(Beck 1992). 
In contemporary Western societies individuals' accountability for personal welfare is 
the motto (Rose 1989). In circumstances of modernity safety cannot be externally 
assured and the awareness of the risks is expected to be translated into the adoption of 
self-care measures. In the specific field of health, risks are not taken as external 
enemies, nor considered as a product of social interactions. Risks to health are seen as 
coming from the individual's presence or absence of self-control; the self is supposed 
to manage and master the drives that put the body at risk (Crawford 1994; Ogden 1995; 
Scott and Freeman 1995; Lupton 1995b). The 'self is the risk itself. Commenting on 
the specific case of the current phase of AIDS epidemic, Ogden remarks, "the HIV 
virus itself is no longer a risk to health: the individual's ability to control their sexual 
behaviour is now the risk" (1995, p.413). In such circumstances, the estimation of the 
potential riskiness or safety of personal actions, like embarking on sexual encounters, 
and also the consequences of right and wrong judgments have got to be assumed by the 
'self who has the moral obligation to be 'careful'. 
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The reliance on a personal identification of 'risk objects' is, as I have stated previously, 
part of the process in which risky/safe sex is personalized. In my view, to see 
risk/safety as belonging to a given person and to assume personal responsibility for 
finding out 'who is risk' and 'who is safety' in the realm of sex, is an attempt to reduce 
the uncertainties, hence the risks of sex (Thompson 1986). In spite of the efforts, 
however, doubts about the faithfulness of the 'significant male other' seem to be ever 
present in the girls' mind. As Thompson (1986) suggests, to get to know about a 
potential threat, like that represented by a 'sexual risk object' may reduce the risks, not 
eliminate them. Such a reduction is not achieved by changing the situation in question 
but the level of knowledge about it. The knowledge acquired can only make a 
difference in terms of an increase in the girls' ability to 'colonise' their future by 
making informed decisions concerning present actions. What are the risks of the 
present choices? Among those risks which ones are tolerable and which are not? The 
decisions are made on the grounds of what kind of future they seek to colonise for 
themselves (Giddens 1996), in the sense of who they want to become and what they 
want from their future life. 
"Marta - [. . .}This (the prevention of the risk of a boyfriend's betrayal) has 
no solution. 
Suzana - It's a question of destiny, I think ... or of luck. 
[. . .} Dora - Is it possible to protect oneself against the risk of betrayal? 
Marta and Suzana - No ... 
Katia - It depends because we might like a person who is not worth 
anything ... the most that we can do is to try ... 
Teresa - Ah ... I think that it is not so impossible ... 
Fatima - [. . .} We trust that person (boyfriend) and never expect to be 
betrayed ... 
[. . .} Katia - I think that you have to trust that he likes you because if he 
doesn't ... (. . .) ... if he stops liking you, he betrays you ... 
Maria - I don't know but this thing that if you love someone you don't 
betray, I don't know ... 
Teresa - Ah ... but I think that you can still find those who don't betray ... 
Katia - Me too ... They exist ... 
Teresa - Come on, there must be someone ... 
Maria - There are some who don't betray .. for example, Fatima has never 
betrayed her boyfriend, has she? 
Suzana - J don't know, everything depends ... you can't guarantee 
anything ... 
Katia - Yeah ... J think we can't ... ". 
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To be aware of the options and obliged to make choices have already been highlighted 
in this thesis as marks of modernity (see Chapter 2). If, on the one hand, this can be 
regarded as positive because it may represent one's ability to master one's own destiny, 
on the other, there is a price to pay. The awareness of the existence of options allied to 
the reflexive act of choosing inevitably generates insecurity. Did I take the right 
decision? Am I assessing the right risks? Will my decision have the expected 
outcomes? All these questions may come to people's minds when they take decisions 
with regard to risks. That seems to be the girls' case. Their emphasis on "to know with 
whom you are" as a form of developing trust in the 'other' and the ability of taking 
care of the 'self, does not appear to generate a sense of complete safety. Trust is 
something that seems to remain open to reconsideration. To trust the 'other' and to 
trust the self-competence to make right decisions apparently brings more uncertainties 
to the context of relationships. As the quotations below demonstrate, the dependency 
on knowledge (which can always be subjected to changes) makes the assessment of the 
risks of sexual relationships only "valid until further notice" (Giddens 1996, p.32). 
"Teresa - [. . .] J can say that J trust him ... but J don't know if J want to trust 
or if J really trust him ... J can't say that J don't have loads of 
doubts ... but ... ok, then J see how the things happen, then J forget it and 
think that it's rubbish ... but J always have a bit of suspicion". 
"Maria - J don't know but J think total trust doesn't exist ... One never 
knows completely the other .. . like affirming that he didn't or won't do 
that ... ". 
"Suzana - You've got to trust him with suspicion, haven't you? J think that 
in the end the man is not...[. . .] they don't put the same value as we do, you 
know? J think that even if it was my husband J wouldn't trust him. J 
wouldn 'tfeel safe ... ". 
"Ines - This thing of trust is complicated ... you never know ... each day is a 
surprise ... ". 
"Maria - [. . .] It's difficult to know if the person loves you so much that he 
is not going to do anything wrong ... maybe only knowing him very well and 
even so one can't know someone so well ... ". 
"Claudia - To trust that a man is telling you the truth is like a lottery, you 
cannot say that you know everything about him ... ". 
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The emphasis on trusting the 'other' as a prophylactic measure in the risky context of 
heterosexual sex was also found in other studies investigating feminine understandings 
of risk/safe sex. In Brazil, for example, Guimaraes (1996) found similar results in a 
study that aimed at investigating women's perceptions of AIDS risk. They interviewed 
women between twenty and forty years of age who were married or in steady 
relationships. Those women belonged to two groups - one of HIV positive and other of 
supposedly non-infected women. One of the most common justifications used by the 
supposed HIV negative women for not taking precautions against AIDS, mainly with 
respect condom use, was 'but I know him' and 'I trust him'. The author has called 
attention to the fact that justifications grounded on 'knowledge' and 'trust' are not 
restricted to this specific feminine population but are present in every social segment. 
My data suggests that this is a correct argument, at least as far as women of different 
ages are concerned. For Guimaraes, given its recurrence, 'knowing the other' is the 
most common method of prevention of AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases 
amongst the feminine population. According to my data, , knowing the other' is also a 
strategy of prevention of other sex-related risks, like the risk of disillusion and betrayal. 
This broader use of 'the knowledge of the other' as a prophylactic against the risks of 
sex are referred by Guimaraes' interviewees': 'I've never thought that he would do this 
to me' and 'he betrayed me'. These phrases expressed the disappointment of the HIV 
positive women when talking about their failed attempts at assessing sexual risks on 
the basis of the knowledge about the' other' . 
In a study with British young women, Holland et al (1991) have also found that 'trust 
the other' is part of feminine strategies to deal with sexual risks. According to Holland 
et aI, 'trust' was used by young women as a way of developing a sense of steadiness in 
their relationships. As the authors have argued, because steady relationships are 
ideologically constructed as monogamous and basically safe, trusting the 'other' can 
signify that the use of other precautions, like condoms for example, is not only 
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unnecessary but also indicates a lack of trust and, therefore, of love. According to the 
data analysis carried out by Holland et aI., condoms were only necessary in the context 
of casual sexual encounters. After the establishment of intimacy and a certain level of 
trust, the only precaution seen as necessary was the pill, which suggests that the only 
risk considered was the risk of pregnancy. 
It is worthwhile coming back for a moment to the idea that the girls' reliance on ((to 
know with whom you are" for the estimation of sexual risks is a reflexive way of 
seeing and constructing the 'self as a 'careful self. My point now is that the 
contribution of the emphasis on 'knowing the other' in the development of girls' 
subjectivities goes beyond that. As the conversation shown below suggests, being 
careful and responsible is perceived as typical of girls/women as opposed to boys/men 
who do not take sex, among other things, seriously. The girls' emphasis on the 
'knowledge ofthe other' in order to position the 'self within discourses of sexual risks 
as a 'careful self can then be interpreted as a means of gendering the 'self, which is 
carried out according to what is perceived as a 'normal' feminine behaviour. 
"Teresa - [. . .] Girls are always much more worried than boys about 
everything ... 
Dora - Do girls think more? 
Teresa - Girls almost burn their brains ... 
Fatima - Girls take it more seriously ... 
Maria - It's because they (boys) see the sexual act differently than girls 
[. . .] 
Dora - And how do boys see that? 
Maria - [. . .] For him to have sex is beautiful ... the girl has got to be kept 
for the person she likes [. . .] ... so for them [the boys] to shag is a thing 
more ... 
Fatima - ... Normal ... a normal thing ... 
Maria - Yeah ... it is part of .. the girl has all that taboo ... that thing, hasn't 
she? 
Teresa - ... That preparation ... 
Maria - ... To be ready ... 
Teresa - ... To find the right guy .. .[. . .]". 
What I am trying to say here is that the reliance on the 'knowledge ofthe other' for the 
development of a sense of security within relationships also results from the influence 
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of gender ideologies in the girls' ways of seeing and being. It is a sort of common-
sense (at least in terms of 'normalized practices') that the feminine participation in 
sexual relationships is to take place in the context of steady relationships. At least this 
is what it is expected from a 'naturally' responsible woman. 
To have sex with a known man symbolizes commitment between the 'significant male 
other' and the 'self; a commitment that is only possible after some time of emotional 
involvement and a sharing of biographical information. In Brazilian society women 
who have sex in casual relationships are still implicitly condemned. In my view, to 
seek to know the 'significant male other' before having sex with him provides a sense 
of security for at least three reasons. Firstly, it increases the ability to make informed 
decisions concerning present and future sexual encounters with this 'other'. Secondly, 
it makes the sexual encounters in which the 'self may be involved fit into social 
norms. And thirdly, it may be a protection against diseases. 
For girls it is safer to have sex with somebody they know, trust and love and to be seen 
as behaving like 'normal' women and also to show it to others (Holland et al1991). To 
behave according to expectations provides a means for the anticipation of others' 
reactions to personal behaviours. In contrast, it is risky to go against the norms. To 
have sex without commitment to the 'other' and to the relationship might mean sex for 
pleasure, something that remains a male privilege, or in the other extreme, a thing 
related to female prostitution. In the realm of female sexual activity there is still the 
feeling that it is safer to embark on sexual encounters for love, which can only happen 
in the context of steady and monogamous relationships. In a similar vein and on the 
basis of their study with young women in Britain, Holland et al (1991) write: "most 
young women are reluctant to describe themselves as having casual sex when the 
culturally approved objective is to be in a steady, preferably monogamous relationship, 
supported by the ideologies of romance and love"(p.18). 
Apart from agreeing about the influence of the culture of monogamy in the girls' 
emphasis on sex for love, I would argue that this is also to do with the fear discourses 
that circulate within the 'risk society'. It appears that for the girls to whom I talked, sex 
is unthinkable, unspeakable and undoable outside the context of romance. 
"Maria - I think that I couldn't have sex with a man without liking him". 
"Julia - ] don't plan anything ... ] don't know my future, but one thing] 
know, I'm not gonna have sex with any man [. . .j, only with someone 1 
like ... ". 
"Tania - ] think that [the woman} must not give herself to the first man 
[. . .j because it [sex} has to be done with somebody you like ... that you 
know also likes you ... ". 
"Ines - ] don't know yet but ] think that sex shall be good when the 
partners like each other ... ". 
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The quotes shown above suggest that romance is the social context of girls' sexual 
encounters. The girls' knowledge of romance gives them a fair idea about the available 
options in terms of men's and women's ways of being and behaving in romantic 
relationships, hence in sexual encounters. How to behave as a 'girl' and what to expect 
from boys in a love-based sexual encounter is then prescribed by the menu of options 
of 'ways of being' in a typical romantic relationship. 
"Ines - Girls are better behaved in relationships ... 
Claudia - Girls take it more seriously ... 
Dora - What's that to be well behaved? 
Claudia - ... only those who want to take the relationship seriously [are 
those who behave well} [. . .j ... the girls take it more seriously. The man 
doesn't ... if the man is supposed to go to the girl's place ... The girl doesn't, 
the girl thinks I've set up the appointment I've got to go, you know? ]t can 
be raining cats and dogs ... at least I'm like that ... If] set up something] will 
be there ... ". 
While the girls have no problem in affirming that to have sex for love is typical of 
girls, they suggest that in general this is not for boys. 
"Katia - [. . .j Many times the girl 'reserves' herselffor the guy she thinks is 
the right guy ... the boys don't .. .1 know an awful lot of boys that were only 
flirting with the girls and had it [sex with them} ... 
Marta - Yeah, just for self-assertion ... 
Maria - ... For haVing experience .. for being experienced and then knowing 
how to do it with their girlfriends ... ". 
"[. . .j Fatima - ] think that in general it's for getting experience .. for 
knOWing how it is [. . .j ... in general] think that the first time of some boys 
is not even with whom they like ... it'sjustfor knowing how it is ... ". 
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This suggests that to find the ideal male partner, one who among other differences 
would not want sex unless it is for love may not be easy. This type of boyfriend would 
be someone who is different from the mainstream men. 
"Dora - Is every boy like that? 
All answer - No ... 
Vera - The majority ... 
Tania - Yeah ... but we find some exceptions [. . .}". 
The idea that 'my man' is essentially different from the majority creates an idealized 
image of boyfriends. The stronger the emotional bond between the girl and her 
boyfriend, the more this image is reinforced. What seems to happen then is that as the 
time passes and the relationship becomes more intimate it gets more and more difficult 
to make objective evaluations about the riskiness/safety of the relationship. The feeling 
seems to be that 'my man is each time more perfect and even if he is not that perfect 
this does not matter because we love each other' . 
The assessment of the risks of sex is recognizably biased by love: "when you love him 
you make the most silly mistakes" . Emotional risks like the risk of being rejected after 
having sex and moral risks like reputation-related risks, for example, have a low 
probability of being realized, for this is what others would do not the one "who likes 
me". Implicitly, it is difficult to question the state of health of a morally correct 'other'. 
So, the risk of sexually transmitted diseases is also 'almost' out of question. 
The imaginary boundary between 'typical' 'others' and the 'different' 'significant male 
other' is fed by discourses of morality that impregnate the messages of sex education, 
particularly those concerning the health-related risks of sex. Biomedical discourse 
strongly suggests that 'risk groups' for HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted 
diseases are constituted by deviant people (Gorna 1996). The 'morally wrong' persons 
are the risk carriers - those who have sex outside steady relationships, who do not take 
care of themselves and do not always use condoms, who have homosexual 
relationships or use injecting drugs. 
For the girls, to whom sex has a great appeal, to survive in such a risky environment it 
is compulsory to look for a man who is outside the boundaries of 'risk groups', one 
who is an exception to the rule. As in a terrain where male nature is believed to be in 
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principle a risk, anything more concrete can guarantee safety (neither scientific 
methods of protection, nor personal strategies). The hope is then that affection might 
bring about a sort of 'subversion' of man's nature, which may mean a promise of 
safety. 
With my analysis of the production of 'risk objects' in the girls' discourses of 
risky/safe sex, I hope to have made clear my point about the connections between the 
girls' interest in 'the knowledge of the other' and 'the care of the self. 
CONCLUSION 
I have reached the conclusion that in the process of developing a personal approach to 
the risks of heterosexual sex the girls are caught up in a cycle of personal projects for 
the 'self. First, under the influence of the dominant discourse of individual 
accountability for personal welfare there is the investment in the production of a 
'careful self. A 'careful self needs to do something to assure protection against the 
risks of sex. The primary means of self-protection is the investment in the knowledge 
of the 'other'. However, to know the 'other' is not sufficient to guarantee safety. On 
the contrary, it is a recognized risky strategy. The need to be 'careful' is then 
reinforced, but not as a way of getting rid of the risks for good. 
The impossibility of guaranteeing a risk-free sexual practice adds another project to the 
'self, one that is more complex than the other ones, but perhaps one that can confer a 
sense of security to the 'self. This project is that of 'self-governance', without which it 
is problematic to think of taking care of the 'self in the risky environment of sexual 
encounters. In such a context to be a 'careful self does not mean to be risk-averse but 
to be able to take control of the risks by choosing which risks to take. And this is (in 
my view, quite accurately) seen by the girls as only achieved by those who are the 
owners of their own life, agents who are free to manage their risk portfolio. 
My conclusion then is that the girls' 'invention' of themselves as 'self-governed' 
beings is a necessity. Without this illusory sense of the 'self it would be complicated 
to 'survive' the awareness that sex always involves some sort of risk, no matter how 
careful one is and, at the same time, to respond to the social demands for self-
protection. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
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The argument of this thesis is that 'risk' is an epistemological construct, an assumption 
that originates in sociological theories of risk. To say that is to assume that risks exist 
only in terms of our knowledge. This is not imply that the dangers of everyday life are 
not real threats, but that danger does not become risk until it comes to be known as 
such. The idea that 'risk' is an epistemological construct leads to further assumptions: 
first, that the 'process of knowing' in which risks become recognized as such involves 
judgmental considerations; second, that this 'process of knowing' is framed by the 
sociocultural environment where what comes to be known as 'risk' is to make sense. 
The knowledge that goes into it is then considered as a by-product of the sociocultural 
interactions of daily life. The attachment of meanings to risk is taken as value-laden, an 
idea that contests the neutrality and objectivity of scientific conceptions of risk and 
argues, instead, that conceptions of risk, either produced in scientific settings or not, 
are subjective 'ways of seeing' it. 
Influenced by such ideas, I designed a research topic to investigate the ways by which a 
group of Brazilian adolescent women see the risk of HIV infection in heterosexual 
relationships. Adolescent women's accounts of risk have usually been absent in health 
promotion's theories about adolescents' risk-taking. Health promotion has privileged 
biomedical perspectives in theorizing about the way adolescent women see the specific 
HIV/AIDS risk. Health promotion's empirical approach to the subject has often looked 
for data about the (ir)rationality of risky sexual behaviour, with an interest in the 
evaluation of what is wrong in adolescent women's ways of thinking that make them 
decide to take risks. My intention, however, was not to use data to judge if the girls' 
risk perceptions were correct or not. My research was exploratory rather than 
evaluative. It was an attempt to study the 'HIV/AIDS sexual risk' from the perspective 
of its subjects, in my case here from the perspective of adolescent women, thus 
expanding our understandings of the meanings of sexual risks in general, and 
HIV/AIDS risk in particular. As some sociologists have suggested, if we are to 
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understand people's responses to risk, we need to look at what they mean by 'risk' in 
the specific contexts where 'risk' makes sense to them. 
The research question became defined as: "how do adolescent women see the personal 
risk of catching HIV I AIDS in heterosexual relationships?", followed by the sub-
questions "what are their views?", "how are those views constructed", and "what are 
the implications of the research findings for health promotion?". Because most of the 
health promotion theories about the way adolescents approach the 'HIV/AIDS sexual 
risk' have drawn on empirical research about their responses to the message of 'safe 
sex', I decided to use the same focus to explore the girls' ways of seeing' HIV/AIDS 
sexual risk. I consider 'safe sex' and 'risky sex' as expressions that are now in common 
use amongst lay people when they talk about' HIV I AIDS sexual risk' . 
The main method of data collection was focus groups. While the focus group technique 
is not new in the context of social science empirical research I have worked with an 
innovative approach. The use of what I have called 'integrating activities' to enhance 
group integration facilitated a great deal the exploration of what risk and sexual risk 
meant to the girls. The qualitative analysis of the data was carried out in two parts; the 
first explored accounts of risk in its broader context (in the form of everyday risks) 
while the second looked at accounts of risk as applied to heterosexual relationships. 
In this thesis we have expanded our knowledge about adolescent women's approaches 
to risk. We have learned, for example, that while the notion of risk can be applied to 
different contexts, risk meanings follow a basic pattern. For instance, whatever the risk 
context, the girls with whom I talked usually employed the word 'risk' in the sense of 
an uncertain danger that mayor may not be realized in the future. Probability 
estimations were added to the meanings of danger to transform 'danger' into 'risk'. 
Risk assessments were carried out on the grounds of a sort of pragmatic rationality, a 
subjective and situated way of reasoning constructed in accordance with the knowledge 
and values learned in life experiences. This way of reasoning proved to be quite 
different from the universal and abstract rationality used by health promotion's risk 
theorists when they make their risk calculations or interpret the risk estimations 
undertaken by lay people (Guizzardi, Stella, and Remy 1997). This immediately led to 
the conclusion that the girls' approach to risk is extrapolated from traditional technical 
interpretations of adolescent women's risk-taking. The girls' discourses of risk were 
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produced in reference to a given knowledge background and set of values, which 
strongly suggested that research and theories on adolescent women's approach to 'risk' 
should consider 'risk' as an epistemological construct and that more attention should 
be given to its social and cultural meanings. 
According to my analysis, the girls' views, beliefs and knowledge of the world they 
live in constitute the raw material upon which conceptions of risk are constructed. Risk 
meanings are produced at the interface between the girls and the sociocultural context 
where they experience their daily life. The knowledge background that each girl uses to 
make sense of risk appears to have a common basis - the same ordinary social 
knowledge used to make sense of the other constitutive elements of private and public 
life. However, this does not mean that every risk is understood via the same 
combination of knowledge, nor that different risks are interpreted through different 
knowledge. To make sense of a given risk seems to imply choosing, amongst the 
available knowledge, the background upon which the risk in question is going to be 
understood. This choice is value-laden. The data analysis has suggested that distinct 
individual combinations of knowledge and personal values informed different 
positions with regard to the same risk. 
We have also learned from this thesis that for the girls to talk of risk inevitably meant 
to talk of 'self. Discourses of risk seemed to imply an obligation to make the 'self 
visible, or better, of making its positions explicit. So another conclusion with regard to 
the knowledge that goes into conceptions of risk is that of the knowledge of 'self. 
'Who is the 'self?' and 'what are the projects of 'self?" were questions whose 
answers came to be intertwined with risk meanings. 
In the girls' accounts of the specific risks of sex, to be 'at risk' or 'safe' was reported 
more as a matter of the individual ability to assess the risks accurately and to act 
accordingly than in relation to the use of external means of protection like condoms. 
To make sense of risky/safe sex was a reflexive exercise that included self-inspection, 
self-problematization and self-monitoring. The data analysed in Chapter 5 has 
indicated that risky/safe sex meanings are produced as representations of 'self. It 
seemed that they are used as expressions of 'risky' and 'safe' identities. This suggests 
that the scientific definition of 'risk' as something that is located within the 'self 
(Ogden 1995), a form of thinking usually employed by health promoters in their 
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theories on HIV/AIDS risk, also underpins the girls' 'ways of seeing' the risks of sex. 
Two conclusions have emerged from this. Firstly, this is an indication of the influence 
of health promotion's discourses on risk on the identity work that seems to be in place 
when the girls make sense of risky/safe sex. Secondly, it suggests that the 
individualistic approach to risk adopted by health promoters also orients the girls' 
understandings of risky/safe sex. The girls' individualistic approach to risky/safe sex 
was clearly emphasized in the data analysed in Chapter 4. Their discourses were 
focused on 'risk' and 'safety' as personal choices, implying a focus on self-governance. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, this association between risk and choice has also been 
especially important for the production of risk discourses in the terrain of health 
promotion. 
Another similarity also shown in the analysis was that the girls perceived the 
boundaries between 'risk' and 'safety' in heterosexual relationships as predictable. 
However, similarly to health promoters, they also talked about such predictions as 
uncertain and revisable. In the girls' talk, 'risk' did not refer to an absolute state of 
affairs. Depending on the circumstances, the same situation could represent 'risk' or 
'safety'. The data analysis has shown that conceptions of risky/safe sex were 
ambiguous, unstable, contingent upon a given time and space, and frequently 
contradictory . 
In the analytical chapters I have developed the notion of the 'risk portfolio', through 
which I have argued that for the girls 'risk' was not a monolithic entity, but part of a 
system of interrelated dangers. I have also made the point about the importance of this 
notion of the 'risk portfolio' for the understanding of the girls' ways of assessing 
sexual risks. Given the contextual and judgmental frame of risk meanings, 'risk' could 
never be thought of in isolation from the many other matters that were also part of the 
risk context. This implied the need to see sexual risks and HIV / AIDS in reference to an 
array of other risks that were equally perceived as possible hazardous outcomes of 
heterosexual relationships. In exploring the girls' specific accounts of risky/safe sex I 
have concluded that sexual risks constitute a veritable web of risks - a risk portfolio -, a 
system of interconnected elements each holding a relative significance within the 
system. HIV / AIDS is considered as just one of the many risks that adolescent women 
generally face in sexual encounters. For example, the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS in 
214 
a sexual encounter also carries with it risks of reputation and self-esteem, and other 
things that may be seen as more important than the HIV/AIDS threat itself. Actually, 
for the girls, the HIV / AIDS sexual risk does not have a special importance, as, 
allegedly, it can be more efficiently controlled than other risks. The girls also fear other 
sexual risks, like the risk of being (ab)used by the boy/man with whom they slept or the 
risk of having sex with somebody who lied about his sentiments and just wanted sex 
for pleasure. 
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 has indicated that the monolithic notion of 
risky/safe sex conceptualized by health promotion as representing a single health 
hazard had limited space in the girls' discourses about risky/safe sex. It existed only as 
an abstract entity, which was made concrete when it became personal, that is, when the 
'self became involved in its definition. As soon as personal experiences, beliefs, 
points of view, values started to be articulated to produce a personal approach to it; the 
health meanings that risky/safe sex encapsulates became just one more meaning 
amongst a variety of other relevant meanings. This is an indication that the sole focus 
of AIDS education on disease prevention needs to be reformulated, for HIV / AIDS risk 
does not mean only a health hazard. 
We have learned that in the process of making sense of risky/safe sex the girls 
personalized the risks. This is strikingly similar to the way in which health promoters 
theorize risky/safe sex (Scott and Freeman 1995). In AIDS discourses, the risk is not 
the HIV virus, but the 'self whose personal characteristics may result in an incapacity 
to control behaviour. The 'process of personalization' means the understanding of 
'risk/safety' as belonging to a specific person, something attached to identity. This has 
indicated that the identity work that was attached to the process of making sense of 
risky/safe sex was not restricted to self-identity, but also to the production of 
representations of others' identities. The data has shown that 'risky sex' was usually 
referred to as 'sex with a stranger other', although it could secondarily also mean 'sex 
without the protection of a condom'. 
We have learned that personalization of risky/safe sex constituted the informational 
basis of sexual risk assessment, knowledge about 'risk subjects' (the potential victims) 
and 'risk objects' (the potential threats) being its specific substantive material. The 
identities of 'sexual risk subjects' and 'sexual risk objects' were discursively produced. 
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That is, they were shaped in the girls' discourses about risky/safe sex, which were 
themselves constituted by a combination of other discursive elements. While a variety 
of discourses was involved in defining 'risk subjects' and 'risk objects', the discourse 
on self-governance seemed to be especially influential. The production of the 'sexual 
risk subject' figure was an outcome of personal investments in "the care of the self' 
(Foucault 1984, p.47), whereas the production of the 'risk object' was the result of an 
interest in the 'knowledge of the other'. This desire to care for the 'self by knowing 
the 'other' denotes the extent to which social knowledge, particularly as understood in 
neo-liberal discourses and messages of health promotion, influences the girls' approach 
to the risks of sex. 
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 has suggested that, as opposed to what health 
promoters have been saying about adolescent women, the girls are neither ignorant, nor 
naIve about the risks of heterosexual relationships. The girls have also shown that they 
are not naIve, nor ignorant about their responsibility in the management of those risks. 
Although they may resist accepting that they need to practice what AIDS experts have 
called 'safer sex', they generally agree that 'girls' are 'sexual risk subjects'. So, they 
accept the need to take precautions. While stereotypical representations of adolescents 
have affirmed their 'universal' sense of invulnerability, my conclusion is that the girls 
whom I talked to do not perceive themselves as invulnerable to the risks of sex, 
including HIV infection. And it is exactly because they accept their 'risk position' that 
they do the best they can to control their vulnerability. Without perceiving themselves 
as 'at risk' it would make no sense to invest in 'the care ofthe self. 
It is part of AIDS education messages that, in theory, everyone is a 'risk' and 'at risk', 
but that certain persons are more 'risky' and 'at risk' than others. AIDS education also 
teaches that it is up to the individual to manage the risks. 'More knowledge' is 
recommended to reduce the risks. This 'more knowledge recipe' is what risk experts 
themselves use to minimize the effects of doubt when assessing risks. Knowledge 
should reduce uncertainties, hence risks. Health promotion generally assumes that the 
more knowledge we have, the more we are able to see and assess the risks we are 
exposed to and that this is sufficient for us to be able to make safer choices concerning 
the direction of our private lives. It seems that the girls follow the same logic when 
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they seek to know the 'other' in order to assess the risks of sex and take the necessary 
measures to assure security. 
Misled by the liberal discourses on rational autonomy and health promotion's 
assumption of everyone's (respons)ability to make safer choices, the girls seem to be 
naIve. Apparently they assume that knowledge leads to safer choices (Guizzardi, Stella, 
and Remy 1997). This logic, also employed by health promoters, does not take into 
account the social factors that constrain choices (Gabe 1995; Lupton 1995a; Petersen 
and Lupton 1996), nor the impossibility of totally safe positions in circumstances of 
high-modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 1996). 
The girls' theories about adolescent women's sexual risk-taking portray the latter as 
free agents, a very problematic position if we take into account the power imbalance 
inherent in heterosexual relationships (Holland et al. 1998). To the girls, adolescent 
women not only know the risks but are also able to protect the 'self' if they so wish. In 
general, when they expose the 'self' to a given sexual risk, it is because they calculate 
the costs and benefits of their action, in terms of all the risks involved and of those 
which are less costly, and then choose to take one risk and not the other. Although 
there are some mismatches in the girls' and health promoters' theories of adolescent 
women's sexual risk-taking, like the girls' affirmation that they have sufficient 
knowledge about the risks and strategies of protection and the health promoter's 
insistence that they need more knowledge, the core of both theories remains the same. 
The choice discourse, the presumption of everyone's equal power to act according to 
their will and the simplistic view of behaviour as an individual matter are some of the 
ideologies that seem to underpin both approaches. 
The data analysis made clear that by being socially constructed, the girls' conceptions 
of risky/safe sex are impregnated with the social ideologies that organize their 
everyday life. It also showed that the idea of the individual accountability for personal 
welfare, one of the most pervasive forms of governance to which the modem 'self' has 
been subjected, plays a very important role in the girls' approach to the risks of sex. It 
offers the girls the desired position of autonomy, a position that is apparently 
welcomed by all the social institutions - family, school, health organizations, legal 
systems, political corporations. By taking up subject positions within discourses of 
self-governance, the girls end up by recognizing themselves to be the mentors of their 
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own fate, which suggests a sort of alliance between their personal projects and the 
institutional projects of contemporary neo-liberal regimes (Rose 1989). 
But if on the one hand the way the girls see the risks of sex demonstrates that they are 
trying hard to produce their 'selves' as self-governed individuals, knowing what 
everyone else 'needs' to do to be a good citizen, on the other, there are other projects 
for the 'self. The girls also want to be 'feminine girls', an imperative for those who 
wish to have heterosexual sex experiences. Knowledge about what it means to be 
'feminine' is obviously part of the knowledge background the girls mobilize to make 
sense of risky/safe sex. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the girls' attempts to associate 
knowledge learned from public discourses of risk to gender knowledge creates a 
paradox. The limited menu of options posed by gender discourses contradicts the focus 
on autonomy that is at the core of public discourses of risk. 
The girls' accounts have shown very clearly that health promotion's discourse of 
'autonomous choice' in circumstances where the options are very limited, or even null, 
is problematic. The problem is that the subject positions made available to the girls in 
public discourses of risk conflict with those available in gender discourses. In practice, 
agency is commonly not at hand when the girls need to negotiate personal sexual safety 
(see also Holland et al. 1998). The girls were rarely able to recognize that. Strikingly, 
their conversations provided many examples of a shared knowledge about the 
dynamics of gender relations and its inherent imbalance of power. When talking about 
their personal relations with men, the girls made explicit their complaints about 
women's disadvantages in relation to men but, contradictorily, they never gave up 
portraying themselves as autonomous individuals on matters of sexual risk protection. 
We have seen that, as far as the messages of health promotion are concerned, the girls 
are very good learners (although they seem to use health promotion knowledge in a 
way that is not expected by health promoters). This contradicts the alleged inefficiency 
of health promotion, often pointed out as the reason for its failure in promoting 
behavioural change and the adoption of safer sex practices. It is my conclusion that the 
girls have assimilated not only the substance of health promotion, but also its form. 
The conclusion that a project of self-government is key to the way the girls make sense 
of risky/safe sex indicates that among a number of different types of knowledge that go 
into definitions of risk, the knowledge taught by health promotion is perhaps the most 
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influential. That is to do, I think, with the emphasis on choice that appears in a very 
explicit way in health promotion's discourses of risk. My idea is that for the girls it is 
very tempting to recognize the 'self as an agent as 'agency' is a moral value in high-
modem societies. It represents an ideal of citizenship. 
Health promotion's discourses on risk present girls (and nearly everybody else) as 
agents. Such positions determine symbolic spaces for 'good citizens'; citizens that are 
able to fulfill their moral obligations with regard to personal protection against risks. 
Obviously, when confronting events where agentic potentials are to be used, like the 
risk situations posed by heterosexual relationships, the girls face difficulties in putting 
into practice the power and autonomy that they were told to use. Even so, whenever 
possible, the girls insist that they have the power to choose what they want to do and if 
they want to expose themselves to risk or not. This shows that, at least at a discursive 
level, they are determined to keep the illusory identity of self-governed girls. 
To adjust its discourses to adolescent women's 'real' experiences of sexual risk 
management, health promotion needs to consider the meanings attached to sexual risk 
via other types of learning processes that are experienced in daily life, which for sure 
transgresses the boundaries of health promotion. Health promoters have to abandon the 
arrogant idea that 'risk' is a property of science, that 'health risk' and HIV / AIDS risk 
can only be definable with reference to health parameters and that 'risky sex' is a 
category that encapsulates only health meanings. Health promoters have to recognize 
that, in a society where everything is risky, adolescent woman are made 'risk subjects' 
in a variety of other ways, and that given the reflexive management of the 'self, it is 
their duty to know all the risk possibilities. 
We can see that although the girls demonstrate that they are very good learners of 
health promotion's lessons, they continue to risk their lives by having sex without the 
protection of condoms. The need to use condoms is the logic followed by health 
promoters. For the girls, however, the logic is different. They see themselves as 
investing in self-protection as they are trying hard to make informed decisions 
concerning their sexual life. To know the 'other' is used as a substitute for condom use. 
This strategy is seen as one that 'saves' many risks. The girls do not need to risk their 
relationships, as boys usually do not like condoms; they also do not need to risk their 
reputation because to ask a boy to use a condom may be interpreted as a girl's fear of 
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passing the HIV virus to her partner, and they also do not need to risk being caught 
buying or carrying a condom which would ruin their image of a 'passive sexual being'. 
For the girls, the best option seemed to be to take care of the self 'privately', that is 
without external interference, a strategy that they themselves recognize as carrying its 
own risks. 
My conclusion is that to be able to make a difference in terms of adolescent women's 
protection against the risks of sex health promotion needs first to redefine the problem 
of sexual risk-taking; working with discourses and practices that acknowledge the 
epistemological nature of sexual risk behaviour and its special dependency on gender 
ideologies. This redefinition would result from a shifting approach. In the health 
promotion that I imagine, quantitative risk estimations would be accompanied by 
'qualitative risk assessment', an operation that would be focused on the meanings and 
value of the risks for its subjects. Risk discourses produced by this 'new' health 
promotion would not teach 'choice lessons' without talking about the options 
available. Also, they would not invest in women's empowerment as a means to 
promote individual assertiveness, but in empowerment as a political action, whose 
target would be to challenge dominant masculinity (Holland et al. 1994a). Considering 
that 'risky sex' is not only a sexual relationship that carries the risk of infecting sexual 
partners with HIV, health promotion should also amplify its focus and target sexual 
risks as a category of risks that includes associated hazards. To promote adolescent 
women's protection against a given risk of sex would then also imply to deal with the 
other threats feared by them. 
As for the specific case of the work of health promotion to promote adolescent 
women's (and indeed every women's) ability to protect themselves against the 
HIV/AIDS sexual risk, I suggest with Tamsin Wilton (1997) that this would require an 
investment in the monumental task of changing the world. And the first step would be 
to understand the influence of gender on adolescent women's sexual risk-taking. As 
Wilton (1997) points out, to promote health in the context of safer sex or "to make the 
healthiest choice the easier choice demands no less than the absolute eradication of the 
institution of male supremacy"(p. 52). With that we could perhaps dream of producing 
discourses on risk compatible with ideals of autonomy, where there would be 
legitimate agentic positions available to women whatever their age. 
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Although my research illuminates in various ways how adolescent women approach 
the risks of sex and HIV / AIDS risk, there are still many gaps in our understandings of 
their theories of and responses to risky/safe sex. For instance, it would be worthwhile 
to explore more carefully the influence of the values and meanings of love in their 
conceptions of risky/safe sex. While I chose to explore the emphasis placed on 'self-
governance', 'love' also appeared to be an important theme in discourses about 
risky/safe sex. Given the limited space of the thesis, I also could not give enough 
attention to the importance of gender issues to the attachment of meanings to risk and 
safety as applied to sex. Thus, this could be another focus of more research in the field. 
My research was limited to a small group of girls whose views were investigated in a 
given period of time. Their views may have changed since then, for as I show in this 
thesis, risk perceptions are dynamically produced. My part in the research process as 
the researcher and the interpreter has to be taken into account in making sense of the 
data that I have analysed here. Generalizations can only be cautious both because of the 
small-scale nature of the research and the contextual nature of 'risk' and ofthe research 
process. My thesis does not propose any universal 'way of seeing' HIV / AIDS and the 
other risks of sex; rather, I am arguing for a contextualization of health education, 
which addresses material, ideological and cultural conditions rather than just 
individuals. The commonalities found in the girls' discourses suggest that the results 
are not unique and idiosyncratic to specific individuals, but more commonly available. 
My research suggests that if we are to develop a good understanding of responses to 
HIV / AIDS sexual risk, more research about the way members of other groups see 
risky/safe sex is needed. In the particular case of adolescents, there is an incredible lack 
of knowledge about boys' approach to the risks of sex in general and HIV / AIDS sexual 
risk in particular. In the face of the increasing rates of HIV infection amongst 
heterosexual young adults, I take the matter as something that has to be urgently 
investigated, along with further research about girls' approaches. 
My work has pointed out a number of relevant elements that adolescent women take 
into account in the process of assessing the risks of sex. Many of those elements were 
so far unknown in the field of health promotion. My thesis shows how simplistic the 
current theories of health promotion about girls' sexual risk-taking are. By 
deconstructing the many layers of 'risky sex' it provides important information about 
221 
how and where the risk meanings used in conceptions of 'risky sex' are produced. 
Health promoters can use this information to criticize their own discourses, while 
realizing that much of what girls think about the risks of sex is the product of the work 
of health promoters, and that much of what girls do to protect themselves against the 
risks of sex is not more, nor less, than what they can do in the disadvantaged 
circumstances which health promoters do nothing to change. 
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APPENDIX I 
DISTRIBUTION OF AIDS CASES IN BRAZIL FROM 1983 TO 1998 
Distribution of AIDS cases according to the year of diagnosis and gender 
AIDS case ma le-to-female ra ti o according to the yea r of diagnosis 
So urce : Bras il , M inisteri o da Saude (2000) 
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WEEK 1 
APPENDIX II 
FOCUS GROUPS PLAN 
1- Presenting the Research Process - 15 min. 
2- 'Knowing each other' - 20 min. 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
4- 'Negotiating the Rules' (The deal) - 50 min. 
WEEK 2 
1- 'Remembering the Rules' (Time for Changes) - 10 min. 
2- Integrating Activity - Cards Game - 25 min 
(1) Proposed Topic: "Everyday Risks" 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
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4- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 3 
1- Integrating Activity - 'Adolescents' Love Affairs' (role-play) - 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Male and Female Behavior in Love Affairs' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
2- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
3- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 4 
1- Integrating Activity - 'If I Were You ... ' (Problem Solving Fishbowl)- 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'The Pleasures and Dangers of Love Affairs: differences 
between girls and boys' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
2- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
3- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEKS 
1- Remembering the Deal - 5 min. 
2- Integrating Activity - ' The Simulation of a Judgment' - 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'The Pros and Cons of Male and Female Sexual Activity 
During Adolescence' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
4- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 6 
1- Integrating Activity - ' I Remember that ... ' 
a) writing up a story - 20 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Sexual Relationship: a risky experience' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
b) reporting the story- 15 min. 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
4- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min 
WEEK 7 
1- Integrating Activity - a) Report 1- 20 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: ' What Does It Mean To Make Safer Sex?' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
b) Reporting Interviews - 15 min. 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
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4- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 8 
1- Integrating Activity - a) Report II - 20 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'In Your Opinion What Are Adolescents' Worries When 
Having Sex?' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
b) Reporting Interviews - 15 min. 
3- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
4- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 9 
1- Integrating Activity - Role-play - 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Love Is Trusting In The Other. Love Is Taking Risks' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
2- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
3- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 10 
1- Integrating Activity - Letters from Women Seeking Advice I - 15 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Girls' Doubts Concerning AIDS Risk Via Sex' 
- Letters From Women Seeking Advice II - 15 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Adult Women's Doubts Concerning AIDS Risk Via Sex' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
2- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
3- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 11 
1- Integrating Activity - Role-play - 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'What? To Ask My Boyfriend to Use Condom?' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
2- Interval (snacks) - 20 min. 
3- Group Discussion (discussing and generating topics for next discussions) - 50 min. 
WEEK 12 
1- Integrating Activity - Cartoon- 35 min. 
(1) Proposed Topic: 'Male And Female Reaction To The Safer Sex Initiative' 
(2) A Topic Generated in Past Discussions 
3- Group Discussion - 40 min. 
4- Impressions about the Personal Participation in the Focus Group Sessions - 40 min. 
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